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This paper considers the requirements of “adequate protection” of transborder data 
flows in the European Union.  
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The text of this paper (excluding abstract, table of contents, footnotes and 
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Data processing is driving an information explosion, redefining how we interact in 
a progressively connected world.  
However the rapid, volatile evolution of the online environment is causing tensions 
in the law. Issues have escalated with the emergence of Big Data, cloud computing, 
social networking and mass surveillance.  
The ability to process data internationally has taken on profound cultural and social 
significance. We increasingly use data to speak, socialise, organise and do business- 
how should the law respond? 
The Council of Europe, Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
and United Nations were first to develop legal instruments for regulating data 
processing however it was the European Union (EU) which was initially the most 
successful,1 with the Data Protection Directive (95/46/EC) (the Directive).2  
These instruments were developed when international data flows were exceptional 
and mostly concerned technical rather than personal data.3 However the structure 
of the internet is no longer point to point transmissions within a country but 
international transfers of personal data through reticular networks.  
This thesis will examine the Directive’s attempt to regulate these international 
transfers in the EU context. The examination is an intricate exercise in legal 
pluralism. A multiplicity of distinct normative systems interact- public law, human 
rights law, economic regulation, privacy law, international law, regional agreements 
and national security law all compete for primacy in a shifting legal landscape.4  
                                                        
1 Lee Bygrave Data Protection Law: An International Perspective (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2014) at 53.  
2 Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection of Individuals with Regard to the Processing of Personal 
Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data [1995] OJ L281/31. 
3 Christopher Kuner Transborder Data Flows and Data Privacy Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2013) at 158. 
4 Bygrave, above n 1, at 22.  
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Areas of current debate include: how to determine the applicable law when data 
flows between countries; how national security interests should be balanced with 
privacy; whether “data havens” can be used to circumvent the law; how economic 
goals should be balanced with privacy; whether market based solutions protect 
privacy better than legal regulation; and how technology can be used to protect 
privacy by design and default.  
These concerns are without obvious answers and caused considerable debate as the 
Directive was negotiated. As a consequence of the legal and political compromises 
made the Directive is regrettably but necessarily nebulous.5 The core tension is 
revealed in its dual purposes- to protect the right to privacy and to promote the 
internal market of the EU through the free flow of data.6 These purposes can tug in 
opposite directions.  
The EU regulation of transborder flows- personal data being processed outside the 
European Economic Area- is of central importance as there is concern these flows 
could circumvent the Directive’s protections.  
“Adequacy” is the legal tool used to mitigate these concerns and protect the personal 
data flows. Under the Directive, Member States can transfer personal data to 
countries outside the European Economic Area only if the recipient country ensures 
an adequate level of protection of personal data (emphasis added). Unearthing and 
giving clarity to this complex legal standard provides the centre of mass of this 
thesis.  
The United States was held to provide adequate protection through a scheme called 
the Safe Harbour. However in the recent Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner7 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) found the Safe Harbour invalid, drawing on 
Edward Snowden’s revelations of mass surveillance by the United States National 
Security Agency (NSA).  
                                                        
5 Bygrave, above n 1, at 56.  
6 Article 1.  
7 Case C-362/14 Schrems v Data Protection Commissioner (CJEU 6 October 2015) [Schrems]. 
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This has pushed adequacy into a bubbling discourse about the right to privacy in a 
technological world and the limits of legislating in the interests of national security. 
It is to this discourse I seek to contribute.  
Adequacy provides a locus for discussion as it hosts a considerable clutter of legal, 
political and economic disagreements. The analysis required occasions a broad 
perspective with economic and political components kept firmly in mind. The 
surface structure of adequacy is expressed in the law however a deeper 
understanding of its weaknesses and future requires a sharp analysis of economic 
and political forces. 
First I will examine adequacy’s statutory meaning. Then I will examine how its 
meaning was shaped by the Safe Harbour and Schrems. Finally I will examine how 
the meaning is shaped by the new General Data Protection Regulation8 (Regulation) 
before looking at what the future of adequacy might entail. My research question is 









                                                        
8 Regulation 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of 




II LITERATURE REVIEW 
To contextualise and untangle the uncertainties surrounding adequacy this 
literature review will canvass the broad legal, economic and political landscape of 
the legal standard.  
A How is Privacy Conceptualised in Europe and the United States? 
The portability of data have precipitated a privacy culture collision between the 
United States and Europe.9 In order to understand why the data protection 
approaches are clashing in the context of transborder data flows this section will 
examine the privacy cultures in the two regions. 
Notoriously slippery, the concept of privacy resists definition and as Professor 
Judith Thomson notes, “nobody seems to have any clear idea of what it is.”10 Adding 
to the uncertainty are the distinctive cultural particularities of what should be kept 
private and what deserves protection. To highlight this with jarring vulgarity 
anthropologists point to societies where public defecation does not offend local 
privacy norms.11 This shows the difficulty of using intuitionist arguments when 
defending privacy. Everyone has their own anxieties about privacy invasions 
however to a large extent they are a product of the social and legal values of the 
societies we participate in.12 
Privacy has been employed to protect a multitude of interests, from the rights of 
women, homosexuals, the use of contraceptives and the right to view pornography. 
However no coherent definition has materialised and some commentators argue it 
never will.13  
                                                        
9 Michelle Frasher ”Adequacy Versus Equivalency: Financial Data Protection and the US-EU Divide” 
(2013) 56 Business Horizons 787 at 788.  
10 Judith Thomson “The Right to Privacy” in Ferdinand Schoeman Philosophical Dimensions of 
Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) 272 at 286.  
11 Alan Westin “The Origins of Modern Claims to Privacy” in Ferdinand Schoeman Philosophical 
Dimensions of Privacy: An Anthology (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984) 62 at 63.  
12 James Whitman “Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity versus Liberty” (2004) 113 Yale Law 
Journal 1151 at 1160. 
13 Raymond Wacks Privacy and Media Freedom (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013) at 19. 
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One author has caricatured the tension between the European and American 
approaches as coming from two foundational world views captured by Goethe and 
Jefferson. For Goethe, representing the European position, the development of 
“personality” was the “greatest blessing.” For Jefferson, representing the United 
States, the foundation of a free society lay in press liberty.14  Of course there are still 
threads of the European dignity approach in the United States- a relative 
comparison of the two cultures is required rather than a false dichotomy of dignity 
or liberty.15 
Nevertheless significant divergence exists in both the theory and practice of privacy 
law in the two regions. To many Europeans the American law of credit reporting 
seems most offensive- surely the full credit history of someone who has never 
defaulted should be protected from invasive rummaging.16 Alternatively public 
nudity, offensive to many Americans who treat genitals as “privates” in the full 
sense, is acceptable in Europe as the exposed controls the decision to reveal.17 These 
different beliefs about privacy are clashing in the ideological battle of international 
data transfer but they have clashed before, such as in the context of discovery.18  
1 Privacy in Europe 
The European attitude to privacy is that it protects a “right of personality.”19 
European privacy treats the right to respect and personal dignity as the values of 
supreme importance. Control over the information disclosed about oneself, called 
informational self-determination, is at the core of the right. It is a human right to 
control one’s image, name and reputation.20 The media is seen as a prime enemy 
                                                        
14 Whitman, above n 12, at 1198. 
15 See Lawrence v Texas 539 US 558 (2003) where Justice Kennedy tried to ground his opinion in 
dignity as well as the traditional American ideal of liberty. See also the influential and often cited 
American article, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis ”The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4 Harv Law Rev 
193, where Warren and Brandeis saw the media as the threat to privacy, and argued for all citizens 
to be protected from undesirable and undesired publicity. 
16 Whitman, above n 12, at 1156. 
17 Whitman, above n 12, at 1162. 
18 David Gerber “International Discovery After Aerospatiale: The Quest for an Analytical 
Framework” (1988) 82 AJIL 521. 
19 Wacks, above n 13, at 64. 
20 Whitman, above n 12, at 1160. 
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with the ability to disperse information causing embarrassment, threatening dignity 
on the public stage.  
Commentators such as Robert Kagan have popularised European dignity 
conceptions of privacy as a response to fascist oppression leading up to, and during, 
World War II. 21 Certainly international human rights law, such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)22 and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR),23 were largely a response to World War horrors- and 
international human rights law is crucially linked with data protection law in 
Europe.24  
However Professor James Whitman provides a longer term view of privacy 
protecting dignity. He argues it developed from a slow agitation against exclusive 
hierarchical dignity on the continent. In the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries 
the right to respect was available in court only to high status individuals in Europe, 
particularly through the laws of duelling where high status individuals could defend 
their honour in a duel. Additionally the punishments for low status offenders, from 
a comparative point of view, lacked dignity. A low status offender would be hung 
rather than beheaded, or detained in a penal colony rather than in an apartment.25 
The social norm that everyone should be entitled to dignity, regardless of social 
standing, slowly pushed the status protections reserved for the ruling classes to 
provide “privacy” for all. This social transformation brought dignity and status 
protections not only to the poorer classes and minorities, but even to prison 
inmates.26 
Early data protection legislation occurred at the national level rather than the 
supranational level in Europe, with Germany, Sweden, Austria, Denmark, France and 
                                                        
21 See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (Alfred A 
Knopf, New York, 2003).  
22 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ETS 5 
(signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953) [ECHR].  
23 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 999 UNTS 171 (signed 16 December 1966, 
entered into force 23 March 1976) [ICCPR]. 
24 See Directive, art 1(1), which seeks to strengthen normative links between data protection and 
fundamental rights, see also Schrems. 
25 Whitman, above n 12, at 1167. 
26 At 1166. 
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Norway being the first countries, in order, to enact data protection statutes.27 They 
focused on implementing Fair Information Practices which defined core obligations 
for personal data processing. However it is the international agreements achieved, 
rather than complementary national legislation, which has given European data 
protection law its international prominence.  
2 Privacy in the United States  
Privacy law in the United States germinated from hostility towards media and a deep 
suspicion of the state and public officials. Rather than protecting dignity, privacy in 
the United States concerns liberty and freedom from state intervention, particularly 
in the sanctity of the home. Whitman sees American anxieties about privacy to be 
primarily concerned with protecting a private sovereignty within the family 
household.28 These anxieties are not exclusive to the United States however, with 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (the Charter)29 and the 
ICCPR also protecting the home from unlawful interference.30  
The United States Constitution does not have a specific privacy provision however 
the Supreme Court has found a right to privacy exists within the Bill of Rights. A host 
of heated political issues have been dealt with as privacy matters. For example 
abortion was conceived as a privacy issue in Roe vs Wade,31 as was homosexuality 
in Lawrence v Texas.32 Whilst some argue the flexibility of privacy to encompass such 
issues is a strength, others such as Professor Raymond Wacks express disquiet that 
it is an overstretching and weakening of privacy law.33 Certainly the Constitution 
cuts in both directions. For example the First Amendment can support privacy 
                                                        
27 Paul Schwartz “The EU-U.S. Privacy Collision: A Turn to Institutions and Procedures” (2013) 126 
Harv Law Rev 1966 at 1969. 
28 Whitman, above n 12, at 1160. 
29 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union [2012] OJ C326/391 art 7 [Charter]. 
30 ICCPR art 17, see also Entick v Carrington [1765] EWHC KB J98 for a common law defence of the 
home.  
31 Roe v Wade 410 US 113 (1973). 
32 Lawrence v Texas, 539 US 558. 
33 Wacks, above n 13, at 4.  
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through protection of freedom of association however it can also hinder privacy 
through asserting the right to freedom of speech.34  
Crucially privacy in the United States, whilst weak when in conflict with the freedom 
of the press, has enjoyed strength in the context of police or state violations. Once 
violations involve state actors there seems to be greater judicial willingness to find 
in favour of the plaintiffs- Whitman argues if an issue can be analogised with a state 
invasion into the home, a privacy violation is particularly likely to be found.35 There 
is a possibility the home invasion metaphor could be mobilised to cover mass 
surveillance of transborder data flows, perhaps catalysing American enthusiasm for 
stronger data protection.  
However Professor Stephen Schnably argues the ideal of privacy as resisting state 
power is a chimera. Rather than seeing the state as the opposition and looking to 
strengthen privacy protections against the state, he argues a better focus would be 
how privacy could be protected by the power of the state.36 This could provide a 
well-resourced counter to the growing privacy invading ability of private economic 
actors. However Snowden’s revelations reduced the credibility of leading western 
states- they were shown to engage in obscurantism and obfuscation regarding the 
extent of their surveillance. The lack of credibility the United States has when 
discussing data protection would appear to be a significant hurdle to achieving 
Schnably’s ideal.  
The United States also has an individual responsibility narrative. Users are expected 
to protect their own privacy interests in a relatively deregulated environment. This 
belief resonates with the self-help culture in which Americans are supposed to look 
out for themselves. For example Professor Fred Cate believes the most effective way 
of protecting privacy is through individual responsibility rather than regulation.37 
However this position suffers from the heterogeneous nature of internet users- 
there is a considerable diversity in the sophistication and privacy awareness of 
                                                        
34 Schwartz, above n 27, at 1976. 
35 Whitman, above n 12, at 1215 
36 Stephen Schnably “Beyond Griswold: Foucauldian and Republican Approaches to Privacy” (1989) 
102 Harv Law Rev 737 at 739.  
37 Fred Cate Privacy in the Information Age (Brookings Institute, Washington, 1997) at 131. 
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users. It is difficult to expect all the unsophisticated young internet users in the 
United States to protect their privacy online, particularly when to participate in 
popular culture they may feel coerced into using a wide range of online services all 
with different privacy protections.  
B What Purposes do Data Protection Law and Transborder Flows 
Serve? 
Data protection law generally and transborder data flows specifically serve a 
multitude of purposes- which often conflict. For simplicity the purposes have been 
organised under three areas: privacy; politics; and economics. This is necessarily 
reductionist with some topics, such as fundamental rights, clearly including 
elements from more than one area.  
1 Privacy 
From a humanistic perspective data protection law and transborder data flow 
protections typically seek to protect the right to privacy. For example the Council of 
Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data (the Convention) aims to secure for individuals “respect 
for his rights and fundamental freedoms, and in particular his right to privacy” 38 
and the Directive protects “the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, 
and in particular their right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal 
data.”39 In the specific case of transborder flows there is a heightened risk to privacy 
if the recipient country has lower data protection standards than the transferring 
country- a so called data haven.  
However privacy is not always the explicit value protected. For example data 
protection legislation in Europe often does not protect “privacy” but other values 
                                                        
38 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal 
Data 108 ETS (signed 28 January 1981, entered into force 1 October 1985) art 1.  
39 Lee Byrgave Data Protection Law: Approaching Its Rationale, Logic and Limits (Kluwer Law 
International, Netherlands, 2002) at 37. 
15 
 
such as “personality”40 or “personality right”41 or “personal integrity.”42 The array 
of values referred to hint at an underlying incoherence. Even when privacy is used 
explicitly, as in the Convention and Directive, the high generality of “rights and 
fundamental freedoms” suggests a host of values upon which justification for data 
protection law may be constructed.  
At a broad level, Professor Alan Westin has classically outlined four functions of 
privacy. First, it fosters personal autonomy by allowing individuals to avoid 
manipulation by others. Second, it allows the removal of the social masks worn by 
individuals both online and offline. A young law student may be: a caring boyfriend; 
a motivating hockey captain; a loving grandson; a campfire entertainer; an online 
environmentalist; and a responsible older brother. Privacy gives rest from the 
emotional effort of always wearing one of those masks. Thirdly, privacy gives the 
opportunity to test new ideas, insulated from the criticism of others. This allows self-
development and self-evaluation. Finally, privacy allows intimacy and the sharing of 
protected communications.43 
It is important here to note a distinction between privacy and the narrower 
“information privacy” that data protection law looks to protect in transborder data 
flows. Westin outlines that information privacy concerns a claim of an individual to 
determine for themselves how, when and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others.44 More succinctly Professor Arthur Miller describes it as 
“the individual’s ability to control the circulation of information relating to him.”45 
If transborder data flows are not protected then an individual’s ability to control the 
information circulating about him is reduced. The chilling effects of a loss of 
information privacy were articulated in a 1983 decision by the West German 
Constitutional Court. They outlined if someone cannot predict what personal 
information is known to others in his social situation, or what knowledge may be 
passed on to other parties not present, he is inhibited in his freedom to plan and 
                                                        
40 Federal Act on Data Protection 1992 (Switzerland), art 1(1).  
41 Federal Data Protection Act 2003 (Germany), art 1(1).  
42 Personal Data Act 1998 (Sweden), s 1. 
43 Alan Westin Privacy and Freedom (Bodley Head Ltd, New York, 1967) at 34-35.  
44 At 7. 
45 Arthur Miller Assault on Privacy: Computers, Data Banks and Dossiers (University of Michigan 
Press, Michigan, 1971) at 40. 
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decide freely how to act.46 For example if an individual does not know whether 
participation in an online referendum or political movement will be registered, and 
he does not know whether personal risks might flow from others having knowledge 
of such participation, that individual’s autonomy is constrained.  
Significant threats to privacy exist with modern data processing- particularly 
through profiling. Sir Tim Berners-Lee, creator of the World Wide Web, uses a health 
insurance example to highlight concerns. If a health insurance company can 
purchase the search queries of a user, who might have searched for books on cancer 
for example, the company could increase premiums.47 The premiums might rise 
even if the searcher was simply browsing for curiosity or to gather information for 
a friend.  
Crucially the inferences drawn from algorithms are largely based on existing 
stereotypes, which can be further perpetuated by the processing. Individuals might 
not share the information they do online if they knew how it shaped their profile 
and therefore chance of securing credit, a job or parole.48 Some forms of data 
profiling can be particularly manipulative and invasive of privacy- such as the 
deliberate targeting of individuals with addiction issues.49  
2 Politics 
Data protection law and transborder data flows interact with complex political and 
legal vales including: human rights; national security; sovereignty; and political 
protest.  
Human or “fundamental” rights are an increasingly important realm of data 
protection law. The ECHR, ICCPR and United Nations Declaration of Human Rights50 
                                                        
46 Donald Kommers The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany (Duke 
University Press, North Carolina, 1997) at 299. 
47 Richard Marsh Jr “Legislation for Effective Self-Regulation: a New Approach to Protecting 
Personal Privacy on the Internet” (2009) 15 Mich Telecomm & Tech Law Rev 543 at 544. 
48 At 547.  
49 Alessandro Acquisti “The Economics of Personal Data and Privacy: 30 Years after the OECD 
Privacy Guidelines” (paper presented to OECD Conference Centre, Paris, 1 December 2010) at 74. 
50 United Nations Declaration of Human Rights GA Res 217A (III), UN GAOR, 3rd sess, 183rd plen mtg, 
UN Doct A/810 (10 December 1948).  
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all protect privacy as a human right. Importantly it was the Charter which heavily 
influenced the case of Schrems. The court crucially found the requirements of 
adequacy must be considered in light of the fundamental rights guaranteed under 
the Charter and in particular the large number of people who would be vulnerable 
to having their rights infringed if their personal data was transferred to a country 
not ensuring adequate protection.51  
The court found an adequate level of protection requires a protection of 
fundamental rights and freedoms that is “essentially equivalent,” rather than 
identical, to the protection guaranteed by the Directive.52 The fundamental rights 
under the Directive were given a “high level” of protection.53 However as James 
Michael argues, human rights can be a difficult legal landscape. Critically human 
rights can threaten privacy in some contexts- for example freedom of expression, 
the right to impart information, is a human right which can act against privacy.54 
Additionally human rights apply best in an all or nothing fashion, when they collide 
it can be difficult to weigh the competing interests.  
National security also has a difficult relationship with adequacy. National security 
provides an exemption from the requirements of the Directive55 as well as an 
exemption in the Safe Harbour scheme.56 However as ruled in Schrems national 
security as an exemption can restrict protections of personal data only so far as is 
strictly necessary57 and to meet overriding legitimate interests.58 There has long 
been a tension between safeguards and the power of sovereign states to act in the 
interests of national security. With the incredible processing power of mass 
surveillance networks, the conversation over limits to acting in national security is 
gaining momentum in the public discourse. However there is a difficult tension 
between the judiciary, the legislature and the executive when the exemptions are at 
issue. To find a government as acting outside the national security exemption is to 
                                                        
51 Schrems, at [78]. 
52 At [73]. 
53 At [39]. 
54 James Michael Privacy and human rights: an international and comparative study, with special 
reference to developments in information technology (Unesco Publishing, Dartmouth, 1994) at 45.  
55 Art 13(1)(a)  
56 Commission Decision 2000/520/EC (Safe Harbour) [2000] OJ L215/43 para 4 annex 1. 
57 Schrems, at [92].  
58 At [84].  
18 
 
attack a central core of their sovereignty- these tensions are particularly 
pronounced when they occur between a national government and a supranational 
body such as the EU.  
In general online activity can create trying sovereignty and jurisdictional issues. 
Professor Lawrence Lessig classically refers to a situation where a group of people 
from multiple countries transfer data to another country’s servers to build a virtual 
community in cyberspace. It is an exceptionally difficult political and legal problem 
to decide which jurisdiction should govern- where the servers are, where the people 
are located, or somewhere else.59  
If states can bolster their digital sovereignty and extend their online jurisdiction 
then their political power is increased. The United States for example, has looked to 
extend their online jurisdiction extra-territorially into Russia.60 The EU is certainly 
looking to extend their data protection norms beyond Member States. Adequacy can 
be viewed as a tool in this complex battle for achieving digital sovereignty- the 
requirements act extraterritorially by imposing obligations on data controllers and 
processors outside of the European Economic Area.61 Ultimately there is economic 
leverage for the spreading of the EU’s standard of adequacy as trading states want 
to access the huge European market.  
From a civic point of view data protection laws can facilitate global communication, 
the reporting of news, safe dissemination of political viewpoints and coordinated 
mobilising of political protest as occurred during the Arab Spring uprising.62 If 
transborder data flows are not secure, or simply perceived to be unsecured, there 
can be a considerable chilling of the exercise of political rights and civil 
disobedience. Adequacy can therefore serve an important signalling function to 
citizens wanting to know what online activities and jurisdictions are safe. However 
given Snowden’s revelations of mass surveillance, it is difficult for citizens to predict 
                                                        
59 Lawrence Lessig Code Version 2.0 (Basic Books, New York, 2006) at 27. 
60 See US v Ivanoc 175 F Supp 2d 36 (D Conn 2001) where the United States held individual 
accountable under United States law for intending and causing harm in America whilst acting 
online from Russia. 
61 Directive, art 25.  




the extent and nature of threats to personal data processed as part of the exercise of 
political rights.  
Data protection law in the context of transborder data flows serve a crucial 
harmonising purpose. The Directive looks to bring about an approximation of the 
national laws of its Member States resulting in equivalent levels of data protection.63 
If laws are harmonised then the regulatory burden of operating across jurisdictions 
is significantly reduced. If a company has to carefully redesign the digital services 
they provide in order to comply with different national regulations they may avoid 
countries entirely, at the very least they will incur higher costs of doing business. 
The harmonising of data protection law to ease transborder flows serves a clear 
financial purpose as well as nurturing political relationships between states.  
The United States has advocated for an open internet but secretly sought to 
undermine encryption and conduct mass surveillance of users.64 Most countries do 
not have the political or economic power to oppose this American dominance-
particularly as many free ride on American intelligence and military capabilities. 
Whilst the EU does not have jurisdiction over American agencies such as the NSA, 
crucially they can influence the European operations of American firms.65 From a 
hegemony perspective, adequacy can therefore be viewed as an ideological 
battleground for control of the international norms of transborder data flows. Data 
is an incredibly valuable asset so influence over the international norms of 
transborder data flow provides significant political power. Dr Michelle Frasher 
describes the process as “information statecraft” where there is an attempt to 
influence the behaviour and policies of states by acquiring or controlling data 
flows.66 Whilst some argue the Safe Harbour is closer to European rather than 
American data protection norms,67 the United States very effectively negotiated 
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considerable limitations, including national security exceptions and the exclusion of 
financial data from the scheme.68   
3 Economics 
An economic lens provides essential insight to both the background context of 
adequacy as well as the case of Schrems. Both the Directive and the Regulation have 
economic progress as a driving purpose.69 Economics is a central concern for data 
protection legislation generally but holds particular importance for transborder 
flows- international commerce demands these flows take place.  
Many technology innovations rely on transborder data flows to function, including: 
the internet of things; the app economy; cloud computing; Big Data; online 
streaming services; E-commerce; and crowdfunding.70 These technologies hold 
tremendous potential across multiple fields, with Big Data analytics in Google Flu 
Trends (predicting influenza outbreaks from aggregated search queries on Google) 
being an often cited success.71 Data protection law has the uncomfortable task of 
protecting privacy whilst still promoting these beneficial emerging technologies. 
There is concern too many privacy protections may hinder the development and use 
of these technologies. However strong privacy protections may also provide the 
nurturing environment Westin outlines above- cultivating imagination and 
inventive propensities.72 Finding a balance is crucial given the substantial gains to 
welfare these technologies promise. However I am concerned support for privacy in 
this context will be unwisely labelled technophobic and anti-progress.  
Of particular consequence is the industry opposition to omnibus regulation of 
privacy in the United States. The same year the Directive was made industry 
representatives in the United States argued omnibus privacy regulation would: 
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hinder innovation; drive marketing activity off the internet; add unnecessary costs 
to online advertising; and distort the market definition of consumer privacy 
preferences.73 They argued for stripped down sectoral legislation. Benefits were 
expected to flow from having relatively unfettered access to consumer information- 
such as more relevant advertising, better fraud protection and more convenient 
customer services. Consent requirements were thought to burden consumers and 
create additional costs- perhaps a self-fulfilling prophecy in light of the unhelpful, 
obscure privacy policies issued by many corporations.  
Industry believed market forces could and would satisfy customer privacy 
preferences.74 There was also a belief that excessive privacy regulation might not 
only raise the cost of business, but ultimately push corporations to do business 
outside of the United States.75 This argument may marinate American concerns 
about “foreigners” taking domestic jobs, or “American” jobs being lost to other 
countries but it is unclear whether firms gain an advantage by having lower privacy 
protections. Indeed under certain conditions privacy protections appear to be 
revenue enhancing.76 The adequacy requirements of the Directive might therefore 
be seen as an attraction rather than a deterrence for many business and consumers- 
who might not want to risk their personal data being compromised. 
Nevertheless the anti-regulation position is backed by neoclassical economic 
scholarship. Professor Paul Rubin and Dr Thomas Lenard suggest consumer 
preferences for data protection can be satisfied by market forces and self-regulation 
rather than a legal standard like adequacy. They argue public fallout from firms 
misusing personal information has previously catalysed the improvement of data 
protection practices- presumably they believe the changes to be sufficient, 
widespread and enduring. However customers are often unaware of where, when 
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and how a data breach occurs compromising their ability to discipline the data 
controller by reducing their demand for services.77  
The Department of Commerce in the United States notes that an erosion of trust will 
retard the adoption of new technologies.78 It is difficult to know the extent to which 
internet users will trade off privacy and accept unscrupulous data processing in 
order to secure the benefits flowing from future technologies. However it appears 
the market for privacy tends to underprovide protection for individuals under many 
real world conditions such as consumers acting myopically or data subjects having 
incomplete information.79 
Neo-classicist Justice Richard Posner views the protection of privacy as creating 
inefficiencies by hiding information- under the neoclassical framework perfect 
information is required to achieve the correct market equilibrium.80 However the 
neoclassical economic scholarship is strongly contested with Professor Jerry Kang 
and Professor Paul Schwartz pointing to two market failures. First, information 
asymmetries exist as consumers are unaware how personal data are being handled 
and transferred online- there is also an ancillary issue of uninformed consent 
whereby users agree to privacy policies without knowledge of them.81  Second, there 
is a collective action problem as consumers are fragmented, facing concentrated 
costs but diffuse benefits of individually bargaining for better privacy policies.  
Considering “more relevant advertising” as a benefit and consumer consent as an 
intrusive cost appears biased towards data controllers rather than data subjects. 
Some commentators even style targeted advertising as an “immensely powerful 
instrument for the elimination of ignorance.”82 To conceive of life’s accumulation of 
knowledge as the receiving of advertising appears to be an appalling degradation of 
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epistemology. Nevertheless more relevant advertising as a benefit receives 
considerable ventilation. The advertising is seen as solving, rather than exploiting, 
an information asymmetry, whereby consumers overcome their lack of knowledge 
about new products, which is held to empower them.83 This justification requires 
the highly contested foundation that humans are at the core, materialistic 
consumers.  
Professor Curtis Taylor challenges more relevant advertising as a benefit, arguing 
that naïve consumers do not anticipate secondary uses of their data and can be 
exploited rather than empowered.84 Given the complexity of privacy terms and 
conditions it is incredibly difficult for a common consumer to decipher a single 
privacy statement let alone rank them. From an empirical point of view the number 
of consumers who actually read privacy terms and conditions also undermines a 
market based solution- on one analysis if every American internet user read all the 
privacy policies of websites they use the opportunity cost of that time would be 
approximately USD 781,000,000,000.85 Kang describes individuals as “largely 
clueless about how personal information is processed through cyberspace.”86 Even 
when consumers are informed of privacy implications, there is evidence they act 
myopically when analysing the short term benefits of free online services and the 
long term costs of information revelations.87  
In summary data protection law and transborder flows seek to balance complex of 
diverse purposes. Privacy, innovation, sovereignty, hegemony and economic growth 
can all be constrained or nurtured by transborder data flows. Crucially it is adequacy 
that has the uncomfortable task of navigating these conflicting, dissimilar goals. 
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C What is Personal Data?  
Personal data is the fundamental unit of information privacy. The terms change 
across jurisdictions but “personal data” and “personally identifiable information” 
are foundational concepts in data protection law as they act as jurisdictional 
triggers. If data being transferred across borders does not fall within the definition 
of “personal data” then the legal requirements of the Safe Harbour and the Directive, 
including adequacy, do not apply.  
Crucially there are different approaches in Europe and the United States- the United 
States have taken a much narrower approach to personal data. Data may activate 
one jurisdiction’s data protection law but not the other. This can raise compliance 
costs and cause substantial uncertainty for organisations operating across borders. 
Additionally the Article 29 Working Party (Art 29 WP), an advisory data protection 
body with a representative from each Member State, has noted a diversity of 
approaches to the scope of “personal data” across Member States, let alone between 
the United States and Europe.88  
The line between personal and non-personal data has proved to be uncomfortably 
amorphous, creating substantial uncertainty. This occurs as emerging technologies 
can reidentify ostensibly “anonymised” or “non-personal” data in some 
circumstances. This has significant privacy implications as non-personal data does 
not engage the requirements of adequacy. Therefore governments and businesses 
can freely share and sell anonymised data yet specific individuals could still be 
reidentified and have their privacy violated.  
1 United States Approach 
The United States, with their sectoral approach to data protection, does not have a 
common definition of personal data. However there are three main approaches 
being: the tautological; the non-public; and the specific types approach. Having 
                                                        
88 Article 29 Working Party “Opinion 4/2007 on the Concept of Personal Data” (01248/07/EN WP 
136, Adopted 20 June 2007) at 3. 
25 
 
multiple approaches to what constitutes personal data clearly increases the 
complexity of achieving adequacy.  
The tautological approach lacks elegance and provides little guidance with self-
referential descriptions. For example the Video Privacy Protection Act of 1988 
defines personally identifiable information as “information which identifies a 
person.”89 Sifting out personal data from non-personal data is very difficult under 
this approach and whilst its open ended nature provides flexibility for new 
technologies, conclusions reached under the approach are likely be based on ad-hoc 
intuitions of judges and regulators.90 
The non-public approach, rather than defining personal information directly, simply 
excludes publicly accessible information or information that is purely statistical 
from being personal information. For example the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 
defines “personally identifiable financial information” as “non-public personal 
information.”91 Here the issue is that the public/private divide is not the same as the 
identifiable/not identifiable divide. Publically available information in connection 
with other publicly available information or in connection with non-public 
information can identify individuals in certain contexts but the data may not be 
subject to data protection law under this approach.92  
The specific types approach designates certain categories of data as per se personal 
information. For example under the Massachusetts data breach notification statute, 
personal information is someone’s first name and last name together, or first initial 
and last name combined with a social security number, credit/debit card number, 
driver's license number or financial account number.93 Professor Daniel Solove 
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argues this approach suffers from rigidity in that data outside the categories could 
still reveal a lot about an individual, particularly in combination with other data.94  
2 Directive and the Regulation  
The Directive defines personal data as “information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person” 95 (emphasis added). “Identified” is not defined in the 
Directive but member countries have interpreted the concept variously. For 
example in Germany a person is identified when “it is clear that the data relate to 
the person and not to another” and in the United Kingdom a person is identified if 
“there is sufficient information either to contact him or to recognise him by picking 
him out in some way from others and know who he/she is.”96  
The set of personal data is expanded significantly under EU law by the concept of an 
“identifiable” natural person. The Directive defines an “identifiable” person as “one 
who can be identified, directly or indirectly, in particular by reference to an 
identification number or to one or more factors specific to his physical, 
physiological, mental, economic, cultural or social identity.”97 Further guidance is 
given by the note that “account should be taken of all the means likely reasonably to 
be used either by the controller or by any other person to identify the said person.”98 
Information at the wider level of “identifiable” and the narrower “identified” are 
treated equally and subject to the full rights and duties of the Directive, including 
adequacy.  
The Regulation maintains the concept of identifiable but shifts the nomenclature to 
“indirectly identified.”99 Personal data is defined as “any information relating to a 
data subject” and a data subject is anyone who can “be identified, directly or 
indirectly, by means reasonably likely to be used.” Furthermore the new technology 
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centric examples of location data, online identifiers and genetic identify are given as 
possible links that might directly or indirectly identify a person.  
Professor Daniel Solove and Schwartz criticise the European approach on its lack of 
nuance- it does not distinguish between different levels of “identifiableness.” Some 
data with names, addresses, birth dates and social security numbers very clearly 
identify specific individuals. However other data relating only to an “identifiable” 
rather than “identified” individual require further effort to narrow the data down to 
a specific individual. The disparity in the effort and resources required to identify 
data at the lower end of the continuum of “identifiable” from data that have already 
been identified is not considered under the European approach- the law treats them 
the same. This can mean disproportionate compliance costs for data processors and 
controllers who are handling personal data with different levels of risk.100   
Solove and Schwartz argue the “all means likely reasonably to be used” test is a 
strength of the European approach as it gives flexibility as new technologies are 
discovered.101 However I believe the test lacks perspective in some contexts. For 
example, a well-resourced and dedicated adversary might be able to reidentify 
personal information from anonymised data using means that would not be “likely 
reasonably to be used” under the test.  
Turning personal data into non personal data through anonymisation has relieved 
legislatures of balancing privacy with the free flow of information. The risks of 
reidentification and subsequent privacy harm have been deemed incredibly low 
therefore the requirements of data protection law have not applied to anonymised 
data (emphasis added). Whilst this assumption of risk may have held truth in the 
past it is becoming far less accurate. Reidentification science is driven forward by 
two increasing factors- the power of computer hardware and the richness of 
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auxiliary information.102 Professor Paul Ohm describes the promise that 
anonymisation protects privacy as an ‘empty one.’103  
Professor Arvind Narayanan and Professor Vitaly Schmatikov equate the medieval 
alchemist belief in turning lead into gold with the belief records containing sensitive 
data can be transformed into non personal data.104 Reidentification science does not 
just show a flaw in a particular anonymising or pseudonymising technique, but 
shows the fundamental inadequacy of the entire paradigm of deidentifying data.105 
Nevertheless data is persistently sold and shared with a belief privacy will be 
protected through pseudonymisation and anonymisation.  
For example in the mid-1990s a government agency in Massachusetts released 
every state employee’s medical records to researchers after removing explicit 
identifiers such as name, address and social security number. Privacy had been 
protected, assured the Governor. Graduate student Latanya Sweeney, after 
purchasing voting records and combining them with the medical records, 
reidentified the Governor’s records and promptly sent them to his office.106 Paul 
Ohm predicts this generation’s computer scientists will shock with examples of 
seemingly implausible reidentification.  
A particularly unsettling reidentification example concerns location data from cell 
phones. Cell phone location data can be incredibly useful for urban planning, 
emergency response development, business and epidemiology- however the 
anonymised location data of users has significant privacy implications. Unsettlingly 
researchers in Belgium and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology analysed 
1,500,000 cell phone users over fifteen months and discovered just four location 
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points over a year, when combined with publically available information such as 
twitter feeds, were enough to uniquely identify 95% of users.107  
Reidentification science is completely undermining the current approach to what 
constitutes personal data.  This is a fundamental issue for data protection law and 
will be discussed further in section VIII(A)(3). 
D Facebook  
“I want to meet Mark Zuckerberg one day and thank him….I’m talking on behalf 
of Egypt….This revolution started online. This revolution started on 
Facebook.”108 
“If Facebook were a government agency, its power would be as undisputed as it 
would be frightening…If a government department had so much up to the minute 
information about who we know, where we have been and what we are doing at 
its fingertips then one can only imagine the outcry.”109 
How can we reconcile these positions? The first statement from Wael Ghonim, a 
Google executive who helped catalyse the Egyptian revolution in 2011 captures the 
optimism of Facebook’s political value. The second, by Australian Writer Julian Lee, 
feeds anxieties of corporate and government power.  
Facebook plays host to these complex issues and more: the power relationship 
between a state and its citizens; the balance of power between corporate and state 
actors; how the law restricts corporate and state action; how social norms 
concerning privacy shift over time; how to regulate algorithms; and the extent to 
which fundamental rights to privacy and data protection can be infringed in the 
interests of national security. These debates pervade a wider conversation about 
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data protection in the modern era but are tethered to Facebook as an archetypal 
example. 
Facebook is the world’s largest social networking website. Users share photos, 
messages and videos with each other and are subject to targeted advertisements 
based on their activity. Its mission is to change the world’s information architecture 
to a “network built from the bottom up…rather than the monolithic, top-down 
structure that has existed to date.”110 This invites a sense of empowerment, the 
unpicking of the status quo, a reclaiming of control over information flows. However 
the website’s architecture funnels the personal data of users up Facebook’s 
hierarchy who then on sell to advertisers or release the data to law enforcement.  
From an economic perspective, Facebook greatly benefits from analysing its users’ 
personal data. Revenue increases are driven by ads targeted to users exhibiting 
specific behaviours or characteristics desired by the advertiser.111 “User” is 
employed in this setting as “customer” obscures the true business model. Clarity is 
gained by viewing the customers of Facebook as the advertisers with the users as 
the producers and the asset being traded as personal data. Beyond targeted 
advertising, Facebook is diversifying its e-commerce revenue streams with new 
features such as Marketplace, a buy, sell and exchange platform. In 2015 Facebook 
recorded total revenues of USD 17,930,000,000 which was an increase of 44 per cent 
on the prior year.112 
Facebook is the means by which an increasing number of individuals connect to each 
other and the world. In a recent Pew Research Centre survey more than 62 per cent 
of American adults stated they receive news from social networking sites,113 
predominantly from Facebook with Twitter playing a lesser but important role.  This 
is a profound shift of power from traditional media channels to social networks. 
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Whilst other social networking sites such as BEBO and Google Plus have enjoyed 
pockets of success, Facebook has now achieved considerable market dominance.  
Mark Zuckerberg, Chief Operating Officer and Founder of Facebook, encourages 
users to share more content with more people, declaring in 2010 that privacy is no 
longer a social norm.114 Facebook has attracted significant criticism for how they 
gather and treat the data of their users. For example they conducted, without 
consent, secret psychological tests on 700,000 users in 2012. The website changed 
the positivity or negativity of peoples’ newsfeeds- the content they see- to determine 
how users would respond.115 Chief Operating Officer Sheryl Sandberg refused to 
apologise for the lack of consent, instead apologising for how the tests were 
communicated.  
In Europe the personal data of Facebook users are transferred to the United States 
for processing.116 It is this international transfer which engages the requirements of 
adequacy. Concern was raised by Max Schrems over whether this data flow was 
subject to mass surveillance after being transferred. Hogan J in the Irish High Court 
found the NSA did have considerable access to Facebook data, believing there was 
‘no other realistic conclusion.’117 Mark Zuckerberg however has denied Facebook is 
a conduit to mass surveillance and declared he had no knowledge of the PRISM 
surveillance program until after the issue received public ventilation.118  
Beyond the United States, other governments are well aware of the value of 
Facebook data, with the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences concluding the 
networking site was “exploited by Western intelligence services and used for 
subversive purposes…its special political function can be a threat.”119 However the 
website is utilised for the political purposes of citizens as well as their governments. 
For example prior to the Ben Ali dictatorship falling in Tunisia, Facebook was a 
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crucial platform for disseminating videos and information about the oppressive 
regime, giving a voice to isolated pockets of the Tunisian population. Activists such 
as Mohamed Bouazizi, who committed suicide by self-immolation in protest, were 
broadcast all over the world in Facebook videos.120 Conversely however, the 
Tunisian government was, at the same time, using JavaScript insertions to steal the 
Facebook passwords of activists in order to remove pages considered harmful to the 
government’s interests.121  
Facebook is a strong example of how modern business corporations can rival the 
power of states. With over a billion users only China and India can compete with 
Facebook’s “population.” Facebook also sends diplomats (lobbyists) to foreign 
countries with Mark Zuckerberg enjoying access to heads of state. Addressing the 
G8 in 2011 he argued excessive internet regulation would not work122 and more 
recently he was the guest speaker at the APEC leaders’ summit in Peru. 123 
How content is delivered to users is determined algorithmically by factors such as 
friend relationships, explicitly expressed interests and content quality.124 These 
algorithms can hold considerable power over political opinions. Whilst there is the 
potential for social media to deliver a broad spectrum of political content, there is 
concern users exist in echo chambers and filter bubbles. These occur when 
algorithms, over time, create social media spheres in which users predominantly 
view content agreeable to their pre-existing preferences, insulated from conflicting 
viewpoints.125 This effect exists and is statistically significant however its exact 
magnitude is contested.126  
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Algorithms produced by third parties using Facebook data are also of concern. For 
example Admiral, one of the largest car insurance companies in Britain, was forced 
to recall their initiative to set premiums from mining Facebook data. The company 
believed users writing concise sentences, using lists, not using exclamation marks, 
using measured language such as “maybe” rather than “always” or “never” and 
arranging catch ups at specific locations and times rather than just “tonight” were 
less likely to crash their cars. 127 After a negative public response to the initiative 
Facebook decided to find Admiral as operating outside Facebook’s terms of service.  
People continue to reveal traditionally private information on Facebook, be that 
sexual orientation, net worth, relationship status or political affiliation. These 
revelations can be consensual and explicit however further non-transparent 
processing of such data for secondary purposes can conflict with the Directive. As 
Big Data analytics continues to develop these issues of automatic processing and 
secondary uses of data will likely increase.  
Facebook is critical to this thesis not just for how it catalysed the shaping of 
adequacy in Schrems but for its microcosm position in the general conversation on 
regulating emerging data technologies. Facebook was not the only corporation 
exposed in Snowden’s leaks however its market dominance and the extent and 
sensitivity of personal data circulating on the website make it an incredibly useful 
lens to view the requirements of adequacy through.  
E Key Points: 
Privacy is conceptualised in terms of personal dignity and personal autonomy in 
Europe. It is about enjoying a personal space in which to develop and grow.  
Privacy is conceptualised in the United States as freedom from state intervention. It 
is about having dominion over one’s body or home.  
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However there are considerable economic and political factors shaping privacy.  For 
example United States legislators appear more willing than European legislators to 
compromise privacy for an attempt at greater business efficiency and national 
security.  
These divergent views have resulted in a considerable clash over how personal data 
should be protected and what personal data should be protected when it is 
transferred internationally. “Adequate protection” is the standard required by the 
EU.  
The divergent views of the United States and EU characterise an incredibly tense 
data protection debate. Schrems increased tensions when the ECJ found the means 
by which the United States achieved adequacy, the Safe Harbour, to be invalid.  
Facebook provides a useful lens to view adequacy as it can be seen as a microcosm 












III INTRODUCTION TO ADEQUACY  
Adequacy is a standard in EU data protection law which when achieved allows 
transborder data flows to occur. It is a tool to protect the personal data of those in 
the EU. 
Under art 25(1) of the Directive, Member States can only transfer personal data to 
countries outside of the European Economic Area who ensure an adequate level of 
protection, unless certain specific derogations apply. This protects personal data 
from being transferred to a jurisdiction providing less protection. Europe could have 
impeccably high standards but the privacy of subjects could still be violated if one 
link in the processing chain was in a less protected domain.  
The adequacy examination requires a case by case analysis “in light of all the 
circumstances surrounding a data transfer operation.”128 This suggests a granular 
inquiry of specific transfers, corporations or sectors, however the European 
Commission can find an entire country ensures adequate protection.129  
A country can ensure adequate protection by reason of its domestic law, 
professional rules and international instruments and is assessed under art 25(6) of 
the Directive for the “protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and rights 
of individuals” provided.130 The core fundamental rights referred to are the right to 
privacy and the right to protection of personal data.  
Once a country has a positive adequacy decision transborder data flows between 
that country and the European Economic Area are presumed to be suitably 
protected. However before an adequacy decision is made by the European 
Commission, the Art 29 WP provides an opinion on the level of protection of 
personal data in the applicant country.  
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Whilst the Art 29 WP reports follow a set structure looking at specific data 
protection principles, they also take a wide look at the applicant country’s legal 
landscape and how that landscape might hinder or promote data protection. For 
example in New Zealand’s report, it was relevant that there is no written 
constitution in the traditional sense but higher law in the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act 1990 and the Human Rights Act 1993. So too was it relevant that New Zealand 
is a parliamentary democracy, with an independent Privacy Commissioner and 
independent judiciary with common law links to the United Kingdom. Even New 
Zealand’s business culture and small size where dissemination of poor data handling 
practices spread quickly were considered factors.131 The Art 29 WP opinions use the 
same data protection principles to structure the analysis however each report is a 
unique exploration of how the applicant compares to the European standard.  
In EU law, Directives are legislative acts which set out a standard or goal for the law 
but allow individual Member States to implement their own laws to achieve that 
standard. This is in contrast to a Regulation which has direct binding force. The 
resulting flexibility inherent in implementing Directives allows Member States of 
the EU to express slight legal differences in their data protection. Crucially countries 
outside the EU applying for adequacy are also given flexibility in the implementation 
of the relatively high European standard. This flexibility plays a political role as 
declaring a country’s data protection standards as inadequate can be seen as a 
slight- flexibility can provide breathing space for countries with different methods 
of providing protection.  
The EU has an interest in multiple countries achieving adequacy. This encourages 
trade with Member States, protects the privacy of European subjects and also 
propagates European privacy norms rather than United States norms. However 
successful applicants are often extended some flexibility. For example New Zealand 
was not without issue- the Art 29 WP stated New Zealand failed to fully comply with 
the direct marketing principle but it “did not believe there is a major shortfall or that 
this needs to stand in the way of an ‘adequacy’ finding.”132 Crucially the opinion 
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stated, “although some concerns still exist, adequacy does not mean equivalence 
with the Directive”133 and hence a positive adequacy finding was recommended. 
Whilst adequacy is a legal standard, it is an instrument of diplomacy. This political 
component helps to explain why the meaning of adequacy is under stress, the 
political angle must be kept firmly in mind throughout this thesis. In New Zealand’s 
case, it appears the discretion was awarded in light of the “pioneering role” New 
Zealand is expected to play in developing data protection laws in the Pacific.134 
If a country fails to achieve a positive adequacy finding from the European 
Commission, or has not applied, there are other ad hoc mechanisms through art 26 
which can allow for the transfer of data.  
First, there is a list of narrow derogations, such as when the data subject has given 
his consent unambiguously to the proposed transfer or the transfer is required for 
the performance of a contract.  
Second, a company can use Model Contractual Clauses (MCMs). Specific clauses have 
been approved by the European Commission and organisations can achieve 
adequate protection by subjecting themselves to them. Effectively they implement 
the principles of the Directive into off the shelf contracts allowing for rapid 
approval.135 Initially they were met with dissatisfaction however after being 
remodelled with greater input from the business community they have achieved 
greater prominence.136 The MCMs impose significant obligations on the data 
exporters. For data transfer to occur there must be a legal basis for processing in the 
recipient country and the data must have been collected and processed legally 
before being transferred.137  
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Thirdly, a company can subject itself to Binding Corporate Rules (BCRs). They are 
available for a company or group of companies transferring data across borders but 
within the company or group. Each Data Protection Authority in each country 
involved in the transfers must approve the BCRs before they are valid, making 
approval lengthy and expensive. Large corporations who have utilised BCRs include 
General Electric and Hewlett-Packard.138 It is worth noting BCRs and MCMs can be 
used in tandem. For example a corporation may use a BCR to transfer data 
internationally within a corporate group but use MCMs to transfer data 
internationally outside of that group. 
The European Data Protection Authorities prefer full country adequacy decisions 
over BCRs and MCMs as a basis for transfer. This is because BCRs and MCMs only 
create small pockets of adequacy in a country with otherwise inadequate 
protection.139 The list of derogations are the least preferred and they are interpreted 
narrowly and strictly as they do not protect personal data once it has left the 
European Economic Area. The Data Protection Authorities are sceptical about 
allowing the exceptions to be used as a basis for transferring large volumes of 
data.140  
Finally, there is the specific case of the United States who negotiated the Safe 
Harbour. Whilst the United States has not received a formal finding of adequacy 
through the normal route, the Art 29 WP opined the United States did not provide 
adequate protection for personal data prior to Safe Harbour.141 The special scheme 
was activated in 2000 when the European Commission released the Safe Harbour 
Arrangement and supporting documents. It is a voluntary self-certification program 
for United States firms overseen by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) whereby 
members agree to be bound by certain negotiated data protection principles in 
order to receive data from the EU.142  
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A What are the Adequacy Principles in the Directive  
The adequacy principles are the foundation of European data protection. Under the 
Directive, adequacy analysis has two components - the content of the data 
protection rules and the effectiveness of their enforcement.  
Whilst a holistic analysis is used, the core of adequacy is found in the extent the 
following principles and enforcement mechanisms are provided for by the laws of 
the applicant country. If the principles are contained in a country’s legal system, and 
appropriate enforcement mechanisms are in place, adequacy will be satisfied.  
The Art 29 WP has outlined the core data protection content principles as:  
(i) purpose limitation;  
(ii) data quality and proportionality;  
(iii) transparency;  
(iv) security;  
(v) rights of access, rectification and opposition; and  
(vi) restrictions on onwards transfers.  
Additional areas of analysis for specific types of processing are:  
(i) sensitive data;  
(ii) direct marketing; and  
(iii) automated individual decision making. 
From a procedural and enforcement perspective, the analysis also looks at:  
(i) the level of compliance;  
(ii) the support and help to individual data subjects; and  
(iii) redress mechanisms.143  
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These three clusters of (i) core principles, (ii) specific processing requirements and 
(ii) procedural and enforcement considerations, provide the framework for 
adequacy analysis.  
However it is important to contextualise the history of this framework. Born not in 
a vacuum the Directive’s principles build on the foundations laid by the Council of 
Europe Convention 108,144 the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data of 1980 and the United Nations Guidelines of 1990.145 
If an applicant country has introduced data protection legislation adopting the 
norms of the OECD guidelines, United Nations Guidelines or the Council of Europe 
Convention 108 their likelihood of satisfying adequacy is significantly improved.  
The Council of Europe Convention in particular if ratified is a strong indicator of 
adequacy. Whilst it does not restrict onwards transfers to third countries it does 
contain the other five core content principles and also requires safeguards for the 
protecting of sensitive data.146  
1 Purpose limitation  
The purpose limitation principle has two component: (i) data must only be 
processed for a specific purpose; and (ii) the data must not be used in a way 
incompatible with that purpose. 
The purpose for processing must be explicitly specified prior to or at the time of 
collection. There is a strong push for the purpose to be in writing, improving 
transparency and allowing comparison with subsequent processing purposes.147 
The context of collection and the reasonable expectations of the data subjects largely 
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determine the detail required.148 Vague purposes such as “improving users’ 
experience” are unsatisfactory and larger companies using data analytics have to be 
more thorough in their purpose specification than smaller companies doing limited 
processing.  
Collection is the first processing operation so any processing beyond that, including 
simple storage, must not be incompatible with the original purpose.149 The Art 29 
WP believes the compatibility assessment to be one of the most difficult monitoring 
tasks in data protection as well as one of the most important- it is the substance of 
the relationship between the purpose for which the data were collected and the 
purpose for further processing which determines compatibility.150 Sometimes 
compatibility is obvious, for example if an online retailer selling weekly vegetables 
boxes collected the personal data of a customer, further processing for payment and 
delivery each week would be prima facie acceptable. However the transfer of the 
data to another business selling organic meat boxes each week would not.  
The context of collection and the reasonable expectations of the data subjects are 
critical for substantively assessing incompatibility with a balance of power analysis 
also relevant. For example consider a receptionist found shirking her work duties 
by a security camera. If the cameras were installed for security purposes then under 
the purpose limitation, she could likely reasonably expect the footage gathered to 
be used solely for security purposes and not for employment termination 
decisions.151 Additionally if a data subject was obliged to provide the data under law 
or had their freedom of choice constrained, perhaps by being unable to easily 
terminate the relationship with the data controller, then the incompatibility 
assessment is stricter.152  
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2 Data quality and proportionality  
Under the Directive data must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive” relating to 
the purposes for processing, and must be “accurate, and where necessary, kept up 
to date.”153  
To reduce excessive processing art 7 of the Directive provides that personal data 
may only be processed if certain factors are satisfied. The factors are consent, 
necessary for compliance with a legal obligation, necessary to protect the vital 
interests of the data subject, necessary for the performance of a task in the public 
interest or necessary for the purposes of the legitimate interests pursued by the 
controller. The breadth of factors appears to substantially widen the situations in 
which data may be legally processed however “necessary” acts here as a limiting 
valve on what processing may occur.  
In contrast to the purpose limitation principle which operates at the point of 
collection to reduce excessive collection, data quality and proportionality can 
operate after processing has occurred as data must be “kept in a form which permits 
identification of data subjects for no longer than is necessary.”154 
For example perpetually holding DNA and fingerprint data of a data subject 
acquitted of the crime the data were gathered to solve, was found to be 
disproportionate in the United Kingdom. After considering the Directive and the 
Council of Europe Convention of 1981 the Court held the “blanket and 
indiscriminate nature of the powers of retention” were not proportionate to the 
legitimate goal of crime fighting.155 Other countries in Europe were holding the data 
for two years under certain conditions whereas the United Kingdom wanted to hold 
the data indefinitely to build a large crime fighting database.  
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3 Transparency  
The principle of transparency requires data subjects to be informed about who is 
processing their data156 and the purposes for which the data are being processed.157 
Sunlight is said to be the best disinfectant, so too for data processing.158 Fairness 
demands data subjects are made aware of how and by whom their data is processed.  
However a discord between transparency and understanding persists. A subject 
may be aware of the processing occurring but might not understand how the 
processing will affect their online profile. It is difficult to know how best to catalyse 
the higher value of understanding by providing transparency. 
Art 10 of the Directive controls data gathered directly from a data subject whereas 
art 11 concerns indirect gathering and contains an additional provision whereby no 
information needs to be provided if it would prove impossible or would involve 
disproportionate effort.159  
Further information including the recipients of the data, what the rights of access 
and rectification are and whether the data supply is obligatory or voluntary have to 
be provided to data subjects. However it is only required “in so far as such 
information is necessary” in order to guarantee fair processing, having regard to the 
context of collection.160  
The burden this places on data controllers is unclear as it is difficult to know when 
the provision of this further information is necessary. On this point the Member 
States have shown considerable divergence in implementing the Directive. For 
example the United Kingdom requires information to be provided only “insofar as 
practicable.” Adopting a stricter approach for when the data has not been gathered 
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directly from the data subject, Italy necessitates the providing of further information 
in writing, irrespective of the necessity test.161 
4 Security  
The security principle requires that technical and organisation measures, 
appropriate to the risks, are taken by the data controller when processing data. This 
includes making sure anyone acting under the data controller’s authority does not 
process data except as instructed by the controller. The security principle is 
expressed through art 16 of the Directive requiring confidentiality and art 17 
requiring security of processing. There is a general obligation of the result of 
security of processing without the requirements of specific measures to achieve that 
result. Whilst some Member States, such as Spain, have detailed regulations of what 
technical and organisational measures should be taken, none of the countries 
receiving adequacy decisions has done so. 
Art 17 requires, regarding the ‘state of the art,’ implementation costs, the risks of 
processing and the nature of the data, that appropriate technical and organisational 
security measures are taken. However identifying and responding to different risks 
can be an incredibly technical and nuanced requirement- whilst many organisations 
and countries have dealt with financial risk and legal risk from breach of confidence, 
dealing with cyber-security risk is a relatively new field. Specialised knowledge is 
required to understand how data security may be threatened in different settings, 
making the security principle particularly perplexing for the data subject and lawyer 
alike.  
5 Rights of access, rectification and opposition  
Under this principle data subjects should be able to obtain a full copy of their 
personal data and rectify the personal data when incorrect. Additionally they should 
be able to object to processing in certain contexts. This principle is about allowing 
data subjects to participate in, and have some level of control over, the processing 
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of their data. To the extent this can be achieved, this principle is crucial to 
informational self-determination.  
Under art 12(a) data subjects have the right to obtain, without constraint and 
excessive delays or costs: information as to whether their data are being processed; 
the purpose of processing; and the logic involved in automatic processing. Art 12 
also provides for the rectification and erasure of incomplete and inaccurate data.162  
Under art 14(a) data subjects have the right to object to data processing generally 
with art 14(b) giving the specific right to object to direct marketing.  
It is important to note how principles can be interdependent. For example the 
transparency principle and the purpose limitation principle with their notification 
requirements contribute significantly to the exercise of access, rectification and 
opposition rights-without an awareness of what data processing is occurring, it 
would be difficult to object to that processing.  
6 Restrictions on onward transfers 
Transfers of personal data beyond the transborder flow are only allowed when the 
second recipient also provides an adequate level of protection. This is needed as 
otherwise the Directive could be circumvented by transferring data out of the EU’s 
jurisdiction. The only permitted exceptions are those found in art 26(1) of the 
Directive which include the data subject unambiguously consenting to the proposed 
transfer or the transfer being required for the performance of a contract. 
7 Sensitive data 
The Directive outlines that certain categories require extra protection and special 
rules for processing. The sensitive categories of data are listed in art 8 of the 
Directive, being personal data revealing: racial origin; ethnic origin; political 
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opinion; religious or philosophical beliefs; trade-union membership; health data 
and data concerning sex life.  
However what constitutes sensitive data can shift depending on the context. For 
example someone’s food preference on a flight might not reveal sensitive data but 
equally it could reveal health information if the data subject had specific dietary 
requirements and could also reveal religious information if the data subject 
required a halal meal. Nevertheless the Directive takes a categorical approach where 
certain categories of data are held to a higher standard.  
8 Direct marketing  
Under this principle, data subjects should be able to ‘opt out’ of having their data 
transferred for the purposes of direct marketing. The general right to object to 
processing is found in art 14(a) with 14(b) specifically addressing direct marketing. 
Every Member state with the exception of Luxembourg has adopted a ‘Mailing 
Preference List’ or ‘Robinson List’ which allows data subjects to opt out of receiving 
direct marketing.163 The implementation of this principle is noteworthy for 
highlighting the role industry based codes of conduct can play in securing positive 
adequacy findings.  
9 Automated individual decision making 
Interestingly art 15(1) allows a data subject to object to automated decisions. This 
was innovative at the time of the Directive’s creation and some considered it to 
create a new principle- decisions which can substantially impact a person’s interests 
should not be fully automated.164 However art 15(1) only concerns decisions “based 
solely on automated processing.” This allows decisions made substantially by 
automatic means as long as a human is involved in some capacity at some stage.  
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As an increasing range of decisions are made by automated means this principle is 
likely to come under considerable stress in the future.  
10 Procedural and enforcement mechanisms 
Data protection systems require a good level of compliance with the rules, support 
and help to individual data subjects looking to exercise their rights, and appropriate 
redress to injured parties when rules are broken. This usually requires an 
independent data protection supervisor or privacy commissioner. Crucially this 
section includes a broad analysis of the accessibility and efficacy of a legal system. 
If data subjects are prevented from enforcing their rights, it will be little consolation 
they have them in the first place.  
B Discretion in Assessing Compatibility with Principles  
Schrems found the European Commission’s discretion to be strict when deciding 
whether a country satisfies adequacy, due to the importance of data protection and 
the large number of data subjects whose rights can be infringed by inadequate 
protection.165 However this assertion betrays reality- the European Commission has 
exercised significant discretion in awarding adequacy decisions.  
The Art 29 WP found New Zealand to have several weaknesses- with the most 
concerning being the lack of restrictions on onward transfers to other countries. The 
weaknesses were held to be mitigated by New Zealand’s size, geographical isolation 
and the small probability that significant volumes of personal data would be on 
transferred. 166 The awarding of adequacy to New Zealand by the European 
Commission shows considerable discretion. It would be illuminating to know 
whether such discretion would still be offered if, irrespective of geographic isolation 
and limited data transferring, New Zealand had a politically caustic relationship 
with the EU.  
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It is difficult to unpick the motivations behind such shifting tolerances of 
imperfections. Clearly there is a realpolitik component. A negative decision is an 
outcome the European Commission wants to avoid or at least hide- they do not want 
to discourage applicants and the scheme increases in value as more countries 
achieve adequacy. Nevertheless by hiding how discretion is exercised transparency 
is reduced. Indeed the Art 29 WP has never published a negative adequacy opinion, 
with the only examples of failed applications coming from external consultants.167 
Exercising discretion to overlook imperfections mitigates political embarrassment 
but without transparency it is impossible to see how the discretion is exercised on 
a case by case basis. Additionally negative decisions could be a useful resource for 
applicant countries looking to align their data protection with the standard of 
adequacy, even if the deeper motivations for the discretion remained hidden. In 
borderline cases knowing what is not up to the adequacy standard could be just as 
useful as knowing what is.  
Without greater transparency it is incredibly difficult to know why certain countries 
adequacy decisions are blocked or encouraged. However there is some evidence of 
questionable concerns playing a role. For example Ireland delayed and officially 
objected to Israel receiving a positive adequacy decision from the European 
Commission. Initially dressed as concern over minor features of how manual data 
processing was carried out, Ireland later admitted to objecting in outrage over the 
alleged use of Irish passports by Israeli agents involved in targeted killing.168  
Ultimately the discretion exercised by the European Commission has caused 
uncertainty over the meaning and requirements of the adequacy principles. For 
example regarding Argentina’s application, the Art 29 WP was concerned the 
Argentinian Data Protection Authority lacked jurisdiction over all data processors 
and controllers in the state. Moreover there was no guarantee the Data Protection 
Authority would be independent, enforcement mechanisms were unclear and 
almost no enforcement was actually occurring.169 Nevertheless a positive adequacy 
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decision was made. This is a pointed difference to the positon taken in Schrems 
where independence of supervisory authorities and access to legal redress were 
crucial underpinnings of adequate protection.  Interestingly, members of the Art 29 
WP have admitted “politics” entered into the decision.170  
C Key Points: 
Adequacy is a standard of data protection countries outside of the European 
Economic Area must reach in order to process data originating in the European 
Economic Area.  
It is a complex legal standard composed of core principles but also incorporates a 
wide analysis of the legal landscape in a third country.  
Whilst the Art 29 WP follows a set structure of analysis applications are considered 
on a unique case by case basis.  
However the amount of discretion afforded to different applicants varies. This 
makes it difficult to have a stable view of exactly what the requirements of adequacy 
are.  
Crucially negative adequacy decisions are not published preventing a closer 





                                                        
170 Kuner, above n 3, at 66.  
50 
 
IV HOW WAS ADEQUACY SHAPED BY THE SAFE HARBOUR 
AGREEMENT? 
The Safe Harbour agreement was found to provide adequate protection, before 
being invalidated in Schrems. By examining the level of protection provided it is 
possible to examine the threshold for adequacy.  
A What Was the Safe Harbour? 
Shortly after the Directive entered into force, tension surfaced between the United 
States and the EU over transborder data flows. The United States Government 
claimed restrictions on data flows threatened over USD 100,000,000,000 in trade.171 
The Safe Harbour was the political and legal solution to the United States being 
highly unlikely to satisfy adequacy through the usual route.  
The Safe Harbour was a voluntary data protection regime whereby United States 
organisations could self-certify they were complying with the Safe Harbour privacy 
principles, being: notice (subjects should be informed about how data is collected 
and used); choice (consumers must be able to opt out); onward transfer (transfers 
to third parties are only allowed if the third party provides adequate protection); 
security (should prevent loss of personal information); data integrity (data should 
be relevant and accurate); access (individuals should be able to access and correct 
their data); and enforcement (there should be effective means of enforcing the 
rules).172 It was a special route to adequacy outside of the usual country wide 
adequacy findings, Model Contract Clauses and Binding Corporate Rules.  
The FTC enforced the scheme. If an organisation engaged in commerce made a 
public declaration to adhere to the Safe Harbour principles then failing to follow the 
principles could be deceptive practice under s5 of the FTC Act.173  
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The United States did not receive a normal finding of adequacy, indeed prior to the 
Safe Harbour decision the Art 29 WP believed the United States did not provide 
adequate protection.174 As discussed in the literature review, the United States 
conceptualises privacy differently to the EU- the United States have narrow 
constitutional privacy protections against state actors, a patchwork of federal 
statutes and limited privacy legislation at the state level.175 There was also 
scepticism of the European approach from the United States perspective, with 
Professor Lillian BeVier suggesting omnibus legislation and a centralised data 
protection board was “a little like recommending that the fox, albeit dressed up as a 
benign and friendly farmer, guard the chickens.”176 
The clash of ideology played out over two years of negotiation between the 
European Commission and the United States Department of Commerce. The 
European Commission consequently adopted Decision 520/2000/EC177 in 2000 
recognising the Safe Harbour as providing adequate protection. This power was 
exercised by virtue of art 25(6) of the Directive. The final agreement was the result 
of considerable compromise.  
An example of a compromise which reduced the protection afforded by the Safe 
Harbour was the exclusion of financial data. Corporate data rights are seen as crucial 
underpinnings to intellectual property and commerce- The United States did not 
want to cede any control of these data flows.178 There was a narrative in the United 
States that overzealous data regulation of the financial services could push 
corporations to do business elsewhere. The Department of Commerce resisted the 
Directive’s reach by claiming the Financial Modernisation Act of 1999 (GLB Act) 
imposed a level of data protection higher than most data protection laws in 
Europe.179 However the European Safe Harbour negotiators were sceptical as the 
GLB Act allowed for mergers across financial services which could result in data 
being transferred between affiliates and processed without the consent of the data 
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subject. Additionally there were no consumer rights to access financial data and 
multiple agencies were responsible for enforcement depending on the corporate 
structure of the financial institution.180 Ultimately the success of the United States 
negotiators in excluding financial data considerably narrowed the amount of data 
that could flow through the Safe Harbour, reducing its effectiveness.  
Two European Commission Staff Working Papers initially reported on the Safe 
Harbour’s implementation, the first in 2002, the second in 2004. The 2002 report 
noted the number of self-certifying companies was lower than expected, being only 
129 at the time, however the scheme was described as getting off to a “relatively 
trouble free start.”181 Several weaknesses were identified, if not fully quantified, and 
described as teething problems. Substantial resources were used by the Department 
of Commerce to host seminars and workshops for interested organisations. 
Unacceptably, fewer than half of the organisations involved in the scheme were 
found to have privacy policies with all seven of the Safe Harbour principles. The 
2004 report again showed the number of participants in the scheme was lower than 
expected and was described as cause for disappointment. Only 400 organisations 
had self-certified by the end of 2003 and fewer signed up in 2003 than in 2002.182 
The low number of participants suggests the scheme was not widely viewed as 
overly beneficial. The surprise at the low number of participants suggests the 
European Commission Staff valued the scheme higher than the organisations 
considering membership.  
B Substantive Protections 
The principles of the Safe Harbour were different than those in the Directive.  
The Safe Harbour principles were:  
(1) notice, data subjects had to be informed their data was being collected and 
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used and given contact information should they have inquiries; 
(2) choice, data subjects had to be able to opt out of the collection and transfer of 
their personal data to third parties;  
(3) onward transfer, transfers to third parties were only allowed if the receiving 
party provided adequate protection;  
(4) security, reasonable efforts had to be made to prevent loss of collected 
information;  
(5) data integrity, data had to be reliable and relevant for the purpose it was 
collected;  
(6) access, data subjects had to be able to access their personal data and correct or 
delete it when inaccurate; and  
(7) enforcement, there had to be effective means of enforcing these rules.  
Whilst the nomenclature shifted the standard of protection was still required to be 
adequate. However several concerns became apparent before Schrems. As the 
language employed shifted, so too did the protection.  
1 Data quality  
The Safe Harbour regime looked to protect data quality through its principles of data 
integrity and access. Specifically they contained the concepts of purpose limitation, 
accuracy, completeness and compatibility of purpose. However the purpose 
limitation in the Safe Harbour was a husk of the principle in the Directive- it did not 
require the purpose to be explicit, specified and legitimate, nor were the 
requirements of fairness and lawfulness present.183 Also lacking was the 
requirement for data processing to be not excessive. Without those narrowing 
constraints on processing, the scope for further “compatible” processing was greatly 
increased, weakening data minimisation and reducing protection. This is 
particularly significant as data quality weaknesses, such as vague processing 
purposes, can compound by weakening other principles such as transparency.  
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2 Legitimate processing  
Under art 7 of the Directive processing is prohibited unless specific circumstances 
are satisfied such as unambiguous consent. The other five avenues under art 7 only 
allow processing if it is “necessary” for specified reasons- supporting a narrow 
approach for interpreting the exceptions.184 This is in contrast to the Safe Harbour 
which gave general permission for processing provided notice (informing data 
subjects of the purpose their data were being processed for) and choice (giving the 
data subject the opportunity to opt out from data processing) were satisfied.  
The notice requirement was not particularly strenuous for United States 
organisations. Notice was to be provided when data subjects were first asked to 
provide data however the Safe Harbour allowed them to do so “as soon thereafter 
as is practicable”- this created space for misuse. The practicable allowance was 
removed when the processing was for a new purpose or for disclosing data to a third 
party. Nevertheless in light of the lack of purpose specificity discussed above data 
controllers could circumvent this requirement if the original purpose was 
sufficiently broad to include the “new” purpose. Crucially third party disclosure 
under United States law, for example law enforcement requests for data, could also 
override the notice requirements.  
Additionally the choice component suffered the weakness of being opt out rather 
than opt in. The data subject was supposed to be “provided with clear and 
conspicuous, readily available, and affordable mechanisms to exercise choice.”185 
However data subjects may have simply missed the option to opt out- the passive 
Safe Harbour standard is lower than the active, unambiguous consent required in 
the Directive.  
3 Onward transfer 
Notice and choice were expected to provide suitable protection against onwards 
transfers of data under the Safe Harbour as the data subject had to be able to opt out 
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of the onward transfer. This suggests the data subject was involved before every 
transfer of their data.  
In comparison to the apparent case by case approach of the Safe Harbour, the 
Directive gives general permission for data transfers outside of the European 
Economic Area provided the recipient provides adequate protection. Superficially 
this suggests the Safe Harbour may have provided better protection against onward 
transfers as the data subject can opt out for each specific transfer. However I would 
caution against this position. First, United States law could override the Safe 
Harbour allowing transfers to take place irrespective of data subject consent. For 
example when law enforcement made a request for data access as part of an 
investigation. Second, if a data subject passively “agreed” to a privacy policy by 
ticking a box allowing for the onward transfer of data, well before such data was to 
be transferred, that weak consent (in the sense that it might not be informed, specific 
and unambiguous) could pre-empt the right to opt out.186  
4 Rights of data subjects  
Rights of access, deletion, correction and amendment were contained in Annex I in 
the Safe Harbour with Annex II providing significant limitations. Under Annex II the 
right to access was “subject to the principle of proportionality or reasonableness” 
and if the information requested was neither sensitive nor used in decisions 
significantly affecting the individual then access rights could be limited to data that 
was readily available or inexpensive to provide.187 This gives organisations room to 
deny legitimate access with any counterarguments having to go through a time 
consuming dispute resolution mechanism- many data subjects simply would not 
bother. The Safe Harbour organisation could also charge a “not excessive” amount 
for data access and were required to provide an answer only  
“without excessive delay and within a reasonable time period.” This allowed 
organisations to slow down the process of achieving access, perhaps hoping the data 
subject would become increasingly apathetic as time and costs increased.  
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Further access restrictions existed for confidential commercial information and 
instances where access was likely to “interfere with the safeguarding of important 
countervailing public interests.” It is unclear exactly what constitutes important 
countervailing public interests however national security, defence and public 
security were named in the Annex II.188 Certainly it would be difficult for a data 
subject to argue their access would not infringe confidential commercial 
information.  
Disappointingly the right to deletion of data under the Safe Harbour scheme was 
limited to inaccurate data. This would deny a data subject the ability to request 
deletion of accurate data that had been wrongly collected or processed.189 Deletion 
of accurate data could occur through a dispute resolution mechanism requiring 
deletion as a sanction for unlawful processing however again this could be a 
considerable time and cost burden on the data subject.  
5 Independence  
The Safe Harbour was a self-certification regime with alternative dispute resolution 
providers and the FTC overseeing enforcement. Organisations provided a signed 
letter to the Department of Commerce with contact details, a statement they were 
binding themselves to the Safe Harbour, a description of the processing operations 
and a description of the privacy policy and where it could be found in full.190 An 
organisation could receive an external compliance review of whether their privacy 
policy was sufficient and whether it had been effectively implemented, but this was 
not mandatory, they could simply assess themselves. This placed a substantial 
amount of trust in the private sector. Professor Lillian BeVier stated having a central 
European Data Protection Board was like having a fox guard the chickens- perhaps 
the simile resonates more effectively in the context of self-certification through Safe 
Harbour.  
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Certainly self-certification sits uncomfortably with the European Jurisprudence 
holding “complete independence” of national supervisory authorities as an 
“essential component” of protecting personal data.191 The supervisory authorities in 
Europe are described as “guardians of…fundamental rights and freedoms” by the 
Court of Justice.192 This is a high standard to measure the Safe Harbour against. 
C Preliminary Conclusions on the Safe Harbour  
In conclusion the Safe Harbour had systematic weaknesses which were well known 
prior to Schrems. The push for adequacy is a push for the widespread acceptance of 
a high water mark for data protection that respects fundamental rights. That the 
main trading partner of the EU opted for a special, lower protection, different 
approach is antithetical to the European intent to propagate a clear, high data 
protection standard of adequacy. David Flaherty, an ex United States British 
Columbia Data Protection Commissioner, noted the negotiations were an 
opportunity to pressure the United States into adopting European norms.193 They 
borrowed some of the language but the underlying protection was significantly 
compromised. 
Ultimately the Safe Harbour showed the extent to which political and economic 
pressures can act against legal standards. Compromise is the currency of 
international bargaining but the adequate protection in the Safe Harbour is 
significantly below that required by the Directive- consequently adequacy as a high 
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V INTRODUCUTION TO SCHREMS 
A Who is Max Schrems and What Action Did He Take against 
Facebook?  
Max Schrems is an Austrian lawyer and privacy activist. During a semester aboard 
at Santa Clara University in California, Facebook’s privacy lawyer Ed Palmieri spoke 
to his class. Schrems was deeply unsettled by what he perceived as Palmieri’s 
limited grasp of European data protection standards.194  
After completing a research paper on Facebook’s alleged misunderstanding of 
European privacy law, Schrems exercised his right of access and requested all the 
data Facebook held about him. He received a file more than 1200 pages long with 
information much more detailed than he expected, including messages he thought 
had been deleted.195 
After receiving his personal dossier from Facebook, Schrems brought several 
complaints against Facebook Ireland Ltd (Facebook is incorporated in Ireland for 
tax purposes.) In August and September in 2011 the following were included in 
complaints laid with the Irish Data Protection Commissioner: 
(i) ”pokes” (application which notifies the ‘poked’ user) were kept after the user 
removes them;  
(ii) shadow profiles were created for non-users;  
(iii) users were tagged in photos without their consent, they have to opt out rather 
than opt in;  
(iv) deleted posts were still kept by Facebook;  
(v) messages were stored even after deletion;  
(vi) the privacy policy was vague and unclear which impacted the legitimacy of 
consent;  
(vii) facial recognition features were disproportionate and opt out rather than opt 
in;  
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(viii) many categories of data were not accessible (such as biometric face print); 
(ix) Facebook failed to guarantee any level of data security;  
(x) deleted friends were stored by Facebook;  
(xi) the like button embedded on other websites tracked users all over the 
internet; and  
(xii) users could be placed in groups without their consent.196  
After three years of difficult engagement with the Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner all 22 complaints were withdrawn. The decision to withdraw was 
made in light of the Irish Data Protection Commissioner refusing to make a formal 
decision on the complaints, the Commissioner denying Schrems access to counter 
arguments made by Facebook and the rising financial and time costs of continuing 
to pursue the complaints.197  
Schrems had considerable difficulty, in addition to the institutional inertia at the 
Irish Data Protection Commission, of financing the legal work and recruiting top 
legal talent, with many data protection lawyers unwilling to work against a large 
data processing corporation. In response, Schrems created the non-governmental 
organisation Europe-v-Facebook.org and accepted crowd funding for his campaign. 
The organisation’s central focus is whether European Data protection laws are 
enforceable in practice. Key areas of concern are: transparency; opting in instead of 
opting out; individual control of data; data minimisation; and open social networks. 
Just as people on different telecommunications networks can talk to each other, 
Europe-v-Facebook.org believes social networks should be opened so people can 
use other social media sites but still interact with people on Facebook.198  
Schrems was decided narrowly but should be contextualised against the wider goals 
of Europe-v-Facebook. They represent an important push for higher standards of 
data protection- a grassroots attempt to strengthen the meaning of adequacy in 
favour of data subjects. They currently have a privacy class action suit against 
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Facebook which they are looking to bring in the European Court of Justice as well as 
actions in Ireland, Belgium and Germany questioning the validity of the MCMs used 
as a backup by Facebook to transfer data. The class action has received considerable 
support with over 25,000 supporters signing up in a short amount of time with some 
further 50,000 registered to join the action if allowed.199 It is uplifting that a young 
lawyer and his peers have made such an impact on the shaping of adequacy. 
However given the widespread awareness of mass surveillance it is disappointing 
governments and other well-funded organisations left the responsibility to an 
underfunded student.  
In spite of the resource constraints facing Europe-v-Facebook, a 23rd complaint was 
made and pursued, concerning the forwarding of Facebook data from Facebook 
Ireland to the NSA via Facebook America. Facebook Ireland is within the Directive’s 
scope so the export of data is permissible only if there is adequate protection.200 It 
was this surviving complaint which led to the case of Schrems.  
On the 25th of June 2013 Schrems complained to the Irish Data Protection 
Commissioner that his data was being sent from Facebook Ireland Ltd to Facebook 
Inc in the United States through the Safe Harbour scheme and that this scheme was 
not providing adequate protection. Of concern was Edward Snowden’s revelations 
that the NSA in the United States was being granted mass access to Facebook data 
under PRISM.201 
Schrems argued the purpose limitation expressed in art 6(1)(b) of the Directive was 
violated, relying on the Art 29 WP’s opinion that mass use of commercial data for 
investigative purposes is a breach of the fundamental right to privacy.202 Schrems 
also argued the principle of proportionality enshrined in art 6(1)(c) was violated as 
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during terrorism investigations, only “specific individualised data should be 
transferred…on a case by case basis.”203 
The Irish Data Protection Commissioner argued he had no duty to investigate what 
he described as a frivolous and vexatious complaint. However Schrems sought 
judicial review of the decision arguing failing to investigate the complaint and make 
a formal decision was unlawful. He successfully argued the Data Protection 
Commissioner could not rely on the Safe Harbour to dismiss his complaint as the 
complaint brought the validity of the Safe Harbour into question and draws on facts 
of mass surveillance that were unknown when the Safe Harbour began.204  
B Interlocutory Judgment of the Irish High Court  
1 General remarks: 
The narrowness of the legal issues decided betray the case’s complexity.  
Whilst Hogan J endeavoured to “apply neutrally the applicable legal materials” he 
felt a “via media” between the United States and the EU could in many respects only 
be determined at “the level of international diplomacy and realpolitik.”205 He was 
clearly aware of the hegemonic component to mass surveillance, as he noted it was 
contributing to the “preservation and reinforcing of American global political and 
economic power.”206  
Justice Hogan showed support for surveillance however, declaring “these 
surveillance programmes have undoubtedly saved many lives and have helped to 
ensure a high level of security, both throughout the Western world and elsewhere.” 
He also declared terrorist attacks such as 9/11 and the London and Madrid train 
bombings, highlighted why “intelligence services needed as a matter of practical 
necessity to have access to global telecommunications systems in order to disrupt 
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the planning of such attacks.” 207 I caution against framing the benefits as obviously 
true and implying the attacks could have been prevented if only the current NSA 
mass surveillance tools were in use. I adopt a similar position to computer scientist 
Jarod Lanier- he believes a rational conversation on mass surveillance is prevented 
by the overestimation of the presumed benefits of supercomputing and big data 
analysis tools. This over optimism of mass surveillance tools masks the disconnect 
between the modelling and the underlying structure of reality.208 Indeed Lanier 
argues for more scientific analysis of the assumed security benefits, which would 
allow a more nuanced comparison against the very real privacy harms.  
Additionally Hogan J believed Snowden’s disclosures may have put the lives of 
security operatives at risk and certainly hampered entirely legitimate counter-
terrorism operations.209 Again this is a contested conclusion. Glen Greenwald and 
the other journalists given Snowden’s documents vetted the documents released to 
mitigate harm to United States individuals. Whilst the United States House of 
Representatives in their Executive Summary on Snowden’s leaks state Snowden 
“caused tremendous damage to national security”210 they do not provide any 
evidence of this damage in the report. Instead there is an assertion the “full scope of 
the damage is unknown” and that the United States Government will have to spend 
billions mitigating it.211 The United States government believes revealing the 
specifics of harms caused would present a further risk. Disappointingly Hogan J does 
not address these tensions.  
Nevertheless Hogan J was supportive of Edward Snowden overall, finding his 
revelations “demonstrate a massive overreach on the part of the security 
authorities, with an almost studied indifference to the privacy interests of ordinary 
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citizens.”212 It is just difficult to balance this statement with the assertion that 
entirely legitimate counter terrorism operations were hampered (emphasis added).  
Transparency in particular concerned him with the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court (FISC) criticised for its secret and ex parte hearings. Additionally 
he was dismayed at the gag order preventing telecommunication companies from 
revealing the mass, undifferentiated hand over of records to the NSA.  
Crucially he did find the NSA to have the ability to access Facebook data in the course 
of mass and indiscriminate surveillance, indeed he believed there was “no other 
realistic conclusion.”213  
2 Issue of frivolity:  
Considerable attention in the judgment concerned the initial position that Schrems’ 
complaint was frivolous. Given the profound importance of mass surveillance and 
mass privacy invasion, that Schrems complaint could be frivolous rightly infuriated 
many. However the term does not just mean silly or futile, but incorporates 
“unsustainable in law” as a meaning.214 The Data Protection Commissioner felt 
bound by the Safe Harbour decision from investigating Schrems claim hence 
believed the request to be unsustainable in law rather than silly, foolish, or trivial. 
3 What was referred to the Court of Justice? 
Justice Hogan reworked Schrems’ complaint in an unusual judicial move. He 
believed the manner in which the Commissioner had interpreted and applied the 
Safe Harbour in light of the Charter was not the true objection.  Rather Schrems’ 
complaint concerned the terms of the Safe Harbour regime itself- although he 
stressed the validity of the Safe Harbour had not directly been challenged in the 
proceedings.215 
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Snowden’s revelations in conjunction with the entry into force of art 8 of the Charter 
suggested to Hogan J that a re-evaluation of the interpretation of both the Safe 
Harbour and the Directive might be necessary.216 He was swayed by the general 
novelty and practical importance of mass surveillance issues for all twenty eight 
Member States of the EU and hence referred the matter to the European Court of 
Justice.  
The issues he referred were:  
(i) Whether a National Supervisory Authority is prevented from examining a 
complaint that data transferred to another country is not adequately protected, 
if a European Commission decision states that it is adequately protected; and   
(ii) Whether the Safe Harbour is valid.  
The first question investigates the extent to which supervisory mechanisms must be 
independent to provide adequate protection. The second investigates the extent to 
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VI SCHREMS IN THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE 
Schrems invalidated the Safe Harbour agreement and outlined a positive adequacy 
finding requires a level of protection not identical but “essentially equivalent” to that 
guaranteed in the EU under the Directive, in light of the fundamental rights in the 
Charter. 217 This is a clear divergence from the 2011 position of the Art 29 WP in 
New Zealand’s adequacy opinion where adequacy was found to “not mean 
equivalence with the Directive.”218  
The new test gives discretion in the legal means of achievement, particularly in light 
of common, civil and federal law systems interacting, however the discretion in the 
final essentially equivalent level of protection required is held to be strict.219  
In cases raising difficult or novel areas of law in the EU, Advocate Generals analyse 
the submissions made to the ECJ and deliver impartial non-binding opinions on legal 
solutions. Yves Bot was the advocate general in Schrems and his opinion shared 
considerable similarity to the conclusions reached in the Court’s final judgment. His 
reasoning is spread throughout my analysis.  
Whilst from a simple semantic perspective adequacy implies satisfactory or 
sufficient protection of fundamental rights, Bot believed adequacy should be 
interpreted in light of the objective of a “high level of protection of fundamental 
rights.”220 This lead him to declare a third country can only achieve adequate 
protection when it offers a level of protection “essentially equivalent” to the 
protection afforded by the Directive.221 This terminology and high standard of 
protection was adopted in the ECJ and is the current standard for achieving 
adequacy.  
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“Essentially equivalent” is an artful term, providing more flexibility than identical 
whilst still demanding a high standard of protection- it appears to go to the 
substance rather than the form of the protection provided. Although crucially the 
ECJ does not specifically define essentially equivalent nor is there an examination of 
what the EU baseline is. 
These incredibly vital but broad questions are left wanting by the judgment, with 
instead a narrow focus on (i) the powers of national supervisory authorities in the 
EU and (ii) whether the Safe Harbour is valid.  
Before examining the case it is important to be precise about what the ECJ judgment 
held concerning the validity of the Safe Harbour. Art 1 of the Safe Harbour was found 
invalid for not duly stating the reasons the Safe Harbour ensured adequate 
protection, and art 3 was found invalid for restricting the National Supervisory 
Authorities. As the articles were inseparable from the rest of the decision, the entire 
scheme was found to be invalid.222  
The Court did not undertake an analysis of whether or not the United States 
provides an adequate level of protection. Nor did the Court specifically decide 
whether the Safe Harbour framework provided an adequate level of protection. 
Instead, the Court found the powers of the National Supervisory Authorities were 
unlawfully restricted and the Commission decision approving the Safe Harbour 
failed to engage in a thorough enough analysis under the requirements of EU law, 
resulting in the invalidation of the Safe Harbour.  
It is noteworthy that Koen Lenaerts, President of the ECJ, stated after the case “[w]e 
are not judging the U.S. system here, we are judging the requirements of European 
Union law in terms of the conditions to transfer data to third countries, whatever 
they be.”223 The case is a slight to the United States system of data protection but it 
is presented as an analysis strictly on the requirements of EU law.  
                                                        
222 Schrems at [105].  
223 Valentina Pop “ECJ President On EU Integration, Public Opinion, Safe harbour, Antitrust” (14 
October 2015) Wall Street Journal <www.blogs.wsj.com>.  
67 
 
This makes sense politically as well as legally as the ECJ’s jurisdiction under the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union is limited to EU laws presented by 
EU Member States so it would be inappropriate to comment on the legality of the 
FISC.224 However the Advocate General’s opinion does examine the politically 
sensitive background to the case. This, along with the highly useful work of the Art 
29 WP, allows a broader analysis of adequacy to be ventilated and provides useful 
context to the narrow ratio of Schrems in the ECJ.  
The case analysis is broken down into four areas: the powers of the National 
Supervisory Authorities; the detection and supervisory mechanisms provided by 
Safe Harbour; whether the limitations and derogations provided by the Safe 
Harbour were precise, clear and accessible; and Safe Harbour validity in light of the 
requirements of proportionality and necessity.  
A Framework for Analysis: Four European Essential Guarantees  
After the invalidation of the Safe Harbour in Schrems the Art 29 WP assessed the 
jurisprudence of the ECJ relating to art 7, 8 and 47 of the Charter, as well as the 
jurisprudence of art 8 of the ECHR dealing with surveillance issues. After analysing 
this jurisprudence, the Art 29 WP issued guidance on what interferences to 
fundamental rights in a democratic society can be justified.  
Adequacy is a level of fundamental rights protection essentially equivalent to that 
guaranteed in the EU by the Directive read in light of the Charter. The European 
Essential Guarantees (Guarantees) provide a framework for assessing whether 
interferences to those fundamental rights are justified, demonstrating the level of 
fundamental rights protection required and giving body to the meaning of adequacy. 
Whilst the Guarantees were articulated in light of Schrems, they provide an excellent 
framework for examining how the meaning of adequacy was shaped in the case. 
The Guarantees are: 
                                                        




(1) Processing should be based on clear, precise and accessible rules; 
(2) Necessity and proportionality regarding the legitimate objective must be 
demonstrated; 
(3) There must be an independent oversight mechanism; and  
(4) Individuals must have effective remedies available. 
The first area of analysis in Schrems, examining the powers of the National 
Supervisory Authorities, can be seen as constituting the third and fourth Guarantees.  
The second area of analysis examining the validity of Safe Harbour in the context of 
effective detection and supervisory mechanisms, concerns the third and fourth 
Guarantees.  
The third area of analysis, examining the validity of Safe Harbour in the context of 
the clarity, precision and accessibility of the derogations and limitations concerns 
the first Guarantee.  
The fourth area of analysis, examining necessity and proportionality of mass 
surveillance, concerns the second Guarantee.  
The Guarantees are assessed on an overall basis in Court however they will 
separated for the purpose of clarity in this analysis.225  
B The Powers of National Supervisory Authorities  
The first issue area of analysis concerned the powers and independence of National 
Supervisory Authorities generally, and the Irish Data Commissioner specifically, 
when asked to investigate a complaint about a data transfer presumed adequate by 
a European Commission decision.  
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Under art 28 of the Directive, supervisory authorities must be endowed with 
investigatory powers and operate with complete independence. If the Irish 
Commissioner was bound by the European Commission Safe Harbour decision and 
could not investigate the validity of Schrems’ complaint, as the Irish Commissioner 
contended, the Commissioner would not be independent.  
Whilst the Directive does not define complete independence, Commission v Germany 
held it to be acting “completely freely, without taking any instructions or being put 
under any pressure.”226 Additionally the decisions of the authorities, as guardians of 
the right to private life, were required to be above any suspicion of partiality.227  
Commission v Hungary also held independent supervisory authorities to be an 
“essential component” of protecting individuals’ data228 and required those agencies 
to be free from any “external influence in whatever form, whether direct or indirect, 
which may have an effect on their decisions.”229 Indeed mere risk of political 
influence over decisions of the authorities would be enough to compromise 
independence.230 It is noteworthy that Ireland has been criticised for insipid 
enforcement of corporate regulation to encourage foreign direct investment. Whilst 
this is predominately in tax and company law, the difficulty faced by Schrems in 
bringing his complaint has extended criticisms of the lack of enforcement to data 
protection also. 
Beyond the case law of the ECJ, the independence of supervisory authorities was 
found to “derive from the primary law of the European Union” including art 8(3) of 
the Charter and art 16(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.231  
Using the language of earlier cases, Schrems held independence to be an “essential 
component” of protecting individuals’ personal data. This also mirrored the 
language of Advocate General Bot who stated independent supervisory authorities 
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are an “essential component”232 and “at the heart of the European system” of 
personal data protection. He stated independent supervisory authorities were a 
necessary feature for an adequacy finding233 and that depriving the supervisory 
authorities of the ability to investigate the Commission decision would be contrary 
to the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms, specifically privacy, and 
would violate the principle of independence.234  
Whilst Schrems reaffirms the importance of independence in data protection 
oversight, analysing the powers of the National Supervisory Authorities from a 
purely legal perspective obscures an important ancillary issue. Adequacy of course 
has two sides, the content of the rules and their enforcement. Even if the oversight 
mechanism has sufficient powers and is independent, it must have the resources to 
fulfil its duties. In 2015 the Irish Data Protection Commissioner received nine 
hundred and thirty two complaints which were opened for investigation. Although 
a number of complaints were resolved informally, formal decisions were given in 
only fifty two cases, a rate of 5.6 per cent and the office had a budget of 
approximately EUR 3,000,000.235 In 2014, nine hundred and sixty complaints were 
received with formal decisions given in twenty seven cases, a rate of 2.8 per cent, 
and again the budget was approximately EUR 3,000,000.236 Given the prevalence of 
large multinational data controllers in Ireland, the Irish Data Commissioner 
specifically, and National Supervisory Authorities generally, appear to be under 
resourced. From a practical point of view, one can see why the Irish Data 
Commissioner was hesitant to examine the well-resourced Facebook. It is difficult 
to believe the ECJ in Schrems requiring investigations to be conducted 
“independently” with “all due diligence” will have much impact if the investigators 
are not given adequate resources to carry out those investigations. 
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Ultimately the ECJ found supervisory authorities must be able to investigate 
transfers, with all due diligence, to protect fundamental rights.237 So the first issue 
for the Court, whether a National Supervisory Authority is prevented from 
examining if data transferred to another country is adequately protected, if a 
European Commission decision states that it is adequately protected, must be 
answered no. To preserve independence, the Court found supervisory authorities 
must be able to investigate complaints against data transfers even when the transfer 
is presumed adequate by a Commission decision.238 Of course as Commission 
decisions are presumed lawful until withdrawn, annulled or declared invalid by the 
ECJ, meaning the Safe Harbour cannot be declared invalid by a National Supervisory 
Authority, such as the Irish Data Commissioner. However they must be able to 
investigate the transfers, and then refer their findings to the ECJ. 239 
The powers of the National Supervisory Authorities, as well as allowing an 
investigation into the validity of Safe Harbour, also contributed to the invalidity of 
the Safe Harbour itself. Article 3 of the Safe Harbour controls the conditions under 
which a supervisory authority in a Member State may suspend data flows through 
the Safe Harbour. The cumulative criteria were: a substantial likelihood the Safe 
Harbour Principles were being violated; a reasonable basis for believing the 
enforcement mechanisms concerned were not taking adequate and timely steps to 
settle the case at issue; the continuing transfer would create an imminent risk of 
grave harm to data subjects; and the competent authorities in the Member State had 
made reasonable efforts to provide the organisation with notice an opportunity to 
respond.  
These provisions restrict the ability of supervisory authorities to exercise their 
powers, including investigatory powers, by setting thresholds for intervention.240 
The thresholds of “substantial likelihood,” “reasonable basis” and “imminent risk of 
grave harm” reduce the ability of the supervisory authorities to act and hence 
undermine their independence. This is incompatible with art 28 of the Directive 
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read in light of art 8 of the Charter which requires supervisory authorities to 
examine, “with complete independence,” claims of fundamental rights infringement 
concerning personal data.241  
The ECJ found the implementing power granted by the EU legislature to the 
European Commission to adopt adequacy decisions under the Directive did not 
confer the authority to restrict the powers of National Supervisory Authorities. 
Given the court found the Commission exceeded its competence in restricting the 
supervisory authorities’ powers through art 3, the article was found to be invalid, 
bringing the validity of the entire Safe Harbour into question.242  
C Safe Harbour Validity: Detection and Supervisory Mechanisms 
The reliability of the Safe Harbour as a self-certifying regime was founded 
“essentially on the establishment of effective detection and supervision 
mechanisms” which could identify and punish infringements of fundamental 
rights.243 Adequacy has two sides- the content of the rules and their enforcement. 
The Safe Harbour was initially found to satisfy adequacy however enforcement 
issues severely afflicted the scheme and eroded the meaning of strong, adequate 
protection.   
1 Applicable Law 
The Directive is interpreted within a wider body of EU Law- crucially art 7 and 8 of 
the Charter and art 8 of the ECHR. However when an issue concerning the 
application or interpretation of the Safe Harbour regime arose, only United States 
law was applicable.  
Annex IV of the Safe Harbour outlined several paths for claiming damages under 
United States law, including fraudulent misrepresentation of facts, negligent 
misrepresentation of facts, intrusion upon seclusion and publication of private 
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facts.244 However the Safe Harbour being interpreted under United States law was a 
significant issue for European data subjects-while the Directive provides protection 
to data subjects generally, protection under the United States Constitution and 
United States Privacy Act of 1974 was only available to United States citizens and 
legal permanent residents. This gave almost no protection for European data 
subjects.245  
The FISC, who were to oversee the surveillance by United States federal law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies also provided limited protection- attracting 
significant criticism from Advocate General Bot. He found the FISC fell considerably 
short of providing an effective judicial remedy. First, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act provides no protection to European citizens, only United States 
citizens,246 and second, the FISC’s proceedings are ex parte and secret.  
The normal path for enforcement of the Safe Harbour was the alternative dispute 
resolution mechanisms which investigated claims and referred cases to the FTC if 
required. An alternative path existed with organisations being able to nominate the 
European Union Data Protection Panel to deal with claims concerning human 
resources data, however relatively few organisations used this path.247  
Unfortunately the normal enforcement path of the alternative dispute resolutions 
mechanisms and the FTC was plagued by serious issues. For example they did not 
have authority to test the legality of fundamental rights infringements from the 
United States executive. The United States executive did not have to comply with the 
Safe Harbour as only self-certifying organisations were bound by its terms.248 
As a self-certification regime, organisations in Safe Harbour were expected to 
provide a signed letter to the Department of Commerce with contact details, a 
statement they are binding themselves to the Safe Harbour, a description of the 
processing operations and a description of the privacy policy and where it can be 
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found in full.249 However definition issues weakened many privacy policies with the 
unclear “aggregate information” and “technical data” sometimes used instead of the 
standard jurisdictional trigger of “personal data.” Moreover some companies 
attempted to override the definitions in the Safe Harbour agreement by outlining 
their own definitions, for example by trying to exclude publically available 
information from being “personal data.”250 
2 Federal Trade Commission 
A troubling authority issue narrowed the jurisdiction of the FTC. The FTC has 
competence only in deceptive practices affecting commerce- the data controller 
must be engaged in commerce. However it was unclear whether this included 
human resources data and up to 30 per cent of organisations participating in the 
scheme were doing so to import human resources data.251 There was also 
uncertainty over whether the processing of personal data in the context of 
charitable fundraising and other non-commercial activities would engage in the 
FTC’s jurisdiction as they are not “engaged in commerce.”  
Interestingly the regulatory stance of the FTC shifted considerably during the Safe 
Harbour discussions and the aftermath of its implementation. Prior to 
implementation self-regulation was held to be “the least intrusive and most efficient 
means to ensure fair information practices” however this belief shifted ultimately 
resulting in the FTC formally recommending to Congress they enact omnibus 
privacy legislation.252  
Astonishingly it was only in 2009 that the FTC launched their first action against an 
organisation for violating the Safe Harbour.253 This is some seven years after the 
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first European Commission Staff Working paper first identified key weaknesses. The 
FTC did not protect the data of European data subjects through the Safe Harbour.   
3 Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms 
A 2008 study by Australian consulting company Galexia documented several of the 
key weaknesses of the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms under the Safe 
Harbour.254 Of the 1597 listed participants in the scheme in 2008, only 1109 were 
current members, with many of the listed members having failed to renew 
membership. Many no longer existed and some had duplicate or triplicate entries. 
Only 348 members successfully listed an acceptable dispute resolution mechanism 
and only 54 of those extended protection to all types of data.255  
Many Safe Harbour members failed to list a dispute mechanism at all and more than 
200 listed mechanisms that were unacceptably high cost- for example 184 
organisations selected the American Arbitration Association as their dispute 
resolution provider which costs between USD 120 and USD 1200 per hour with a 
USD 950 administration fee and a minimum charge of four hours.256 This is clearly 
incompatible with Safe Harbour Frequently Asked Question 11 which states the 
dispute resolution provider must be “readily available and affordable.”257 
TRUSTe was one of the main alternative dispute resolution providers nominated by 
Safe Harbour organisations. However of the 881 requests they received in 2010, 
only three complaints were deemed admissible and grounded, leading to an 
organisation changing their privacy policy. The following year they received 879 
complaints however only one organisation was required to make changes to its 
privacy policy.258 Clearly data subjects were having substantial difficulty resolving 
disputes in their favour.  
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Surprisingly, the European Commission Working Paper report of 2004 found the 
relatively low level of complaints from data subjects as suggesting organisations 
were in compliance with the Safe Harbour principles. This is a weak conclusion in 
light of the poor visibility of privacy principles, low success rates for data subjects 
and high costs. If people do not know their rights, are confronted by high costs and 
believe their likelihood of a favourable outcome are low they are unlikely to 
complain. Audits were tentatively proposed in a 2004 European Commission report 
as a possible means of checking compliance with the Safe Harbour principles. 
However the report noted they are highly resource intensive and United States 
companies would likely resist them on the basis of business confidentiality and 
sensitive information so they were not implemented.259 
4 Conclusions 
Safe Harbour and self-certification sits uncomfortably with the European 
jurisprudence holding “complete independence” of national supervisory authorities 
as an “essential component” of protecting personal data.260 The supervisory 
authorities in Europe are required to be “guardians of…fundamental rights and 
freedoms” by the Court of Justice.261  
The difference in protection provided in the United States from Safe Harbour is 
substantial- a Federal Agency with a limited jurisdiction and almost non-existent 
enforcement working with expensive reactive dispute resolution providers who 
want to keep the business of the organisation using them. This strongly contrasts 
with the EU where independent supervisory authorities have a wide mandate and 
are not explicitly seeking the business of the organisations they are looking to 
regulate.  
Against these strong critiques of the detection and supervisory mechanisms 
provided by Safe Harbour, it is difficult to see how the mechanism could have 
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received an initial positive adequacy finding- one gains an impression of the political 
and economic incentives the parties had to bring about the Safe Harbour.  
It is noteworthy that the Galexia study, after finding little improvement had been 
made after the negative European Commission Staff Working Paper reviews in 2002 
and 2004, concluded significant privacy risk continued to exist for consumers. The 
report recommended the European Commission, the FTC and the Department of 
Commerce conduct a comprehensive analysis of every entry on the Safe Harbour list 
and warn European consumers to check the certification date of any organisation 
publically claiming to be a Safe Harbour member.262 The lack of effective detection 
and supervisory mechanisms was clearly known prior to Schrems.  
Advocate General Bot concluded the ineffectiveness of the detection and supervision 
mechanisms constituted an interference with the right to an effective remedy under 
art 47 of the Charter.263 Given the above analysis it is difficult to reach any other 
conclusion. The ECJ found effective judicial review to secure compliance with EU law 
was a requirement of the rule of law itself.264 Agreeing with Advocate General Bot’s 
position but strengthening the language of condemnation, the ECJ found the lack of 
legal remedies for European citizens failed to “respect the essence of the 
fundamental right to effective judicial protection, as enshrined in art 47 of the 
Charter.”265 Given independent supervisory authorities are a necessary feature for 
an adequacy finding266 and are at the heart of the European system of personal data 
protection, the Safe Harbour clearly falls short of adequacy on this point.  
There is a troubling concern that Safe Harbour not only fell short of the 
requirements of adequacy, but that adequacy withered as a standard of protection 
with the Safe Harbour. The length of time Safe Harbour was operating and the 
failings of the detection and supervisory mechanisms reveal considerable weakness 
in the supposedly adequate protection.  
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C Safe Harbour Validity in Light of the Derogations and Limitations : 
Clear, Precise and Accessible.  
Building on art 52(1) of the Charter, the ECJ in Michael Schwarz v Stadt Bochum 
outlined the requirements for fundamental rights limitations. The limitations must: 
be provided by law; respect the essence of the fundamental rights; be in accordance 
with the principle of proportionality; be necessary; and genuinely meet general 
interest objectives recognised by the EU or meet the need to protect the rights and 
freedoms of others.267 If the Safe Harbour fails this threshold then it will be 
incompatible with EU law.  
Broadly, the analysis of the derogations and limitations concerns two of the 
Guarantees. First, processing should be based on clear, precise and accessible rules. 
Second, necessity and proportionality with regard to the legitimate objectives 
pursued must be demonstrated. The Guarantees are closely linked, for example a 
proportionate measure must be limited in scope, which requires clear, precise rules, 
however for ease of understanding the Guarantees will be analysed independently.  
Examining the derogations and limitations in the Safe Harbour is crucial to gaining 
an understanding of the protection provided by adequacy. If the Safe Harbour 
protections, initially found to be adequate, can be easily circumvented, then 
adequacy as a high standard of data protection suffers.  
For an interference to be in accordance with the law it must have some basis in 
domestic law and be compatible with the rule of law,268 in that is adequately 
foreseeable, accessible and formulated with sufficient precision.269 To meet this 
requirement the law must protect against arbitrariness and provide, with sufficient 
clarity, the scope of discretion conferred on competent authorities.270 
In contrast to the strict approach to limitations in the Directive which are to be 
interpreted narrowly and are shaped by the ECHR, the Charter and national 
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constitutional laws,271 the Safe Harbour substantially widened the available 
exceptions and limitations through Annex I paragraph four.  
The fourth paragraph of Annex I allowed the principles of the Safe Harbour to be 
limited (a) “to the extent necessary to meet national security, public interest or law 
enforcement requirements” and (b) when case law, statute or government 
regulation produced conflicting obligations.272 This gave national security, public 
interest and law enforcement requirements primacy over the Safe Harbour 
principles.273  
Writing an opinion comparing the Safe Harbour and the Directive, Professor 
Franziska Boehm found it was easily possible to circumvent the protections by 
transferring the personal data to third parties or the government under United 
States law. Any legal authorisation, be it federal, state or local, could override the 
Safe Harbour protections.274 This greatly expands the possibilities for 
circumvention and accordingly she felt the Safe Harbour could not be regarded as 
adequate. 275  
Advocate General Bot felt as “legitimate interests” was not defined in the Safe 
Harbour it left considerable uncertainty as to the scope of permissible derogations 
under Annex I paragraph four (b), which he saw as contrary to art 7, 8 and 52(1) of 
the Charter.276 He believed the general and imprecise nature of the derogations 
under (b) as being sufficient in itself to prevent the scheme from ensuring an 
adequate level of protection.277 As the Safe Harbour could be disregarded under (b) 
whenever the scheme conflicts with a United States law, Advocate General Bot felt 
the scheme was incompatible with the condition that derogations are limited as to 
what is strictly necessary.278 It is difficult to disagree with Professor Boehm and 
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Advocate General Bot given the breadth of legal authorisations allowing an 
overriding of the Safe Harbour.  
Advocate General Bot also found “public interest” and “law enforcement 
requirements” to be vague under Annex I paragraph four (a). Whilst public interest 
and law enforcement are legitimate aims they are not defined in the Safe Harbour 
creating uncertainty over their scope. He found “national security” was the only 
exception under Annex I paragraph four (a) capable of sufficient precision to be an 
acceptable limit on fundamental rights.279 Crucially however the Safe Harbour did 
not contain rules on how the interferences would be limited when the United States 
pursued national security nor how effective legal protection could protect against 
that interference.280 Whilst states receive a fairly wide margin of appreciation when 
selecting the means to protect national security,281 and secret surveillance can be 
perfectly legitimate, there must be adequate safeguards to prevent surveillance 
from “undermining or even destroying democracy under the cloak of defending 
it.”282 
The ECJ agreed with Advocate General Bot’s analysis holding the settled case law of 
the Court regarding interferences with the fundamental rights contained in art 7 and 
8 to require “clear and precise rules governing the scope and application of a 
measure” as well as minimum safeguards.283 The lack of clarity over the scope of 
surveillance and the ineffective safeguards discussed clearly conflict with these 
requirements- there is no limit to the scope of discretion conferred on authorities in 
the United States under the Safe Harbour when pursuing national security 
objectives.284 I believe not only is the Safe Harbour short of the requirements for 
clear, precise, accessible rules governing interferences with fundamental rights, it is 
considerably short. That any legal authorisation in the United States can override 
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the Safe Harbour protections makes the schemes initial positive adequacy decision 
incredibly perplexing.  
C Safe Harbour Validity in Light of Derogations and Limitations: 
Necessity and Proportionality  
Adequate protection requires a level of fundamental rights protections essentially 
equivalent to that provided by the Directive. If the limitations in the Safe Harbour 
do not satisfy necessity and proportionality then adequacy will not be satisfied.  
In EU law, limitations are subject to the principle of proportionality and may only be 
made if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest 
recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others. 
The ECJ held “above all” that to protect the fundamental right to private life the 
limitations to the protection of personal data must apply only in so far as is “strictly 
necessary.”285 
The Court was uncompromising in finding the Safe Harbour to be well short of 
requiring limitations to apply only as is strictly necessary. Both the access and 
subsequent use for mass surveillance purposes constituted an interference which 
was not strictly necessary.286  
Additionally the Court noted the European Commission itself had found the United 
States authorities could process EU personal data beyond what was “strictly 
necessary and proportionate to national security” through the Safe Harbour scheme.  
Nevertheless proportionality and necessity, which are crucial to understanding 
whether a limitation on fundamental rights is acceptable, receive only light analysis 
in both Schrems and the wider case law of the ECJ. 
Usefully, the Art 29 WP has released an opinion on the meaning of proportionality 
and necessity in the context of law enforcement measures which interfere with 
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individuals’ right to privacy and data protection. They outline that as the 
requirements of necessity and proportionality developed from the case law of the 
ECtHR under art 8 of the ECHR, the case law of the ECtHR can provide guidance on 
the meaning of necessity and proportionality. The meaning, scope and application 
of the concepts of necessity and proportionality under EU law are held to be no less 
than under art 8 of the ECHR.287  
The case law of the ECtHR has provided three criteria which must be satisfied when 
examining interference with fundamental rights: (i) the interference must be in 
accordance with the law; (ii) the interference must be in pursuit of a legitimate aim; 
and (iii) the interference must be necessary in a democratic society. Failure to satisfy 
all the criteria will result in an interference with fundamental rights being 
unjustified.  
The first two criteria were examined in the previous section however the third, that 
an interference must be necessary in a democratic society, is multifaceted and 
requires further analysis.  
The Art 29 WP has stressed the importance of necessity not being interpreted too 
broadly, as this would allow for the circumvention of fundamental rights, nor should 
it be interpreted too strictly, as this may set too high a bar, restricting perfectly 
legitimate activities.288 
The case law of the ECJ is light on what is meant by necessary however the ECtHR 
has found “necessary” as being “not synonymous with indispensable…neither has it 
the flexibility of such expressions as ‘admissible,’ ‘ordinary,’ ‘useful,’ ‘reasonable’ or 
‘desirable.’”289  
Three tests have developed to determine whether a measure is necessary in a 
democratic society. They are: (i) whether there is a pressing social need; (ii) 
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whether the interference caused by the measure is proportionate to the legitimate 
aim; and (iii) whether the reasons given to justify the interference are relevant and 
sufficient. The third test is really an amalgamation of the prior two tests in that 
relevant and sufficient reasons justifying an interference exist only if a pressing 
social need exists and the measure is proportionate. However research and surveys 
can be used to support the analysis under the third approach.290  
The Court in Schrems found legislation allowing generalised access to personal data 
is not limited to what is “strictly necessary”291 with generalised access to personal 
data violating the “essence of the fundamental right to respect for private life” under 
art 7 of the Charter.292 However the Court did not indulge in a full explanation of 
how this conclusion was reached. This is disappointing as the necessity and 
proportionality of mass surveillance sit at the core of the conversation about 
regulating data in the modern world. In order to understand the Court’s conclusions, 
I will examine mass surveillance under the necessity and proportionality tests.  
I use the first two tests but will use research and surveys to make the analysis more 
rigorous. The tests share similarities and whilst separated here for clarity, should be 
seen as two methods of answering the same question- is an interference necessary 
and proportionate in a democratic society? 
1 Test one: pressing social need  
Reviewing the jurisprudence in the ECtHR, the Art 29 WP highlighted several factors 
for assessing pressing social needs. They are: whether the issue, if left unaddressed, 
may result in harm or have some detrimental effect on society or a section of it; 
whether there is evidence a measure may mitigate such harm; what the broader 
societal, historic or political views of society on the issue are; and whether 
opposition views have been sufficiently taken into account.293 “Pressing” is held to 
imply a level of urgency, immediacy or severity to the need. 
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Whether or not an interference corresponds to a “pressing social need” is fluid over 
time and inherently subjective. For example the ECtHR had to find whether the law 
criminalising consensual homosexual sex was “necessary” in Northern Ireland. 
Changing societal views and insufficient evidence of harm meant the law was not 
remedying a pressing social need and hence was not “necessary.”294 Whilst 
necessary interferences with fundamental rights in the interests of national security 
has long been at issue, it has received particularly sharp attention in the public 
dialogue after 9/11.  
(a) Whether the measure mitigates against harm 
Terrorism is the current harm to be countered when mass surveillance measures 
infringing on fundamental rights are being justified. However there is little evidence 
mass surveillance mitigates the harm of terrorism. Indeed Senator Patrick Leahy 
speaking at a Judiciary Committee in December 2013 stated the oft cited statistic 
that 54 terrorist plots had been thwarted by mass surveillance was “plainly wrong” 
and the American people had an “inaccurate impression of the effectiveness of NSA 
programs.”295 This incorrect impression extends to Ireland with Hogan J’s 
comments in the interlocutory judgment in Schrems that the surveillance programs 
had “undoubtedly saved many lives.”296  
New York Times reporter Charlie Savage made requests for evidence of useful mass 
surveillance leads under the Freedom of Information Act in the United States, 
finding little value in the mass surveillance programs. The Federal Bureau of 
Investigation field officers who had to scrutinise the leads generated from one 
system found the tips so frequent yet unimportant they reported back “you’re 
sending us garbage.”297  
Looking to the potential benefits of modern scientific techniques, Edward Snowden 
described the current situation of NSA data collection for terrorist identification as 
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“analysis paralysis.” He believes excessive information is collected making it 
impossible to prioritise, narrow and exploit the data. It occurs due to the base rate 
fallacy- attempting to identify exceptionally rare data points, terrorists, from huge 
data sets, produces high levels of type one as well as type two errors. Respectively, 
they are identifying of innocents as suspects and failing to identify real criminals. 
Epidemiologists know this fallacy and hence try to screen all older women for breast 
cancer but not all younger woman (who have a lower incidence rate). If all younger 
women were scanned then the number of type one errors would waste oncology 
resources on cancer free females, with significant harm resulting from unnecessary 
surgeries. From a mathematical perspective, mass surveillance of individuals fails to 
mitigate harm. Instead it provides excessive and low quality predictions with 
substantial resource and privacy costs.298  
As an interesting thought experiment beyond the case, the subtest of whether an 
issue, if left unaddressed, may have a detrimental effect on society or a section of it, 
can be applied as a meta-analysis to big data analytics generally.  Big data analytics, 
rather than the problems they are looking to mitigate, may produce detrimental 
effects. For example, Harvard Professor Latanya Sweeney has found big data bias 
creeping into algorithms resulting in the racial profiling the black community in the 
United States.299 Additionally data analytics setting the bond amounts and sentence 
lengths in Florida are still used even though the algorithm commits type one errors 
against black defendants twice as often as whites (incorrectly labelling a defendant 
as likely to commit a future crime when they do not).300 Even the oft cited success of 
Google Flu Trends mentioned in the Literature Survey consistently over predicts flu 
prevalence- reliance on it could cause a significant distortion of hospital resource 
allocation.301 There is a ‘Big Data Hubris’ that pervades big data generally and mass 
surveillance specifically, where foundational issues of measurement and reliability 
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are substituted for quantity.302 Further research is needed on the detriment caused 
by the misguided belief in the accuracy of big data in a mass surveillance context.  
(b) What are the broader societal, historical and political views? 
Mass surveillance is a difficult, politically charged area where fundamental rights 
are often perceived as relatively unimportant and threats are overestimated. The 
pressing social need test may loses effectiveness to the extent it gives genuine 
weight to inaccurate societal views on mass surveillance to protect national security. 
Certainly the broader societal, historical and political views can provide useful 
context to why public support for mass surveillance persist however I find it 
concerning that inaccurate opinions on the efficacy and necessity of mass 
surveillance could be given weight by the Court.  
Interestingly only 42 per cent of those surveyed from Spain, Germany, Sweden, 
Netherlands, United Kingdom, France, Greece, Italy, Poland and Hungary believe 
human rights should be a top foreign policy goal when surveyed by the Pew 
Research Centre.303  
In the aftermath of Edward Snowden’s revelations of mass surveillance 47 per cent 
of people in the United States believed counter terrorism mass surveillance 
programs had gone too far in restricting fundamental rights with 35 per cent 
believing the programs had not gone far enough. However in the aftermath of the 
San Bernadino and Paris shootings in 2015 56 per cent of people in the United States 
believed the programs had not gone far enough with only 28 per cent believing the 
programs to have gone too far in restricting fundamental rights.304 This is a 
substantial change in belief over a relatively short period. Additionally in the United 
States 58 per cent of individuals surveyed believed the use of torture on suspected 
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terrorists could be justified.305 These societal beliefs do not sit comfortably with a 
high standard of fundamental rights protection.  
Despite double digit decreases in recorded violent and property crime in the United 
States since 2008, only 15 per cent of all voters, and 5 per cent of all Donald Trump 
voters, believe crimes rates have been reduced.306 Moreover in the United States the 
majority of voters believe the NSA’s mass surveillance programs help prevent 
terrorist attacks in the United States, with only 28 per cent believing they do not.307 
Clearly there is significant divergence between the facts and the broader societal 
and political views.  
Given the intensity and emotion surrounding media coverage of terrorism it is 
perhaps unsurprising the broader societal and political views of terrorism in the 
United States overestimate its mortality and overestimate the effectiveness of the 
mass surveillance tools. Weapons of mass destruction sound terrifying, terrorist 
attacks are graphic and mortifying examples of the harm humans can inflict on each 
other- many have an understandable desire to give the government sufficient 
powers to remedy this. However even if the temptation for many is understandable, 
I do not think it should be given weight given the lack of efficacy of the mass 
surveillance programs and the very real fundamental rights infringements that mass 
surveillance entails.  
(c) Whether opposition views have been sufficiently taken into account 
28 per cent of United States citizens after the San Bernadino believed mass 
surveillance programs have go too far in violating fundamental rights. It is unclear 
whether their views have been taken sufficiently into account. 
Certainly they are joined by a significant caucus of legal and political academics 
opposing the current intrusions on fundamental rights made in the interests of 
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national security. Even if lawyers, as Schrems discovered when he looked for legal 
representation, are less willing to support fundamental rights ahead of the business 
of multinational data controllers.  
But opposition views have a difficult time effectively permeating the public 
discourse. Opposing mass surveillance can be seen not as pro human rights, but as 
pro-crime. “If you have nothing to hide you have nothing to fear” is a well fed 
narrative employed by the media and the political machinery to silence opposition 
views. It plays to the comfortable but cognitively dissonant belief that only 
miscreants are under constant surveillance. Opposing mass surveillance can be 
labelled as unpatriotic- it is telling United States legislation concerning mass 
surveillance have been deceptively labelled the Patriot Act and the Freedom Act.  
The phrasing of opposition view is also concerning. It structures the debate as being 
between national security and privacy. However national security and privacy can 
be mutually reinforcing, for example increasing data security at government 
agencies can prevent blackmailing and increase privacy- the true opposing views 
may be between liberty and control.308  
(d) Conclusion on pressing social need test 
Ultimately in spite of difficulties with examining the broader societal, historical and 
political views, as well as considering whether and what oppositions views have 
been sufficiently taken into account, mass surveillance would fail a pressing social 
need test- at the very least on the grounds it does not effectively mitigate against 
terrorism. There is little evidence mass surveillance mitigates against the harm of 
terrorist attacks and the “urgency” and “severity” of the issue appear in the broader 
societal views but overinflated in light of the statistics. 
2 Test two: proportionality  
Proportionality requires interferences to go no further than required to fulfil the 
legitimate aim pursued. If the Safe Harbour allows disproportionate interferences 
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then it cannot provide adequate protection. The Art 29 WP has found 
proportionality to require a close analysis of: whether the proposed measure is 
limited in scope; whether safeguards are in place; the severity of the issue and the 
harm which society could be exposed to; and the benefits of the proposed measure 
over existing measure.309  
(a) Limited in scope.  
Crucially the Court in Schrems found the Safe Harbour did not contain any rules 
limiting interferences with the fundamental rights of European data subjects when 
United States entities pursued national security.310 Compounding this were the lack 
of references to effective legal protection against such interferences.311 
Consequently the Safe Harbour did not appropriately limit the scope of fundamental 
rights interferences.  
Retention of DNA and fingerprint samples by Police in the United Kingdom was held 
to be disproportionate and hence not necessary in a democratic society in S & 
Marper v United Kingdom.312 When considering whether the measure was 
proportionate and a fair balance between competing private and public interests the 
Court was struck by the “blanket and indiscriminate nature” of the retaining powers 
and was concerned there was no differentiation of the seriousness of alleged 
offences or the age of the suspects.313 Indeed individuals could have their 
fingerprints and DNA samples taken in connection with minor, non-imprisonable 
offences. This reasoning clearly applies to the surveillance permissible under the 
Safe Harbour as not only are the powers blanked and indiscriminate, all individuals 
whose data passes through the scheme can have their fundamental rights infringed, 
a larger set than just those charged with offences.  
Digital Rights Ireland in the ECJ examined the issue of whether a data retention 
directive, pursuing the legitimate objective of national security, satisfied the 
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principle of proportionality. The Court found it was not proportionate as: (i) the 
measure covered all individuals and all means of electronic communications 
without any differentiation, limitation or exception being made in pursuit of fighting 
crime; (ii) the measure had no objective criterion limiting access and subsequent 
use of the data by the authorities to what was strictly necessary and did not have 
any substantive or procedural conditions regulating the processing of the data- of 
particular concern was that access was not conditional on prior court review; (iii) 
there was no objective criteria for determining the specific data retention period; 
(iv) there were no sufficient safeguards ensuring protection of the data against 
abuse; and (v) the measure did not require data to be retained within the EU.314  
In the Safe Harbour there was no required relationship between the data retained 
and a threat to public security- even a simple relationship like time period or a 
geographic zone or something more complex like a nexus of individuals likely to be 
involved in serious crime. Instead individuals for whom there is no evidence of any 
remote link at all with serious crime were having their data processed.315 Given that 
the mass surveillance underpinning Schrems concerned the content of data rather 
than metadata as in Digital Rights Ireland, concerns are particularly pronounced.  
Additionally whilst in Digital Rights Ireland the Court found national security to be 
a legitimate aim, the storing of data for up to two years was a disproportionate 
intrusion into the private lives of customers whose data is retained without any 
suspicion.316 The mass surveillance mechanisms using the personal data flowing 
through Safe Harbour are even more alarming given they do not have a time limit 
for deletion.  
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Ultimately the generalised rather than limited access by public authorities, as well 
as the unlimited data retention period, was held to compromise the essence of the 
fundamental right to respect for private life guaranteed by art 7 of the Charter.317  
(b) Safeguards 
Crucially the Safe Harbour did not contain rules on how the interferences would be 
limited when the United States pursued national security nor how effective legal 
protection could protect against that interference.318 As shown by the earlier 
analysis, the alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and FTC were clearly falling 
short of acting as sufficient safeguards.  
The lack of safeguards in S & Marper was decisive as there were no independent 
reviewing of the justification for retaining suspects’ data and there were limited 
possibilities for acquitted suspects to have the data removed.319 The need for 
safeguards was held to be “all the greater” when personal data processing is 
automatic and used for police purposes- this clearly applies to the automatic 
processing used for mass surveillance through the Safe Harbour.320 Given the 
criticism of the safeguards under the effective detection and supervisory 
mechanisms section, the interference with fundamental rights in Schrems could not 
be considered as sufficiently safeguarded against.  
(c) Severity of the issue and harm which society could be exposed to 
Examining the magnitude of terrorism harm is a difficult exercise. However looking 
at the number of fatalities per year in the United States, including perpetrators, gives 
an interesting perspective. In 2001 there were 2,908 deaths, 2902 from the 9/11 
incident alone. In the following thirteen years, six of the years had zero deaths, four 
years had between one and six deaths, and the two highest years had eighteen and 
seventeen deaths. This results in a mean number of deaths of four per year over the 
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2002-2014 timeframe.321 Including 9/11, from 1999-2014 the mean number of 
United States fatalities in the United States was 186 deaths per year with a total of 
2,981 deaths. To contextualise this over 22,000 Americans died from overdosing on 
prescription opioids in 2015.322 Additionally over 600,000 people die of heart 
disease in the United States every year.323  
Accidents in well understood systems, such as car crashes, produce relatively 
minimal social disturbance beyond the families and friends of direct victims. 
However incidents involving unusual means of harm, such as nuclear attacks or 
anthrax scares, are poorly understood and are interpreted by many as omens of 
further disasters causing disproportionate psychological and political impacts.324 
Even though the harms of terrorism may be relatively small compared to car crash 
mortality, the perception of the terrorism harm is substantial and hence legislators 
are under significant pressure to appear to tackle the issue. 
Whilst any death is significant, contextualising the lives lost to terrorism against 
other causes of mortality gives an indication of the urgency and severity of the need 
to combat terrorism through mechanisms that seriously infringe fundamental 
rights. It is noteworthy in a survey conducted just before the 2016 United States 
Election, nearly three quarters of Trump supporters and two fifths of Clinton 
supporters saw terrorism as a “very big problem.”325 Whilst fear of terrorism is 
undoubtedly prevalent, the harm when measured by mortality is relatively small.  
Once again moving from the harm mass surveillance is looking to mitigate to looking 
at the harm actually caused by mass surveillance is a useful exercise. There are some 
significant economic harms flowing mass surveillance. For example economic losses 
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to United States based cloud computing firms is estimated to be between USD 
22,000,000,000 and USD 180,000,000,000.326  
It is also noteworthy the Court in S & Marper was willing to consider harms from 
future use of personal data, with undiscovered technology, as legitimate and 
relevant to examining an interference with fundamental rights.327 This was in the 
context of DNA material being put to future uses. Big Data analytics is likely to allow 
more sensitive intuitions about individuals in the future than it does today. Given 
the lack of data minimisation and ability to store personal data over the long term, 
the processing of personal data by the NSA arguably needs to be contextualised not 
only by the fundamental rights infringements occurring today, but those that might 
occur with further processing to stored personal data as technology develops.  
(d) Benefits over proposed measures 
The requirement that a measure has benefits over existing measures again sits 
uncomfortably in the context of mass surveillance. One analysis of terrorist attacks 
within the United States since 9/11 found metadata collection had “no discernible 
impact on preventing acts of terrorism.”328 Additionally the think tank New America, 
reporting on the NSA, found traditional investigative methods, being tip offs, 
informants and targeted surveillance, provided the impetus for most case 
investigations. The contribution of NSA’s mass surveillance programs was labelled 
as “minimal.”329  
It is hard to see the measures as proportionate in light of the disputed benefits over 
traditional policing methods which interfere less with fundamental rights. In 
Schwarz whether a data processing measure was “necessary” required an 
examination of other measures which will interfere less with the fundamental rights 
under art 7 and 8 of the Charter but would still contribute to objective of the 
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legislation.330 Tip offs, informants and targeted surveillance with a warrant in this 
context all provide genuine benefits with substantially less privacy and data 
protection infringements.  
(e) Conclusion on Proportionality test.  
Given the broad scope, lack of safeguards, contentious magnitude of the harm being 
addressed and lack of benefits of over other measures, mass surveillance appears to 
be a significantly disproportionate interference with fundamental rights. 
3 Conclusion on Safe Harbour validity in light of necessity and proportionality  
Advocate General Bot found the mass, indiscriminate surveillance being undertaken 
in the PRISM program was “inherently disproportionate” and consequently was an 
unwarranted interference with the fundamental rights provided under art 7 and 8 
of the Charter. Mass surveillance was held to be an “extremely serious” interference 
due to its secrecy, the large volume of personal data involved and the substantial 
number of data subjects affected.331 Indeed Advocate General Bot found any third 
country with rules of law permitting mass and indiscriminate surveillance could not 
be considered to offer adequate protection under any circumstances.  
However the ECJ took a slightly unusual step in that art 1 of the Safe Harbour was 
not declared invalid because it allowed for disproportionate and unnecessary 
interferences with fundamental rights, providing a level of protection of 
fundamental rights lower than that required by adequacy. Instead, although art 1 
stated the Safe Harbour provided adequate protection, the ECJ found the Safe 
Harbour contained insufficient findings regarding the international commitments 
and domestic laws by which the United States actually ensured an essentially 
equivalent standard of protection.332 Given the requirement to state the United 
States ensures adequate protection with duly stated reasons, the ECJ declared the 
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Safe Harbour invalid “without there being any need to examine the content of the 
Safe Harbour principles.”333  
This is an unusually technical point upon which to find the Safe Harbour invalid. It 
is politically cautious in that it does not aggressively attack the United States data 
protection system, however it presents as a gloved fist withdrawn at the last 
moment. The judgment clearly holds the Safe Harbour principles and enforcement 
to be well below the adequacy standard of essentially equivalent however the 
invalidation is made on a narrow technical point that insufficient reasons were given 
by the European Commission when making the positive finding of adequacy. The 
Court withdrew from a full, explicit statement that the underlying protection of the 
Safe Harbour was inadequate.  
The purpose of invaliding the implementing decision on a technical point would 
appear to be for future negotiating reasons. If the Safe Harbour was invalidated on 
account of its principles and enforcement regime, it would be difficult to implement 
a new, similar scheme. However if the Safe Harbour was invalidated because its 
implementing decision was not specific and comprehensive enough, this provides 
more flexibility for establishing a slightly improved scheme.  
Ultimately the case fails to rigorously outline the requirements of achieving 
adequate protection- instead it retreats to the ratio that adequacy implementing 
decisions must state sufficient reasons for why a country in fact ensures adequate 
protection.  
E Key Points  
The central finding of Schrems is that adequacy requires a level of protection of 
fundamental rights that is essentially equivalent to that guaranteed within the EU.  
From a legal perspective, independent and effective detection and supervisory 
mechanisms are required and individuals must have legal remedies available.  
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Crucially any processing that interferes with fundamental rights must be based on 
clear, precise and accessible rules. Additionally necessity and proportionality 
regarding the national security interest pursued must be demonstrated.  
Schrems disappointingly failed to complete a thorough analysis of the necessity and 
proportionality of mass surveillance.  
However under my own analysis I suggest mass surveillance falls considerably short 
of satisfying the requirements of necessity and proportionality.  
The case must be understood in its political context. Clearly the EU and the ECJ were 
hesitant to sour diplomatic relations with the United States.  
The Safe Harbour evidently provided inadequate protection of data from its 
inception however under significant economic and political pressure it still received 
a positive adequacy finding. 
Disappointingly the final judgment of Schrems did not explicitly find the protection 
provided by the United States data protection regime or the Safe Harbour 
inadequate. Instead the ECJ found the implementing decision was not thorough 
enough. This move lacks judicial courage and paves the way for a similar mechanism 
(the Privacy Shield) to replace the Safe Harbour.  
Ultimately the ECJ in Schrems failed to seize the opportunity to provide a detailed 
account of the requirements of adequacy and cannot be seen as a strong upholding 







VII FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 
Art 25(6) of the Directive provides an adequacy decision may be given if a country 
ensures an adequate level of protection, by reason of its domestic law or 
international commitments it has entered into, for the protection of the private lives 
and basic freedoms and rights of individuals (emphasis added).  
To better understand adequacy then it is useful to examine the rights to data 
protection and privacy which underpin it. If they are uncertain in scope or the ECJ is 
inconsistent in asserting the rights under the Charter then adequacy will suffer, 
especially in light of the strength of the economic and national security interests 
which can act against those rights.  
Curiously when the Charter was first introduced in 2000 the President of the 
European Commission Romano Prodi outlined the purpose as being “to make more 
visible and explicit to European Union Citizens the fundamental rights they already 
enjoy at European level.”334 However the Charter, rather than just consolidating and 
making more visible the rights contained in the ECHR, introduced new rights such 
as the right to environmental protection under art 37 and of course the right to the 
protection of personal data under art 8. If the right to data protection is simply a 
restatement of the right to privacy then its inclusion in the Charter may be 
redundant. On the other hand it may provide additional protection for adequacy if it 
is distinct from art 7.  
Given the Charter’s relative youth the ECJ has benefitted greatly from the experience 
and expertise of the ECtHR. The relationship between the two Courts has been 
described as a mutually respectful, informal arrangement, a sort of “common 
supranational diplomacy.”335 The right to private life under the ECHR in particular 
has been useful with the ECJ finding art 7 of the Charter to be given “the same 
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meaning and the same scope as article 8(1) of the ECHR, as interpreted by the case-
law of the European Court of Human Rights.”336  
Whilst the corpus of human rights law from the ECtHR gives the right to data 
protection and privacy under the Charter some stability, the ECJ has been hesitant 
in firmly asserting art 7 and 8 of the Charter. Indeed whilst the Charter was 
introduced in 2000 it was not until 2009 that it achieved binding legal status.337 The 
ECJ did not cite the Charter for the first six years of the Charter’s existence, 
preferring to use national fundamental rights protections and the ECHR, although 
the Court of First Instance did cite the Charter directly during this period.338   
Confusion has occurred as the ECJ has drawn on both the ECHR and Charter to 
develop its own fundamental rights jurisprudence. For example in Michael Schwarz 
v Stadt Bochum, a case concerning biometric data on passports, the ECJ examined 
the requirement that limitations of rights must be “provided by law.”339 This 
provision is supposed to import the significant case law of the ECHR which requires 
an interference to have a basis in domestic law as well as be compatible with the 
rule of law, in that it is adequately accessible, foreseeable, free from arbitrariness 
and has sufficient clarity. However the ECJ only analysed whether the interference 
had a basis in domestic law.340 Consequently the Court held the law’s validity to be 
tautologically satisfied by virtue of it being a law, rather than satisfying the 
requirements of being compatible with the rule of law. These confusions 
characterise a jurisprudence lacking coherence and hinder the Charter’s 
development as an independent source of fundamental rights.  
The relationship between art 7 and art 8 of the Charter is also beset with unclarity. 
For example in Volker und Markus Schecke and Eifert art 7 and 8 were found to be 
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closely connected with the Court finding the “right to respect for private life with 
regard to the processing of personal data” was “recognised by articles 7 and 8 of the 
Charter” implying the two articles combine to form a composite right.341 However 
treating the rights as one questions whether they can be relied upon independently 
and art 8 of the Charter implicitly loses its authority to stand alone as a sui generis 
right if it is always pleaded in conjunction with the right to privacy. 
Digital Rights Ireland, in which the ECJ declared a Data Retention Directive invalid, 
also highlights the imprecision of the ECJ’s approach. Initially the Court examined 
the Data Retention Directive’s impact on the right to private life under art 7 of the 
Charter, before finding “such a retention of data also falls under article 8 of the 
Charter”- treating the two rights as providing distinct rather than overlapping 
protection.342 However the separation of the two rights then collapsed with the 
Court finding the protection of personal data under art 8 to be “especially important 
for the right to respect for private life enshrined in article 7 of the Charter.”343 This 
locates the importance of art 8 not in the fact it is a fundamental right, but in its 
relationship to art 7. Curiously, when the Court completed an assessment of the 
legitimacy of the interferences, the rights were considered together. So what started 
as a separate analysis of two rights merged to produce one “right to the respect for 
private life” of which the protection of personal data appeared to be a component.344 
Whilst joining the two rights might appear to reinforce the protection they provide, 
uncertainty results from the ECJ adopting such an inconsistent approach.  
The Advocate General Cruz Villalon’s opinion in Digital Rights Ireland provides little 
assistance. He held that legislation justifiably limiting the right to personal data 
protection under art 8 of the Charter could nevertheless constitute a 
disproportionate interference with art 7.345 This suggests the right to privacy 
provides protection above and beyond the right to data protection. However he then 
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argues the rights “are so closely linked that they may be regarded as establishing a 
single ‘right to respect for private life with regard to the processing of personal 
data.’”346 It is confusing that two rights should be considered together but an 
interference could infringe one but not the other.  
Schrems failed to rectify any of the uncertainty in the relationship between the right 
to privacy and the right to data protection. The Court found adequacy under art 
25(6) “implements the express obligation laid down in article 8(1) of the Charter to 
protect personal data” 347 (emphasis added). However it is unclear why there is a 
focus on art 8 rather than art 7. Particularly given that the Court later found 
legislation allowing public authorities generalised access to electronic 
communications compromised the “essence of the fundamental right to respect for 
private life, as guaranteed by article 7 of the Charter”348 (emphasis added). 
Additionally when considering whether an adequacy decision might have to be 
reconsidered in light of mass surveillance the Court stressed the “important role 
played by the protection of personal data in light of the fundamental right to respect 
for private life.”349 Again this appears to make the right to data protection 
subordinate to the right to privacy- with the value of the former flowing from its 
contribution to the latter.  
Whilst drafting art 8 as a right separate from privacy appeared innovative when the 
Charter was introduced, the jurisprudence of the ECJ has failed to give art 8 an 
independent existence. It is unclear what, if any, protection art 8 gives outside of art 
7. However the youth and uncertain scope of art 7 and 8 of the Charter is not per se 
a weakness as it can allow for flexibility in the ECJ’s response to blossoming issues 
for adequacy. In turn that flexibility can be constrained as required by the 
persuasive but not binding precedent of art 8 of the ECHR.  
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However the relationship between art 7 and 8 of the Charter cannot be clearly 
elucidated from the wider case law of the ECJ and Schrems fails to contribute any 
clarity to the situation. Ultimately the foundation of fundamental rights on which 
adequacy is built is unclear- there are relatively few ECJ judgments asserting the 
fundamental rights to privacy and data protection against strong economic and 
national security interests. This uncertainty and lack of precedent may have 
contributed to the ECJ’s decision in Schrems to find the Safe Harbour invalid on 
technical grounds rather than carrying out a full fundamental rights analysis. 
A Further Case Study: Positive Adequacy Decision for Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) Data.  
After the 9/11 terrorist attacks the United States Bureau of Customs and Border 
Protection wanted PNR data prior to any flights arriving in the United States, for 
national security purposes. 
This left airlines in the EU in a precarious position of potentially violating EU data 
protection law by complying and violating United States law by refusing. As with the 
Safe Harbour, a legal and political compromise was pursued balancing the EU’s right 
to personal data protection and the United States ability to legislate for national 
security purposes. The European Commission initially informed the United States 
that PNR data collection would conflict with EU law. However the United States 
refused to waive the right to penalise airlines refusing to cooperate and 
subsequently many large airlines granted access to the personal data as 
requested.350  
The European Commission, in a political knot, adopted a positive adequacy decision 
for a 2004 PNR agreement with the United States which attracted significant 
criticism. The European Parliament subsequently challenged the adequacy decision 
primarily on human rights grounds but also on the basis of the European 
Commission’s competence to enter such an agreement under the first rather than 
third pillar of the EU. The ECJ found for the European Parliament in 2006 however 
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the decision was decided on competence issues rather than fundamental rights 
issues, with no privacy concerns examined in the Court.351 This politically polite 
move mirrors the ECJ in Schrems invalidating the Safe Harbour on competence and 
narrow technical grounds rather than on fundamental rights grounds.  
The decision by the ECJ invalidating the PNR agreement made no reference to the 
ECHR or the Charter. This meant new PNR decisions could be achieved so long as a 
different implementing procedure was adopted.352 If the original decision by the ECJ 
had taken a fundamental rights approach, rather than a competence approach, the 
subsequent PNR agreements would likely have needed improved fundamental 
rights protections. Additionally it would have been an excellent opportunity to 
shape the relationship between the rights to data protection and privacy against 
national security.  
Locating the reasoning in competence issues halted the first PNR decision but has 
done little to halt subsequent PNR decisions and failed to shape the rights of privacy 
and data protection. Currently the EU has agreements with Canada, Australia, a new 
one with the United States and negotiations have opened with Mexico. The most 
recent PNR agreement was adopted in 2016 and captures significant personal data 
of individuals entering and leaving the EU. 353 
The data demanded include up to thirty five different types of information including 
meal preferences which can indicate religious affiliation. To highlight concerns Paul 
Ohm uses the concept of “information entropy,” which measures how close a given 
fact is to being connected to an individual. It is a measure of the uncertainty of the 
inference chain required to make that connection.354 He argues that apparently 
benign reidentification steps which cause no obvious harm still need to be protected 
against as they shorten the inference chains required. Crucially the PNR data can 
contain mobile phone and credit card information which are crucial linking fields. 
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These two fields can substantially reduce information entropy and link with other 
data sets held by other agencies. Arguably then an analysis of whether the collection 
of PNR data is proportionate needs to be seen against the risks of data sharing 
between agencies using phone or credit card information as linking fields.355  
The value of PNR data collection is challenged on the basis almost no evidence exists 
of such data being used to effectively deter or prevent terrorist activity.356  Professor 
Fred Cate slices the issue poignantly in an American context- if the data mining of 
PNR data achieves a positive terrorist identification rate of 1 per cent, which is 
significantly higher than that achieved in publically disclosed records, around 
7,500,000 passengers in the United States will be incorrectly identified as potential 
terrorists each year. 357 This huge processing of personal data has tangible harms 
beyond privacy invasions, with incorrect placement on no fly lists an obvious 
illustration.  
Rahinah Ibrahim, a Doctor of Philosophy student from Stanford, was denied entry 
to the United States due to a bureaucratic error.358 After several years she achieved 
a pyrrhic victory in that her inclusion on the list was found to be incorrect but she 
still cannot get a visa to visit the United States. A general review by the Department 
of Justice Inspector General found that tens of thousands of people are incorrectly 
placed on the No Fly List with some 35 per cent of the nominations to the list being 
outdated.359 In light of the privacy costs and inaccuracies, and that many of the 
decisions made from the PNR are autonomous with little option for objection, the 
Art 29 WP has been outspoken in their scepticism of whether PNR systems are 
proportionate to the alleged security benefit.360 
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Disappointingly the EU has pushed forward with an internal PNR Directive which 
would be implemented by 2018. This would establish databases tracking the 
movements of all individuals travelling into or out of the EU, although Member 
States can choose to include intra-EU travel as well. A European Data Protection 
Supervisor had described the proposal as failing to achieve the correct balance 
between fighting crime and the “rights of the innocent majority to go about their 
daily lives without undue interference.”361  
Ultimately PNR agreements in the EU show the reluctance to protect fundamental 
rights in light of the national security interests of trading partners. The PNR and Safe 
Harbour experiences show the European Commission is prepared to lower 
fundamental rights protections for European citizens in order to achieve political 
compromise with the United States- ultimately lowering the value of adequacy.  
The ECJ has shown a willingness to find against the European Commission, which is 
encouraging, however the reasoning adopted has only provided short term success. 
The narrow finding of ultra vires in the PNR decision and hence that “the decision 
on adequacy must consequently be annulled and it is not necessary to consider the 
[fundamental rights] limbs of the first plea” is disappointing. The fundamental rights 
pleas were incredibly important. A sharp fundamental rights analysis could have 
provided some clarity over the meaning of art 7 and 8 of the Charter and would have 
given support to the Art 29 WP’s criticisms of PNR data collection. Additionally the 
PNR decision gave the ECJ an opportunity to reinforce the precedent that 
generalised collection of personal data of law abiding citizens is antithetical to 
fundamental rights. I believe the ECJ must be more courageous in asserting the 
Charter against a growing international willingness to interfere with fundamental 
rights in the pursuit of national security.  
B Fundamental Rights in the European Union Generally   
Plainly there are issues with the scope and shape of the fundamental rights to data 
protection and privacy under the Charter. However fundamental rights in the EU are 
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also unclear when analysed from a higher level of abstraction. If the fundamental 
rights of the EU are unsettled or have their authority challenged, then the 
effectiveness and success of adequacy may suffer. The stability of adequacy 
demands a stable conception of the fundamental rights it is to protect. I address two 
primary issues in this section: (i) how an economic focus might reduce the 
protection provided by fundamental rights; and (ii) how primacy issues might 
change the protection provided by fundamental rights.  
1 Economic issues 
The object of the Directive requires the protecting of fundamental rights and 
freedoms however Member States must not “restrict or prohibit the free flow of 
data.”362 A tension exists here between economic pursuits and the rights to privacy 
and data protection. As Schrems noted, the National Supervisory Authorities must 
ensure a “fair balance between, on the one hand, observance of the fundamental 
right to privacy and, on the other hand, the interests requiring free movement of 
personal data.”363  This is further highlighted in recital 2 of the Directive where data 
processing systems are required to respect “fundamental rights and freedoms” but 
also “contribute to economic and social progress.”  
Speaking to the Wall Street Journal on the case of Schrems, Koen Lenaerts, President 
of the ECJ, stated “Europe must not be ashamed of its basic principles: The rule of 
law is not up for sale. It is a matter of upholding the requirements in the European 
Union, of the rule of law, of fundamental rights.” When asked whether the judgment 
sufficiently considered the economic fallout to business he artfully replied “if this is 
also affecting some dealings internationally, why would Europe not be proud to 
contribute its requiring of standards of respect for fundamental rights to the world 
in general.”364 These comments locate fundamental rights at the core of the EU’s 
purpose. However the EU’s history and focus on the common market suggest its 
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centre of gravity lies in the economy rather than human rights as Lenaerts 
implies.365  
Privacy protection might be lowered if there is an economic focus in the ECJ and 
there is concern the Charter encourages this by including economic rights as 
“fundamental rights.” Without a hierarchy of rights well-resourced economic 
interests could dominate social and political rights in certain contexts. Indeed 
Professor Ulrich Haltern has described the EU as a “shallow” and “superficial” 
organisation which “privileges the commercial above all else.”366 Whilst an extreme 
position, his concerns have basis. For example in Schmidberger, freedom of 
expression, a core human right, was held to be an “equal interest” with the right to 
the free movement of goods.367 Additionally in the cases of Laval and Viking market 
freedoms, specifically the right to provide services, outweighed the fundamental 
right to strike which the court felt had been exercised disproportionately.368  
The meaning and scope of fundamental rights can drift over time- shaped by those 
with the resources to litigate. Whilst traditionally conceived of as tools for the 
powerless against the powerful, rights can come to be used by the powerful against 
the vulnerable. The concerns are particularly pronounced in the United States 
experience- corporations have had their political donations protected as free 
speech369 and have been able to restrict inspections from Occupational Safety and 
Health workers due to the right against unreasonable search and seizure.370 It is a 
curious point that a corporation may enjoy freedom from unreasonable search and 
seizure but a United States prisoner may not.371 Fundamental rights can drift over 
time to protect those with the power and influence to lobby and litigate.  
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As the Directive requires a balancing of economic progress with the right to privacy 
and data protection, in the long term the balance may tilt in favour of economic 
progress- with adequacy withering if the rights to privacy and data protection are 
not strengthened. Well-resourced lobbying interests in Europe could be expected to 
align behind “economic” interests. This concern is marked when the history and 
initial economic focus of the EU’s origins are considered. Adequacy has the difficult 
task of accommodating the tension between fundamental rights and economic 
interests. This tension is likely to increase with the emergence and integration of 
technologies with huge economic benefits but significant privacy concerns-
particularly Big Data and artificial intelligence. 
2 Primacy issues 
Some commentators believe the EU has used fundamental rights as a vehicle for 
establishing primacy. Under this interpretation fundamental rights are a palatable 
means to EU supremacy and autonomy rather than an ends themselves, an 
epiphenomenon of the European project of market integration. However just 
because the motivations for fundamental rights may be instrumental in nature, the 
protection provided by those rights is not necessarily weakened- indeed Member 
States rejecting EU law supremacy in favour of their own rights guarantees could 
raise protection in some contexts. However to the extent fundamental rights are 
contested by Member States and international organisations, instability may 
increase and the credibility of the EU as a fundamental rights organisation may 
decrease.  
Initially the EU eschewed the responsibility of guaranteeing fundamental rights- the 
European Economic Community, as the EU was formally known, had competence 
only in economic matters and did not express explicit ambitions to provide 
fundamental rights protections. National courts and the ECtHR, a Council of Europe 
organisation, were already guarantors of fundamental rights. However as the EU 
extended its competence to visas, asylum and criminal matters, fundamental rights 
became much more relevant to the organisation.372 The rights were initially asserted 
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in case law as general principles of law before being codified in Article 6 of the 
Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Charter.373 This move produced tension in 
two domains, between the Member States and the EU and between the EU and other 
international organisations such as the United Nations. 
Starting in the 1960s some Member States questioned whether the fundamental 
rights protections in their constitutions were protected in the realm of European 
Community law. These concerns arose as whilst the exercise of public power at the 
national level was subject to constitutional guarantees, supranational action at the 
European level had no legally binding fundamental rights standards.374 In response 
to these concerns, and to prevent Member States answering the question 
themselves- possibly by declaring the supremacy of their own constitutions- the 
European Court “discovered” that fundamental rights were a general principle of 
European Community law drawn from the constitutional traditions common to 
Member States.375 These general principles were referenced first in Stauder before 
being expanded in Internationale Handelsgesellschaft where it was held “respect for 
fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of [European 
Community] law.”376 Guidance on fundamental rights from international 
conventions, later indicated to include the ECHR and the European Social Charter, 
was held acceptable in Nold.377 Against this backdrop there is a difficulty of 
coherence. The Member States have different constitutional histories- determining 
which traditions are suitably common is a subjective and trying exercise.  
Initially fundamental rights were only used to challenge Community acts rather than 
Member State acts however this stance shifted over time.378 In Roland Rutili v 
Ministre de l'intérieur379 fundamental rights were alluded to as relevant 
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considerations for analysing Member State action. Then in Wachauf v Federal 
Republic of Germany 380 the Court applied fundamental rights principles directly to 
Member State acts implementing Community legislation.381 Building on this in 
Elleniki Radiophonia Tileorasi v Dimotiki Etairia Pliroforissis the Court extended 
their jurisdiction again, implying they could examine all Member State actions 
against fundamental rights as long as the matters concerned fell within the area of 
Community Law. 382 This is a subtle transfer of power from Member States to the EU.  
Member States have been cautious in locating the protection of fundamental rights 
in EU law rather than their own constitutional law. For example the Federal 
Constitutional Court in the late 1980s and early 1990s only accepted the supremacy 
EU law if EU law guaranteed the fundamental rights protection provided under the 
German Basic Law.383 The Czech Constitutional Court, possibly stimulated by the 
German position, also adopted a conditional acceptance position, finding the Treaty 
of Lisbon as compatible with Czech constitution rather than accepting it without 
condition.384  
The experiences of the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) scheme also disrupt the 
harmonious view that Member States and the EU have a coherent, stable 
understanding of how fundamental rights should be protected. As part of an EU 
security initiative the EAW scheme provides for the arrest and surrender of 
individuals from one Member State to another for criminal proceedings. The merits 
of the request and the protection of fundamental rights are taken on trust and the 
alleged crime does not have to be a crime in both the requesting and surrendering 
state. Constitutional Courts in Germany, Poland and Cyprus struck down the 
national laws implementing the scheme on the basis the scheme did not adequately 
protect fundamental rights.385  
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Crucially Belgium made a preliminary request from its Supreme Court to the ECJ on 
the issue of whether the EU’s EAW framework decision was itself null and void, 
rather than just striking down the implementing laws as occurred in Germany, 
Poland and Cyprus. The ECJ upheld the EAW framework however the decision has 
been criticised for only superficially addressing fundamental rights issues and 
assuring a high level of trust did exist between Member States.386 Bubbling beneath 
the assurance were divergent approaches to fundamental rights protections for 
accused- especially given issues such as abortion, inciting racial hatred and 
euthanasia are treated very different across Member States.  
The EAW experience shows (i) how the EU can press security issues ahead of 
fundamental rights; and (ii) the instability of fundamental rights between Member 
States and between the EU and Member States. As Professor Douglas-Scott reminds 
us, the constitutional traditions of Member States can be a “divisive and fragmenting 
source, rather than a unifying source, for rights.”387  
Professor Joseph Weiler believes that whilst the surface language of Stauder and its 
progeny concern human rights, the “deep structure is all about supremacy.”388 The 
ECJ case of Kadi, often heralded as a success for fundamental rights, provides an 
interesting lens to analyse this quest for supremacy.389 Mr Kadi, a wealthy 
businessman, had his assets frozen under a UN resolution on the grounds he was 
associated with the Al-Qaeda network. Whilst the Court of First Instance found the 
primacy of the UN did not allow a review of the decision against EU fundamental 
rights, and that review would cause significant disruption to the international order, 
the ECJ on appeal found his right to be heard, his right to an effective remedy and a 
procedural aspect of his right to property had been violated.390  
The outcome of the case appears to be a victory for fundamental rights against 
overreaching counter terrorism regulation. Indeed writing on the case one academic 
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declared “in the European Union’s flawed system of governance, democracy finds 
solace in judicial review.”391 Whilst justice may have been found in the case, the 
judgment was particularly concerned with autonomy and primacy. The court stated 
the “Community must respect international law”392 however it went on to hold the 
European Community was “based on the rule of law, of a constitutional guarantee 
stemming from the EC Treaty as an autonomous legal system” and that this legal 
system “was not to be prejudiced by an international agreement.”393 There was a 
clear intention to align EU law with constitutional and national law rather than 
international law.  
The Court could have reached the same outcome for Mr Kadi without focusing on 
the autonomy of the EU, instead focusing on the EC’s implementation of the UN 
Security Council order. Choosing not to take that judicial path appears to be a 
deliberate and direct confrontation between the EU and UN.394 Additionally the 
decision of the ECJ to focus on competence rather than fundamental rights in the 
PNR agreements provides interesting context to Kadi. If Kadi is an example of 
fundamental rights overcoming unjust blacklisting then it sits uncomfortably with 
the European Commission pursuing its own PNR agreements, which have widely 
known deficiencies. If however Kadi and the PNR agreements are about the 
assertion of the primacy and autonomy of the EU, then they read together more 
comfortably.  
Analysing how and why the EU has manoeuvred to its current legal relationship with 
its Member States and the international community may appear to be solely an 
academic exercise- such a conclusion would be unwise in the context of Brexit. 
Britain has taken the first step to remove itself from the EU. Supremacy of EU law 
against British law was a key issue receiving public ventilation in the lead up to the 
referendum, although issues of cost saving and National Health Service spending 
appear to have dominated concerns for voters. It is difficult to know the reasoning 
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behind those who voted to leave however the website of the Vote Leave campaign 
provides interesting context. Under the Why Vote Leave page the campaigners, 
writing from a British perspective, claim the ECJ “overrules us on everything from 
how much tax we pay, to who we can let in and out of the country, and on what 
terms.”395 The site also puts forward the question “What is this campaign really 
about?” before starting the answer with “[o]ur political system is stuck. Whichever 
party is in charge, the Government cannot sort out our problems or deliver their 
promises because they have to follow EU rules.”396  
These tensions for supremacy could have consequences for data protection in 
Europe. First it is worth noting Britain might have a difficult time achieving a 
positive adequacy decision as a third country.397 This is particularly in light of the 
recent Investigatory Powers Act 2016 which expands surveillance powers and 
requires telecommunications companies to store web history for up to a year- 
possibly beyond what is strictly necessary and proportionate in the interests of 
national security. Second, if further countries leave the EU the number of European 
individuals receiving EU fundamental rights protection will be reduced. And thirdly, 
as countries leave the EU, the authority of the EU declines. Looking at a hypothetical 
long term an EU with fewer members will have less impact on data protection law 
norms internationally. It is noteworthy that some politicians in Europe are already 
campaigning for further EU exits. For example Norbert Hofer, a far right candidate 
in Austria has advocated for an Austrian referendum on leaving the EU if Brussels 
“fails to refocus on its original role as an economic and trade alliance” and instead 
moves towards “political centralisation.”398  
Considerable tension exists between Member States and the EU over the EU’s role 
as a guarantor of fundamental rights. This is clear in Germany as well as in Britain 
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following their recent move to reject the supremacy of EU law. If further Member 
States follow Brexit there could be a substantial withering of the authority of EU law.  
The development of fundamental rights and the Charter within the EU could 
conceivably take on as much significance as the United States Bill of Rights, it could 
be a defining feature of the EU’s development as a polity.399 However the realisation 
of that goal appears challenging in light of the tensions discussed above.  
Adequacy intends to propagate high EU standards of data protection, built on 
fundamental rights. That campaign is significantly curtailed if the fundamental 
rights foundation on which adequacy is built is challenged and the EU loses the 
support of its Member States. 
C Key Points 
Adequacy requires, by reason of international commitments or domestic law, 
adequate protection of the private lives and basic freedoms and rights of individuals.  
Adequacy is constructed on a foundation of fundamental rights. Therefore the 
fundamental rights jurisprudence of the ECJ is crucial for understanding the 
requirements of adequacy.  
Whilst the ECJ is a relatively new court, with limited case law on data protection and 
privacy, it has benefitted from the experience and expertise of the ECtHR.  
Nevertheless the ECJ has had difficulty defining the scope and shape of the rights to 
data protection and privacy under the Charter. The rights are often combined 
together and the relationship between them is unclear.  
There is little authority for the protection provided by art 8 of the Charter and it has 
limited current utility as a sui generis right.  
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Schrems failed to clarify the nature of the rights as the ECJ did not undertake a 
thorough analysis of the fundamental rights requirements of adequacy- instead 
finding the Safe Harbour invalid on a narrow technical point.  
PNR agreements found to provide adequate protection were another missed 
opportunity to clarify the role of fundamental rights protecting against intrusions 
justified on national security grounds. 
Following an unsettling pattern, the ECJ found the first PNR agreement invalid for 
technical competence issues rather than a lack of fundamental rights protection. 
This has eased the introduction of later PNR agreements.  
The PNR agreements and Safe Harbour are evidence the ECJ has pursued economic 
and political ties with the United States ahead of the fundamental rights of European 
data subjects.  
There is a broad concern the EU’s centre of gravity lies in the economy rather than 
in fundamental rights. This claim draws on: the history of the EU as an economic 
institution; the equating of economic rights with traditional human rights; and the 
ability of economic interests to shape fundamental rights over the long term through 
lobbying and litigation.  
Additionally the EU may be asserting fundamental rights as instruments for 
achieving primacy and autonomy, rather than as goods in themselves. This criticism 
is given weight by the expansion of EU competence over its history and the tensions 
between Member States and the EU, as well as between the EU and other 
supranational bodies such as the UN.  
These tensions have produced cracks in the fundamental rights authority of the EU 
with some Member States challenging the EU’s authority and others looking to leave 
the EU itself.  
Ultimately fundamental rights in the EU provide an unclear and possibly unstable 
foundation on which to uphold the requirements of adequacy. 
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VIII EUROPEAN UNION DATA PROTECTION DIRECTION  
The EU is looking to protect personal data with: (i) the Regulation, which will replace 
the Directive; and (ii) the Privacy Shield, which will replace the Safe Harbour. Both 
have significant consequences for the shaping of adequacy.  
A The General Data Protection Regulation  
The Regulation will come into force in May 2018. According to the European 
Commission the Regulation will deepen the EU internal market, streamline 
international transfers of personal data, ensure stronger enforcement of data 
protection rules and set global data protection standards.400 However the 
architecture of transborder flows and adequacy decisions remains essentially the 
same.401  
The Regulation has a more detailed catalogue of the elements required for adequacy 
and has formally adopted the standard of “essential equivalence” of fundamental 
rights protection as required by Schrems.402  
The specific areas for adequacy analysis under art 45(2) include:  
(i) the rule of law;  
(ii) respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;  
(iii) legislation concerning public security, national security, criminal law and 
access of public authorities to personal data;  
(iv) implementation of that legislation; 
(v) data protection rules and case law;  
(vi) effective and enforceable data subject rights and effective administrative and 
judicial redress for data subjects;  
(vii) whether there is an independent supervisory authority in the third country 
which can assist and advise data subjects on their rights and can cooperate with 
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the EU supervisory authorities; and  
(viii) the international commitments, obligations and organisations the third 
country has entered into, particularly relating to the protection of data.  
In light of the new provisions in the Regulation the level of personal data protection 
required for adequacy is increased. For example: there is a new right for data 
subjects to request data erasure403 (the right to be forgotten); data controllers will 
have to notify both data subjects and the supervisory authority in the case of a data 
breach;404 there is a right to data portability which allows data subjects to access 
and transfer their personal data across different services; special protection for 
children;405 fines for non-compliance are available, up to EUR 10,000,000 or 2 per 
cent of the corporation’s annual turnover, whichever is highest;406 a right to 
explanation of algorithmic decisions is introduced;407 and there is a new 
requirement for data protection by design and by default.408  
The Regulation looks to reduce compliance costs by removing the general 
notification requirement for transborder processing however new obligations 
would appear to offset these savings. Notably the requirements for data protection 
impact assessments, the documenting of all processing operations in detail and 
notification to data subjects and National Supervisory Authorities in the event of a 
security breach will all increase compliance costs- although they could be expected 
to increase the standard of protection.409 The notification requirements for 
transborder processing under the Directive were severely under enforced so the 
removal of the requirement is pragmatic. For example in 2007 the Spanish Data 
Protection Authority received notification for just under 8,500 international data 
transfers. If all were reported as required the number would likely be in the millions 
or even billions.410 
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Under the Regulation the European Commission is expected to review adequacy 
decisions at least every four years and monitor developments which might affect 
adequacy decisions.411 Additionally the European Commission and the National 
Supervisory Authorities are required to “engage relevant stakeholders in discussion 
and activities aimed at furthering international cooperation in the enforcement of 
legislation for the protection of personal data.”412 Scepticism may be appropriate in 
this context given Member States and the European Commission were supposed to 
inform each other under the Directive if they considered a third country was not 
ensuring an adequate level of protection.413 After the Snowden revelations, it 
became apparent New Zealand and Canada, both with positive adequacy decisions, 
were complicit in mass surveillance as part of the Five Eyes surveillance alliance 
however neither lost their adequacy status. Although the European Parliament’s 
Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs called on both the 
Commission and Member States to assess whether the protection provided by New 
Zealand and Canada was still adequate no further action appears to have been 
taken.414  
Looking internally the EU’s criticism of United States mass surveillance is 
duplicitous in light of mass surveillance by Member States. Crucially the United 
Kingdom is involved in Five Eyes. Additionally the Netherlands, France and 
Denmark are involved in Nine Eyes and Germany, Belgium, Italy, Sweden and Spain 
are involved in Fourteen Eyes. The European Parliament has called on those 
involved to revise their intelligence operations so they are in line with European 
fundamental rights obligations, as well as the principles of necessity, legality, 
proportionality, due process, notification, transparency and the presumption of 
innocence.415 However there has been no action taken against complicit Member 
States. The Regulation loses moral force to set high benchmarks for fundamental 
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rights protections when some of its largest countries are themselves complicit in 
generalised mass surveillance.  
Counterintuitively the increases in protection from data portability, privacy by 
design and default and the right to an explanation may make adequacy less effective. 
Very few countries have achieved adequate protection and by raising the bar and 
requiring regular reviews those that have may fall out of favour. Moreover there 
may be weak incentives for other countries to apply- especially given BCRs and 
MCMs allow data to flow outside of a formal adequacy decision. It is noteworthy the 
Art 29 WP conceded in 1998 that the adequacy decision project would be less 
effective if relatively few countries achieved positive adequacy findings.416 Only 
twelve countries have received adequacy decisions and a number are minor players 
in the global data processing environment, including Andorra, Guernsey, the Faeroe 
Islands, Jersey, Israel and the Isle of Man. Clearly the standard is either seen as too 
high for many countries or they do not see a positive adequacy decision as having 
great utility.  
Nevertheless the new requirements of the Regulation do contain some innovative 
features to improve privacy and the level of protection afforded by adequacy. I will 
examine three of the new provisions- the right to data portability, the right to an 
explanation and privacy by design and default.  
1 Right to data portability 
The right to data portability, whilst not directly improving data protection for data 
subjects, could have a positive indirect effect. The right could achieve this by 
increasing the ability of smaller firms to compete against firms with market 
dominance.  
Increasing the competitiveness of online markets gives legitimacy to the 
neoclassical position that the market will incentivise data controllers to protect 
personal data as otherwise data subjects will change providers. This argument is 
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false if data subjects have no meaningful alternatives but a market based solution 
gains credibility to the extent competition is increased. Issues of imperfect 
information and unequal bargaining power might remain, however increased 
competition from data portability could be instrumental in incentivising 
corporations to raise their data protection standards.  
The right can reduce monopolisation in online markets by significantly reducing the 
switching costs of changing provider. Unlike traditional markets, the degree of 
competition present in online markets is often determined by network effects and 
switching costs.417 Switching costs are impediments to users changing their service 
provider- they can be financial such as cancellation costs or effort based such as 
having to learn to use new software or re-uploading many photos to a new social 
media website. Network effects on the other hand concern the extent to which a 
user’s utility from a service increases as the number of other users increases. For 
example Facebook becomes increasingly valuable to users as more people join the 
website as the possibility of communicating with valued people increases.418 
Likewise LinkedIn becomes more valuable to its users as more people join as it 
increases the possibility of making professional connections.  
High switching costs and network effects can concentrate market dominance over 
time. This can be an issue for data protection standards if the dominant firms do not 
adopt high standards and data subjects do not have meaningful alternatives. For 
example Facebook enjoys substantial market dominance in the social network 
market, giving the corporation significant power to shape privacy and data 
protection norms. This is concerning given Facebook’s privacy failings and Mark 
Zuckerberg’s assertion that privacy is no longer a social norm.419 If Facebook has to 
allow its users to easily transfer their data to another social media website this 
                                                        
417 David Evans and Richard Schmalensee “The Industrial Organization of Markets with 
Two-sided Platforms” (2007) 3 Competition Policy International 151 at 152.  
418 Justus Haucap and Ulrich Heimeshoff “Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the internet driving 
competition or market monopolization?” (Discussion paper for Düsseldorf Institute for 
Competition Economics, Düsseldorf, January 2013) at 3. 
419 Johnson, above n 114. 
120 
 
encourages other firms to compete against Facebook, hopefully giving data subjects 
greater choice to select a corporation with their desired level of privacy safeguards.  
2 Right to an explanation  
The newly styled right to an explanation of algorithms could reduce discrimination 
and significantly improve transparency for data subjects. However it requires a 
dramatic overhaul of current algorithm practices and as the first piece of legislation 
to explicitly address algorithmic accountability its success or failure will reverberate 
well beyond Europe.  
First, the right looks to reduce discrimination through data sanitation. This occurs 
by disallowing sensitive data- revealing racial and ethnic origin as well as other 
special categories- from being the basis of automatic decisions producing significant 
legal effects.420 However true data sanitation is frustratingly difficult to achieve as 
removing categories may not affect bias as the relationship between the special 
categories and the outcome can be embedded in proxy variables.421 For example 
home address, with other factors, could be a proxy for ethnicity. Removing the 
special categories may simply deepen the bias making it more difficult to detect. 
Second, the right provides transparency by entitling data subjects to “meaningful 
information about the logic involved” as well as the consequences of algorithmic 
decisions.422 However beyond intentional secrecy to protect trade secrets there is a 
subtle ancillary issue. Companies may not know exactly how their self-learning 
algorithms are making decisions. The algorithms can become less transparent over 
time as different programmers leave and join the programming team. Additionally 
the algorithms can self-learn and evolve. This can make it difficult to understand 
where bias may be coming from. For example consider the google advertisements 
suggesting criminal background checks for “black sounding” names, unrelated to 
arrest records. The Google algorithm learns over time which advertisements get the 
                                                        
420 Bryce Goodman “A Step Towards Accountable Algorithms?: Algorithmic Discrimination and the 
European Union General Data Protection” (Paper presented at Conference on Neural Information 
Processing Systems, Barcelona, 2016) at 2.  
421 At 3.  
422 Regulation, art 13(2)(f), art 14(2)(g).  
121 
 
most clicks out of several possible for a given search string. The discrimination could 
therefore be from the algorithm responding to external data- biased clicking by 
society- or it could be embedded in the algorithm itself.423 The architecture of self-
learning algorithms provides exceptional flexibility in their development but makes 
their internal logical elusive.424  
The right to explanation is likely to be particularly difficult to achieve when 
discrimination is unintentional and opaque, in that it cannot be determined a priori. 
How to achieve the specificity required by the right to explanation may prove to be 
an incredibly nuanced and difficult task. Some commentators such as Professor 
Nicholas Diakopoulos argue transparency through traditional mechanisms of access 
requests and disclosure is likely to be insufficient.  
A new approach- algorithmic accountability reporting- may provide a partial 
solution for Member States and countries looking to achieve adequacy.425 Just as 
corporations require accounting auditing, they could also be required to undergo 
algorithm auditing. Effectively it would involve reverse engineering- varying inputs 
and comparing outputs to make intuitions about the underlying algorithms. Harvard 
Professor Latanya Sweeney followed this process to discover the criminal 
background check bias mentioned earlier. Nevertheless, although she could identify 
the bias she could not decipher where it was coming from. It is a complex area with 
many unknowns and no conventional approach although it has proved successful in 
identifying, if not explaining, algorithmic discrimination in interest rates and 
pricing.426  
The Regulation does not specifically provide for algorithm audits however they 
could become an important component of Data Impact Assessments under art 24, a 
component of industry based Codes of Conduct analysis under art 40 or a 
component of Certification under art 42. Unfortunately algorithmic auditing in the 
United States likely breaches the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act as the testing 
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usually requires violating the common terms of service of common websites.427 
However there is a current case brought by the American Civil Liberties Union 
challenging the constitutionality of the Act to allow academic researchers to test 
internet algorithms in the context of identifying racial discrimination.428  
It is unclear who could provide the external auditing in an EU context- a for profit 
certification company, a quasi-public corporation or a public sector body. Certainly 
it would require significant resources and technical expertise largely outside of the 
skill set of the European Supervisory authorities. Ultimately the introduction of the 
right to explanation has tremendous promise however the implementation in 
practice is likely to be incredibly difficult and resource intensive if it is to be 
effective. 
3 Privacy by design and default 
Privacy by design and default involves imbedding privacy into the design of the 
cyber architecture- preventative, proactive protection rather than remedial, 
reactive protection. The Regulation does not provide a detailed explanation of the 
principle however pseudonymisation is explicitly referred to.429  
Privacy by design and default is a shift to the technology itself protecting privacy. 
Consider location data, it can provide a detailed picture of a data subject- inferences 
can be made about where the data subject lives, works, eats and goes to the doctor. 
Health information can also be inferred from walking speed and frequency of fast 
food visits. As Big Data continues to develop so too will the inferences from location 
data. Many applications use location data to function, for example weather report 
applications. These applications could implement privacy by design and default by 
receiving a course location only. Instead of tracking the data subject to a few metres 
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the application could be designed to give a location to the nearest twenty 
kilometres- sacrificing minimal functionality for significant privacy gains.430 
Additionally when computers crash often data are collected for troubleshooting and 
diagnostics. If the crashes occur a few weeks apart the crashes are often 
unconnected, however if they occur a few hours apart then the first crash is more 
likely to be relevant for diagnosing the second. Consequently the troubleshooting 
application could be designed to change the computer’s unique identifier every day. 
In this way the application does not gain a long record about a single user but can 
still link crashes to each other if they occur in a similar time frame.431 This protects 
the user’s computer habits whilst still providing the troubleshooting application 
with sufficient data for diagnostics.  
Privacy by design and default can be an effective tool for protecting data subjects, 
particular those who are unsophisticated or young. However the focus in the 
Regulation on pseudonymisation and anonymisation is incredibly concerning.432 
Reidentification of pseudonymised or anonymised data will continue to occur-
particularly as hardware power and the richness of auxiliary information increase 
as discussed in section II(C)(2). This reidentification can produce significant privacy 
harms yet the anonymised data flows will not engage the requirements of the 
Regulation or adequacy. Privacy by design and default needs to have a much broader 
scope than anonymisation if it is to be effective.     
There is a fundamental accretion problem where intermediary reidentification 
steps can breed further success. Professors Narayanan and Schmatikov outline that 
any supposedly benign link between deidentified data is an issue as it reduces 
information entropy- shortening the inference chain required to connect a data 
subject from a given fact.433 Linking pseudonymised user records between Netflix 
ratings and IMDb databases may appear benign however further inferences can 
often be made. Perhaps if a data subject reused their username on another website 
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they could be linked to a Facebook profile, an online victim’s support community, or 
a website indulging indecorous tastes.434  
Privacy by design and default has the potential to significantly increase the 
requirements of adequate protection however it will require a broader 
implementation than the anonymisation and pseudonymisation suggested by the 
Regulation.  
B The Privacy Shield 
The Privacy Shield435 is the intended replacement to the Safe Harbour. The 
agreement was reached on the 2nd of February 2016 and represents the new 
framework for transborder data flows between the EU and the United States.436 The 
European Commission believes it will strengthen fundamental rights and restore 
Europeans’ trust in the digital economy.437 
The Privacy Shield intends to provide legal certainty for companies and “inject new 
momentum into the transatlantic partnership.”438 As part of this relationship, the 
Commission has stressed how the EU and the United States share common values, 
political and economic objectives and will “cooperate closely in the fight against 
common threats to our security.”439 This is a slightly forced narrative given the 
differences across the Atlantic in how privacy is conceptualised.  
Enthusiasm for the scheme is not widespread and controversy surrounds its 
implementation. Crucially the Art 29 WP has completed an examination of the 
protection provided by the Privacy Shield and has significant concerns not shared 
by the European Commission.  
The European Commission has praised some of the proposed benefits to the Privacy 
Shield including a new Ombudsman who will work with EU data subjects to check 
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whether relevant national security laws have been complied with.440 Additionally 
the European Commission has commended the passing of the United States 
Freedom Act which allegedly strengthens judicial oversight of mass surveillance and 
increases public transparency.441 This is a curious commendation given the position 
in EU law that generalised surveillance is illegal, regardless of whether there is 
oversight. However the Judicial Redress Act of 2015 has usefully extended the 
privacy protections available under the Privacy Act of 1974 to European citizens. 
From a dispute resolution perspective the Privacy Shield Panel establishes a new, 
last resort mechanism which can take binding action against companies operating 
under the Privacy Shield.442 Whilst the new avenues for redress, including the 
Ombudsman and Privacy Shield Panel, represent a deployment of resources to data 
protection enforcement, which is encouraging, the Art 29 WP is concerned they may 
be too complex and ineffective in practice for European data subjects.443 
Additionally there is concern the Ombudsman is not sufficiently independent for the 
requirements of EU law and has inadequate powers to fulfil its enforcement 
duties.444  
Disappointingly the Art 29 WP found the Privacy Shield, whilst an improvement 
over the Safe Harbour, lacks some key data protection principles required by EU law. 
For example the data retention principle was found to be ineffectively provided for 
by the Privacy Shield’s Purpose Limitation and Data Integrity principles. The Art 29 
WP is also concerned there is no requirement to delete data after the purpose for 
which it is processed has become obsolete.445 Additionally the specific protections 
against decisions based on automated means are unclear.446 This issue is likely to 
compound as the prevalence of algorithm based decision making continues to 
flourish. 
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There is also concern the nomenclature employed by the Privacy Shield is 
inconsistent and results in lacunas of protection. For example the principles are 
applicable when an organisation “stores, uses or discloses” personal data as 
opposed to the standard trigger of “processing.” This introduces uncertainty over 
whether components of processing such as collecting and deleting, which might not 
be contained in “stores, uses or discloses,” engage the obligations and liabilities of 
the scheme. Additionally whilst the scheme defines personal data as “data about an 
identified or identifiable individual,”447 for human resources data the principles only 
apply to “identified records” which appears to exclude the broader “identifiable” 
trigger.448  Overall the framework was found to have a considerable lack of clarity.449  
Annex VI to the Privacy Shield, a letter from the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, also provokes considerable concern. The Annex holds “Intelligence 
Community elements must collect bulk signals intelligence…to identify new or 
emerging threats and other vital national security information that is often hidden 
within the large and complex system of modern global communications.”450 Annex 
VI also specifies six purposes for which mass surveillance may take place, being: 
detecting and countering certain activities of foreign powers; counter-proliferation; 
counterterrorism; cybersecurity; detecting and countering threats to United States 
or allied armed forces; and combating transnational criminal threats.451 Mass 
surveillance is incompatible with EU law so it is alarming the Privacy Shield 
specifically outlines when it may take place. The Art 29 WP did commend the 
requirement for new adequacy decisions to examine access to personal data by 
national security and law enforcement agencies however this is little consolation if 
mass surveillance is allowed.  
Contrary to the assertions of the European Commission, considerable uncertainty 
remains over how the Privacy Shield will cope with the new standards of the 
Regulation. The Art 29 WP is particularly concerned with the impact of the right to 
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data portability and privacy by design and default, which are not included in the 
Privacy Shield. 452 Given how significant the additions are it is short sighted for the 
Privacy Shield to not address the new provisions. If the Privacy Shield does not 
implement the new standards then it will be more likely to be successfully 
challenged in the ECJ. 
If the Privacy Shield fails to attract businesses or is challenged in the ECJ it is 
probable that MCMs and BCRs will have to provide the legal mechanism for 
transborder flows between the United States and the EU. MCMs and BCRs are less 
desirable than full adequacy decisions as they create pockets of adequacy rather 
than securing a high level of protection throughout a full sector or country. Whilst 
they still provide adequate protection their narrowness makes them less efficient at 
spreading EU norms and they will likely require updating in light of the new 
requirements of the Regulation.  
Max Schrems has described the Privacy Shield as “ten layers of lipstick on a pig” and 
has indicated he and others are likely to challenge the Privacy Shield’s legality.453 
Additionally the National Supervisory Authorities are, under the Regulation, 
expressly given the power to suspend data flows to recipients in third countries.454 
This fractures the legal certainty for corporations looking for a continuous transfer 
of data through the Privacy Shield. Pro-privacy National Supervisory Authorities 
and groups such as Facebook-v-Europe could attack the Privacy Shield and prevent 
the data flows- especially in light of the violation to fundamental rights entailed by 
mass surveillance. Businesses will be unlikely to utilise the scheme if they believe it 
may be challenged and struck down. Ultimately the Privacy Shield must be seen as 
failing both its purposes- the promoting of the   digital economy and the protection 
of fundamental rights. It does not constitute adequate protection.  
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IX WHERE TO FROM HERE? 
This thesis opened with an account of how privacy was conceptualised in Europe 
and the United States. Optimistically I thought public opinion on mass surveillance 
could shift if the pro-privacy narrative could be massaged for each audience: for the 
United States- mass surveillance is an invasion into the private home and space by 
public authorities; for Europe- mass surveillance is an affront to personal dignity 
and autonomy. From this public opinion shift I thought pressure could be applied to 
legislatures to improve the standard and enforcement of adequate protection. 
However with the misperceptions of the benefits of mass surveillance and the 
overestimation of the terrorism harms I do not think public discourse will catalyse 
change in the short or medium term.  
The law is responding to perceptions of insecurity and public expectations of strong 
action against terrorism. Most of society relies on intuitive risk assessments where 
experience with unusual hazards comes from the news media455 which is 
problematic as there is a media fixation with horrific, unexpected crimes rather than 
mundane issues producing significantly greater harm. Such is the frenzied terrorism 
coverage that repeated media exposure to the Boston Marathon bombings was 
associated with higher acute stress than direct exposure-being at or near the 
bombsite when the explosion occurred.456  
Humans are ineffective at analysing the difference between a one in a million and a 
one in a thousand chance event. The inaccurate risk perception is amplified when 
there is a perceived lack of control, inequitable distribution of the risk and fatal 
consequences in the event the risk materialises. 457 It is a sad point that two days 
after the Boston Marathon bombing a fertiliser plant in Texas exploded killing five 
times as many people as died in Boston. The official investigation found the 
explosion “resulted from the failure of a company to take the necessary steps to 
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avert a preventable fire and explosion.”458 In 2015 work injuries in the United States 
resulted in more deaths than the equivalent of 1600 Boston Marathon bombings.459 
Legislation and political attention are following perceptions of harm rather than 
harm itself.  
As a partial solution I propose shifting the locus of discussion from mass surveillance 
and national security to data security. Data security concerns unauthorised 
destruction, alteration and disclosure of data as well as unauthorised access, 
including failing to gain explicit unambiguous consent. Moving the debate to the 
harms of data insecurity shifts the focus from terrorism issues to the economic and 
privacy costs of failing to secure data. The Regulation could play a strong role in 
raising data security through the requirements of the new provisions of the 
Regulation as well as through adequacy decisions.  
This new focus could indirectly undermine mass surveillance and appeal to 
corporations looking to reduce the costs of data insecurity. Professor Rascoff makes 
an important point when he notes ambition can be made to counteract ambition- 
technology firms pursuing their own interests can pressure the government to push 
back against a culture of surveillance. As American Civil Liberties Union lawyer Ben 
Wizner notes, “one of the great contributions that Snowden has made is to make 
some very powerful tech companies adverse to governments.”460 Technology 
companies could be encouraged by the Regulation’s provisions to design products 
and services with inbuilt protections for data security, making mass surveillance 
more difficult to undertake.  
A push for higher standards of data security is likely to be much more successful if 
it is presented in the interests of corporations as well as data subjects. Rascoff notes 
that although the corporate motivations for privacy may be “shallow” and 
“malleable,” in that they are economically driven, he notes the Snowden leaks have 
                                                        
458 “Chemical Safety Board Ongoing Investigation Emphasizes Lack of Protection for Communities 
at Risk from Ammonium Nitrate Storage Facilities; Finds Lack of Regulation at All Levels of 
Government” (22 April 2014) United States Chemical Safety Board <www.csb.org.gov>. 
459 Bureau of Labor Statistics “National Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries in 2015” (press 
release, 16 December 2016).  
460 Rascoff, above n 326, at 689.  
130 
 
“galvanised technology firms and allies to join longstanding sceptics of the 
surveillance state in putting pressure on the White House to resist the agenda of the 
intelligence bureaucracy.”461 NSA Director Admiral Michael Rogers, who also serves 
as Commander of the United States Cyber Command and Chief of Central Security 
Service, has noted the working relationship between some telecommunications and 
technology companies with the NSA may never return to what is was before 
Snowden’s leaks.462  
Whilst mass surveillance and national security are divisive issues, there is 
considerable public support for increased data security. Recent research by the Pew 
Research Centre shows the majority of United States citizens do not trust federal 
government and social media sites to protect their personal information. Indeed 64 
per cent of United States citizens are aware they have personally experienced a 
major personal data breach and over 40 per cent have experienced fraudulent 
charges on their credit cards.463  
A recent survey requested by the Director General for Home Affairs of the European 
Commission shows substantial concern over data security also exists in the EU.  Of 
the total respondents: 73 per cent were concerned their online personal information 
was not being kept secure by websites; 67 per cent were concerned their personal 
information was not being kept secure by public authorities; 89 per cent tried to 
avoid disclosing personal information online; and 85 per cent believed the risk of 
becoming a victim of cybercrime was increasing.464 In response to these beliefs the 
Regulation could set high standards for data security and require countries seeking 
adequacy decisions to reach these new standards. Whilst there has been political 
benefits to appearing tough on national security and terrorists, improving data 
security could be also be an incredibly popular political policy.  
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Widespread mistrust of data security could also catalyse data protection 
improvements by corporations looking to satisfy consumer demand, independent of 
political or regulatory pressure. However corporations are not homogenous. Some, 
such as Apple, receive a benefit from producing smartphones with high data 
protection standards. However others, such as Facebook, might lose revenue from 
greater data protection. For example if internet browsers automatically delete 
cookies before accessing Facebook, Facebook’s ability to sell targeted 
advertisements will be reduced. As a consequence of the heterogeneous nature of 
data controllers, regulatory action rather than market mechanisms are likely to be 
more effective at achieving widespread improvements.  
However there is an encouraging rise in the marketing of technological products 
resistant to data breaches and mass surveillance.465 This is a crucial change in 
consumer tastes. Rather than seeking data havens in a race to the bottom of data 
protection law, corporations may produce products and seek environments with 
high data protection to build trust in their businesses.466 Progressively more 
companies are also increasing financial and human resources to comply with data 
protection law and many are appointing specific data protection officers.467 Given 
the rise in value of data, operating in countries or sectors with improved data 
protection can increase firms’ reputations- business are increasingly aware of the 
negative publicity, legal expenses and loss of business following data breaches.  
Before looking at the specific solutions which could be implemented through the 
requirements of the Regulation and adequacy I will canvass what is at stake with 
data insecurity- the harms to individuals, businesses and governments if low levels 
of data security persist.  In particular intellectual privacy, discrimination and 
cybercrimes will be examined.  
 
                                                        
465 Rascoff, above n 326, at 664.  
466 Kuner, above n 3, at 104.  
467 At 150. 
132 
 
A Harms of Data Insecurity  
Data insecurity can threaten innovation by undermining the environment in which 
it flourishes- protected spaces where orthodoxies can be tackled and tinkered with. 
Professor Neil Richards uses the concept of “intellectual privacy.” It refers to the 
protected space in which ideas are created, debated, reworked and refined. Richards 
believes intellectual privacy allows experimentation with controversial and deviant 
ideas which can precipitate cultural and economic advance.468 However this project 
can be undermined by data insecurity. If people believe their unfinished beliefs and 
intellectual experiments can be watched and exposed then there is a chilling 
preference for the mainstream and accepted rather than the bold and controversial.  
As Professor Julie Cohen notes a society will “dampen and modulate behavioural 
variability” if it has “unchecked ascendancy of surveillance structures.” She believes 
such surveillance makes it impossible to maintain a “vibrant tradition of cultural and 
technical innovation.”469 Individuals may be less likely to engage with unpopular 
ideas or analyse controversial books and videos for fear of being profiled in a certain 
way. From a personal perspective I have certainly considered how my researching 
of terrorist attacks for this thesis could alter my online profile.  
Problematically data insecurity can also promote discrimination, by giving data 
controllers an increasing amount of data about data subjects. The personal data can 
be gained by tracking not explicitly consented to or even from illegally obtained 
databases of individuals exhibiting certain behaviours- such as online gambling. 
Treating different categories of people differently can appeal in some contexts, such 
as providing discounts to repeat customers. However other methods such as those 
employed by Target are less comfortable. By mining the data trail of shoppers Target 
could make inferences about whether or not a data subject was pregnant and market 
to them accordingly. Big Data analysts from Target admitted to targeting individuals 
experiencing the “chaotic exhaustion that accompanies the birth of a child” on the 
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basis that if they “buy diapers from us, they’re going to start buying everything else 
too.”470  
Commercial surveillance of data trails can track customers across the internet, 
allowing corporate interests to identify and nudge data subjects in positions of 
relative weakness. This has largely been through internet browsing on personal 
computers and smartphones however the “Internet of Things,” where appliances, 
cars and homes increasingly process personal data, will reduce the sphere of 
unobserved activity.471 Knowing when an individual is vulnerable and experiencing 
the vicissitudes of life allows corporations to manipulate and discriminate. 
Improved data security could reduce the amount of data available to data controllers 
and hence reduce the opportunities for discrimination.  
Blackmail is also a risk raised by data insecurity and can be perpetrated by both 
private and state actors. Gathering information for blackmail purposes has 
traditionally been costly, such as the extensive resources expended following Martin 
Luther King Jr and installing listening devices in his hotel rooms. 472 However in the 
internet era a huge portion of society are relatively low cost potential targets.  
Leaked documents from Edward Snowden about the operations of the Joint Threat 
Research Intelligence Group at the Government Communications Headquarters 
(GCHQ) in the United Kingdom are particularly alarming. Individuals and 
corporations have been blackmailed and manipulated by the taskforce. Under the 
taskforce’s instructions confidential information can be hacked then leaked, false 
material can be posted and attributed to the target, personal computers can be shut 
down, fake victim blog posts can be circulated and fake communications can be 
made to colleagues, neighbours, friends and business partners.473 Distressingly, the 
targets include people neither charged nor convicted of crimes, and include those 
merely suspected of online protest activity. These are incredible powers for a 
government to have. Improved data security could make these attacks more difficult 
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and expensive to carry out although it might be impossible to completely defend 
against them.  
From a commercial perspective, a recent study estimated cybercrime in the year 
ending September 2015 cost the EU USD 62,000,000,000, North America USD 
61,000,000,000 and Asia Pacific USD 81,000,000,000.474 However this may be a 
conservative estimate. Other reports expect annual data breaches to cost over USD 
2,000,000,000,000 globally by 2019.475 The World Economic Forum notes a 
significant portion of cybercrime is unobserved- particularly corporate espionage 
where unauthorised access to confidential data is difficult to detect.476 However 
large scale cyber-attacks are continuing to enter the public discourse, such as Yahoo 
having over 1,000,000,000 user accounts compromised in August of 2013.477 
It is worth noting governments also gain from raising their data security standards. 
There have been significant cybercrimes committed against public bodies. For 
example in 2015 the United States government agency in charge of background 
checks suffered a data breach. Names, addresses, family information, financial 
information, health information and social security information of more than 
22,000,000 federal workers were stolen. The background checks were required for 
intelligence and military officers to get secret and top secret clearances. More than 
a 1,000,000 fingerprints were also taken.478  
In 2014 the White House network was breached and the president’s schedule and 
emails were obtained. Additionally John Brennan, director of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, had his personal email compromised, allegedly by a high school 
                                                        
474 “Cyber-attacks cost global business over $300bn+ a year” (22 September 2015) Grant Thornton 
<www.grantthornton.global>. 
475 Steve Morgan “Cyber Crime Costs Projected To Reach $2 Trillion by 2019” (17 January 2016) 
Forbes <www.forbes.com>. 
476 Ibid.   
477 Sam Thielman “Yahoo hack: 1bn accounts compromised by biggest data breach in history” (15 
December 2016) The Guardian <www.theguardian.com>.   




student. Brennan’s emails contained sensitive documents including the 
questionnaire he filled in to receive his security clearance.479  
Former President Barack Obama even described cyber insecurity as “one of the most 
serious economic and national security challenges [the United States] face as a 
nation.”480 General Keith Alexander, former Director of the National Security Agency 
and Commander of the United States Cyber Command boldly went on record holding 
the United States ability to respond to a major cyber-attack as around a three out of 
ten.481  
Recently data insecurity has been firmly in the public national security discourse in 
the United States. Throughout the lead up to the 2016 United States election Hilary 
Clinton was severely criticised for using a private email server to handle classified, 
secret and top secret information.482 There is serious concern the server was not 
adequately protected from foreign agencies.  
Developing better data security for the public sector mitigates against these harms. 
However improved data security generally also benefits governments as it reduces 
the threat of bot net attacks. For example the cyber-attack on Estonia in 2007 which 
shut down banks, government communications and online media for around two 
weeks was conducted by a network of compromised computers controlled by 
attackers.483 If the standards of data security are raised across all of the European 
Economic Area, as well as internationally though adequacy, then this would reduce 
the efficacy of bot net attacks.  
Disappointingly governments may taper their enthusiasm for improved data 
security as new standards could undermine their ability to conduct mass 
surveillance. Nevertheless there are substantial economic and fundamental rights 
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benefits flowing from greater data security which could catalyse reform and gain 
support from the private sector. Crucially the emotionally charged debate over 
whether mass surveillance is necessary and proportionate to modern national 
security threats could be replaced by a pro-privacy and anti-cybercrime data 
security conversation.  
B Why Can Adequacy and the Regulation Assist?  
Art 25 of the Regulation requires, considering the nature, context, scope and 
purposes of processing, as well as the state of the art and cost of implementation, 
and risk of fundamental rights infringements, that the data controller and processor 
take appropriate technical and organisational measures to protect data by design 
and default.484 Additionally art 32(1) requires appropriate technical and 
organisational measures to be taken to ensure a level of security appropriate to the 
risks of processing.  
These articles provide a framework for a higher level of adequate protection 
through improved standards of data security. Nevertheless art 17 of the Directive 
required such technical and organisation measures to protect personal data but 
diverse measures were taken by different Member States resulting in varying 
protection.485 To provide harmonisation in the case of the Regulation, specific 
measures for achieving data security could be required rather than simply setting 
the goal of appropriate data security.  
Some may argue the market itself will appropriately respond to consumer demand 
for increased security. However Professor Ross Anderson believes a microeconomic 
analysis can challenge this position with perverse incentives, asymmetric 
information, liability dumping and externalities undermining data security in an 
unregulated market.  
Problems arise when a party in a position to secure a system is not the same party 
as the one who would suffer a security breach. For example in the United Kingdom 
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and Norway, the burden of proof in fraud against autoteller machines lies with the 
customer. On the contrary in the United States the burden falls with the bank. 
Unsurprisingly the banks in the United Kingdom and Norway were less effective in 
securing their systems against fraud.486  
In the case of a data breach, costs can be borne by customers and actors outside the 
attacked company. As a consequence a company may underinvest in the level of 
protection that is efficient from a societal viewpoint even if they have invested 
sufficiently to manage their internal exposure.487 For example an energy 
corporation might not consider the secondary costs borne by their customers in the 
event of a cyber-attack resulting in a black out. This can result in a level of protection 
below the societal optimum even if the energy company’s internal cost benefit 
analysis suggests the protection they have is efficient. This suggests regulating for a 
higher level of data security could increase total welfare.  
Distributed denial of service attacks- mobilising botnets to attack others- provide a 
sharp display of the Tragedy of the Commons issue. A company or an individual may 
pay USD 100 for software to prevent their computers from attack, but are unlikely 
to spend even a fraction of that amount to stop their computers being used as a 
vector to attack others.488 With cybersecurity, if one firm increases its defences, then 
that firm is less likely to be a vector for attacks on others and hence the overall 
security of cyberspace can rise. However cooperation is unlikely without external 
forces which suggests a strong role for regulatory intervention through adequacy 
and the Regulation outside of a purely market based solution.  
C What Specific Improvements Could Be Made?  
The requirement for a level of security appropriate to the risks of processing under 
art 32(1) refers to Codes of Conduct as a possible mechanism for achieving 
appropriate data security. The Codes of Conduct could outline specific 
organisational and technical measures to be taken to meet the requirements of the 
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Regulation. These measures could also be required for countries applying for 
adequacy decisions and the standards could be implemented into MCMs and BCRs 
to give wider penetration for the new, raised protections. I canvass several 
organisational and technical measures however with resource constraints it may 
well be the case that only a few are likely to be implemented.  
1 Organisational  
In order to appropriately mitigate data insecurity the risks needs to be analysed. 
However they are hard to quantify making it difficult to determine what standards 
could constitute adequate protection. The risks come in many forms including bot 
nets, exploit kits, spam, identity theft and fraud, social engineering exploits, as well 
as rogue processors operating outside data controllers’ instructions. Empirical 
analysis of cybercrime is difficult although it appears to be transitioning from 
individual specialists committing low volumes of crime to more costly crimes 
committed by organised groups as well as states.489  
Disappointingly a recent Australian survey found 43 per cent of respondents did not 
report data security incidents, predominantly due to a perception that no benefits 
would flow from reporting and a fear of negative publicity.490 Additionally a recent 
United States report estimated only 15 per cent of the nation’s internet fraud victims 
reported their incidents.491  
However compulsory reporting of incidents, funnelled through National 
Supervisory Authorities to the European Data Protection Board, could be a 
significant improvement for analysing and responding to the risks of data insecurity. 
Countries seeking adequacy could be required to join the scheme and those with 
adequacy could be required to sign up or lose their status. Professor Nathan Sales 
argues that data breaches could be conceptualised in a similar manner to public 
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health outbreaks with the collective good benefitting from mandatory timely 
reporting.492 The European Data Protection Board could form an informational 
“cyber CDC (centre for disease control)” style operation.493 They would receive 
threat reports, analyse the data for broader trends and release recommendations 
and alerts as required. Some companies might be hesitant to share vulnerability 
data- weaknesses that can be exploited to access a computer system. However there 
could be more success focusing on threat data (the types of malware circulating) 
and countermeasure data (how to prevent and combat infections).494 Crucially the 
releasing of statistics and reports by the European Data Protection Board could raise 
awareness of both the scale of cybercrime and the importance of data security.  
This scheme would work well with art 33 and 34 of the Regulation which require 
the data subject and relevant National Supervisory Authority to be notified when 
there is a data breach. If the CDC style reporting was not mandatory then there could 
be self-interested firms who would not submit. This could be dressed as a desire to 
avoid anti-trust liability495 but could also be due to reputational concerns or a desire 
to hold a tactical advantage- particularly if they believed their competitors would be 
vulnerable.496 However subsidies, tax credits and intellectual property rights in the 
cyber security information produced could provide positive incentives.497 
Additionally antitrust liability for exchanged cyber security information could be 
decided on a rule of reason approach rather than the per se approach. 
Threat reporting could operate at a governmental as well as at a corporate level. The 
European Coal and Steel Community, as the EU was first known, was for the 
economic benefit of participating Member States. However equally important, the 
supranational body placed the means of going to war, which at the time were coal 
and steel, beyond the exclusive control of individual Member States.498 There is a 
conceptual equivalence today in sharing cyber-attack and cyber defence data as they 
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constitute the means of cyberwar. If governments could be incentivised to 
participate in the threat sharing scheme then the quality of the threat reports could 
be expected to sharply rise. 
The public is aware of mass surveillance largely through the actions of individuals 
like Thomas Tamm, Edward Snowden and Chelsea Manning however global 
surveillance whistle-blowers have been aggressively targeted rather than protected. 
The European Data Protection Board could develop its own whistle-blower 
protection mechanism for both Member States and countries applying for adequacy. 
Whistleblowing mechanisms can be effective tools for rebalancing the information 
asymmetry between data subjects and controllers and could be a requirement for 
achieving adequate protection. 
Penetration testing could also play a role in improving data security information. It 
is the legal, authorised location and exploitation of vulnerabilities in computer 
systems in order to make those systems more secure. It moves beyond simply 
identification of threats and involves actual proof of concept attacks to prove issues 
exist.499 Penetration testing could be encouraged through subsidies, tax and 
insurance benefits or even required for data controllers in certain industries such 
as the energy sector. Countries or sectors looking to achieve adequacy could be 
informed their applications are more likely to be successful with an active 
penetration testing industry.  
The European Data Protection Board could also encourage the legal market for 
purchasing computer exploits or “bugs,” particularly concerning public sector 
systems. Firms such as Google and Microsoft pay tens of thousands of dollars in the 
private sector to individuals and hobbyists who find exploits. There is a thriving 
black market for these exploits however a legal market, perhaps with reputational 
awards, could encourage more people to sell their public sector exploits legally. 
Papers released by Edward Snowden suggest the NSA is spending USD 25,000,000 
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a year purchasing exploits, the EU could clearly have a purchasing system also.500 
There could be a requisite membership fee for the scheme, payable by Member 
States as well as countries looking to achieve adequacy, which could pooled and 
used to purchase the bugs.  
2 Technical 
As Professor Joel Reidenberg notes, information policy can be “embedded in 
network designs and standards”501 and Professor Lawrence Lessig famously 
declared “code is law,” referring to how the architecture of cyberspace, the code, can 
constrain behaviour.502 Their work is at the core of privacy by design and default. 
Rather than simply requiring the result of security, the Regulation could adopt 
Spain’s approach of providing specific measures required for achieving adequate 
protection through code and technical standards. However effective privacy by 
design and default techniques will differ across industries and contexts. Some 
baselines such as using up to data antivirus software and firewall protections have 
widespread application however others such as appropriate storage of biometric 
data will not. This makes it highly like that whilst certain baselines could be 
established, a more flexible and effective cyber building code will be sector specific. 
Like Lessig and Reidenberg, Professor Neal Katyal, has also argued in favour of 
minimum standards of data security design in the same way physical structures are 
subject to building codes.503 He draws a parallel between physical space being well 
lit and cyber space being open source. Just as lighting in physical space allows for 
more eyes to observe possible crime, open source programs harness a broad range 
of eyes which can examine code for vulnerabilities and evidence of past attacks.504 
However observers in cyberspace are not directly analogous to those in real space 
as only a portion of people can read source code. Katyal concludes that the context 
is crucial- whilst open source software improves security in many cases, under some 
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specific conditions involving highly specialised products, it can make it more 
vulnerable. 505 This shows the importance of having flexible codes across different 
sectors.  
Small businesses may require extra assistance to implement data security through 
privacy by design and default however they should not be exempt from the 
requirements. As Clay Calvery, director of cybersecurity at a private Virginia firm 
notes, smaller companies are easier to hack and are increasingly being targeted with 
ransomware which holds data hostage until money is paid. Indeed by some accounts 
the majority of all online attacks may be against small and midsize businesses.506  
Encryption is an obvious privacy by design and default technique which could 
become mandatory for positive adequacy findings. It involves the encoding of data 
in such a way that it cannot be accessed by anyone other than the party with the 
appropriate key or password. A study by the Ponemon Institute found it to be a 
reasonably low cost security measure with a positive return on investment.507 
Encryption is not a panacea however as it does not protect against misuse by the 
recipients who decrypt the data.508  
As discussed earlier coarse location data could also be made mandatory- instead of 
providing location data to the nearest few metres, new technologies could be 
redesigned to provide a less specific location, improving privacy without sacrificing 
efficacy. Location data can significantly reduce information entropy and hence can 
be instrumental in achieving unauthorised data access.  
Another privacy by design and default initiative could be the compulsory storing of 
biometric identifies in the technology under control of the data subject, such as 
smart cards or passports.509 This would remove the need to host the data in external 
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databases, such as those held by customs agencies, which if exploited could result in 
multiple data subjects having their personal data accessed.   
The National Supervisory Authorities and the European Data Protection Board 
would be wise, from a resource point of view, to encourage each sector to have 
significant participation in the development of the standards for adequate 
protection as occurred during the refining of the MCMs and BCRs. Other 
contributors could include the World Wide Web Consortium, an international 
community dedicated to developing web standards led by Tim Berners-Lee and 
Jeffrey Jaffe, and the International Telecommunication Union, an agency of the 
United Nations. The experience of those organisations in developing and 
coordinating technical standards on a global scale could be useful for the EU in 
developing data security standards at the EU level.  
Tailoring standards for specific sectors would likely be costly however a blanket 
approach may cause under protection in some sectors and waste resources in 
others. The health sector for example would likely benefit from a specific code given 
the particular privacy harms which can flow from health data breaches. For example 
access control protocols to minimise the number of health care professionals and 
administrators accessing specific data could be mandatory. Additionally patient 
names and personal identifiers could be kept separate from health status data as 
best as possible. As discussed earlier reidentification is still possible given modern 
techniques however pseudonymisation would make it more difficult.  
From an economic perspective critical infrastructure, including the energy sector, 
healthcare sector, water suppliers, transportation firms and financial service 
providers would require particularly high standards of privacy by design and 
default to ensure data security. A retailer operating in a competitive industry is 
likely to bear most of the cost of a cyber-attack as disappointed customers can take 
their custom elsewhere.510 However a customer living in a certain area may only be 
served by one utility company. Many critical infrastructure industries such as the 
telecommunications and energy sector operate in uncompetitive markets with high 
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start-up costs which act as significant barriers to entry for new firms. As a 
consequence many monopolistic, duopolistic and oligopolistic firms in these sectors 
face limited competition and threat of customer exit. If a power company is the only 
provider of energy to a town they face reduced incentive to increase cyber security 
as customers will not be able to quickly and easily redistribute their patronage 
following an attack. 511 This lack of competition combined with the attraction to 
criminals of critical infrastructure results in vulnerable underinvestment in 
cybersecurity.  
Critical infrastructure are also vital from a national security perspective. Having the 
ability to derail a nuclear power plant or cause a water processing plant to produce 
unsafe drinking water are serious threats. The physical effects flowing from data 
insecurity can be seen in the damage done to Iran’s nuclear program by the 
incredibly sophisticated Stuxnet worm. It is an uncomfortable thought to consider 
how many nuclear plants or other critical infrastructure operations might currently 
be vulnerable to attacks due to low levels of data security.  
It is important to note that regulating by design through sector based codes of 
conduct has significant transparency issues. This is particularly important given one 
of the core issues of mass surveillance is the lack of debate and normative consensus 
over its use. When regulation is achieved by code regulatees are denied the ability 
to make a self-conscious choice over how to act, with the regulators preferring 
control over autonomy and the moral project of honesty.512 If all communications 
are encrypted by default for example, privacy is likely to be improved. However the 
arguments over why personal data should be protected and the extent to which 
fundamental rights can be infringed for the pursuit of a public good might slowly be 
pushed to the background. They are important arguments which need ventilation.  
The competing political and legal values embedded in technology can be hidden with 
certain technological paths seen as natural over time. To mitigate this the European 
Data Protection Board, National Supervisory Authorities and Code of Conduct 
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contributors would have to protect the deliberative spaces where features of the 
code could be debated and revised. If elements of the EU cyber building code project 
were large, open source developments then this would bring the conversation to the 
public to some extent.  
There is an issue the cyber building codes will suffer regulatory disconnect as 
technologies develop. Drafting the codes in a technologically neutral manner may 
reduce this disconnect however it would likely come at a cost of specificity. 
Accordingly the sector based codes will likely have to be living documents, requiring 
substantial updating as new technologies develop.  
Whilst these suggestions for organisational and technical standards for compliance 
with the Regulation and adequacy require a phenomenal dedication of resources I 
believe this can be justified. First, by the extent of fundamental rights infringements 
germinating from data insecurity. Second, and perhaps more pragmatically, by 
looking at the accelerating financial costs of data insecurity and cybercrime. Thirdly, 
and indeterminately, by the secret yet undoubtedly significant investment required 
to develop and maintain the mass surveillance apparatus- funds which should be 











X CONCLUSION  
Adequacy under the Directive has failed.  
Few countries have achieved positive decisions. The Privacy Shield is riddled with 
uncertainty and expressly permits mass surveillance. The Safe Harbour was found 
invalid and BCRs and MCMs have been forced to provide small pockets of adequacy 
for transborder flows to continue.  
Fundamental rights to privacy and data protection have been undermined by 
ineffective enforcement and violated by PRISM. The EU has condemned mass 
surveillance by the NSA however New Zealand and Canada are also complicit yet 
maintain their adequacy status. Hypocrisy pervades with Member States themselves 
participating in mass surveillance. 
The EU was well aware of the Safe Harbour’s deficiencies yet it took an underfunded 
law student to bring the scheme to a conclusion.  
The internet remains a surveillance society saturated with commercial and state 
actors looking to render individuals transparent and predictable through mass 
surveillance. Adequacy has failed to provide shelter from these forces.  
My initial optimism of adequacy under the Directive has been corroded by the 
political and economic ends dominating privacy concerns. Whilst the European 
Commission has recently stated “the protection of personal data is non-negotiable 
in trade agreements” and “European data protection rules cannot be the subject of 
negotiations in a free trade agreement”513 in the very same document they admit 
adequacy decisions can “ease trade negotiations.”514 Indeed the “overall political 
relationship” and “extent of the EU’s (actual or potential) commercial 
relations….including the existence of a free trade agreement or ongoing negotiations 
with a third country” are seen as criteria to take into account when deciding which 
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countries an adequacy dialogue should be pursued with.515 Adequacy is a political 
and economic bargaining tool. The reality is a commercial one, with Japan and Korea 
followed by Mercosur currently designated as appropriate targets.516  
Whilst Schrems is a landmark case it cannot be seen as a strong defence of adequacy. 
Schrems’ narrow ambit does not provide long term protection against private and 
public threats. Crucially there was insufficient analysis of the necessity and 
proportionality of mass surveillance. The essentially equivalent, high level of 
protection of fundamental rights discussed in the case is diluted by the technical 
grounds on which the Safe Harbour was found invalid.  
Disappointingly Schrems follows the uncomfortable trend, shown through the PNR 
saga, of the ECJ withholding fundamental rights analysis in favour of technical, 
procedural points of law. The implication is that economic and political concerns 
dominate the strong protection of personal data.  
Additionally the authority of the EU is being undermined by the threat of Member 
State exit and limited protection has been provided by the vague scope of the 
fundamental rights to privacy and data protection under the Charter.  
With mass surveillance ongoing and the emergence of Big Data it is a crucial period 
for data protection law internationally. I am concerned the direction of surveillance, 
from targeted to generalised, could be normalised without action. National security 
legislation can create new norms of acceptable state action with fundamental rights 
progressively eroded over time.517 This process, or “ratchet effect,” can repeat as 
changed norms represent new baselines on which to expand further national 
security powers. The process can be difficult to counter as politicians are hesitant to 
repeal national security legislation. The political repercussions if a repeal was 
followed by an attack could be career ending.518 However the lack of benefits and 
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extensive violation of fundamental rights mean mass surveillance must be 
challenged. The new standard of adequacy under the Regulation could be a vital 
participant in this conversation.  
With effective implementation and enforcement the Regulation’s provisions on 
algorithmic accountability, data breach reporting and privacy by design and default 
have substantial promise to improve the standard of adequate protection. I believe 
a focus on data security, through sector based cyber building codes, will result in 
higher standards of data protection being promulgated throughout the EU and 
beyond.  
This thesis has canvassed tensions: between an Anglo-American conception of 
privacy and a European conception of privacy; between the economic interests of 
data controllers and the privacy of data subjects; between national security and 
human rights; between innovation nurtured in a protected sphere and innovation 
from unrestricted processing of personal data. These tensions pull and push and 
twist the technological path we all walk which is neither fixed nor natural. These 
issues have bubbled below the public discourse without obvious resolution or 
widespread contribution.  
Speaking to me via private email Max Schrems made a few significant points which 
are appropriate to share. First, for most people, it may be private actors misusing 
data which will have the most effect- failing to get a loan due to illegitimate 
considerations in the algorithmic process for example. However for opposition 
groups- the media, whistle-blowers, dissenters- as he describes, the “core pillars of 
our democratic society,” it is the government surveillance which is the bigger 
problem.519 However he notes they are not distinct threats but a partnership with 
previously unknown surveillance powers. For adequacy to have meaning this 
partnership must be fractured.  
Given the lack of resources dedicated to data protection in the EU it is important to 
consider what key areas should be prioritised- it is unlikely many of my suggestions 
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will be implemented. In light of this I believe compulsory encryption and 
compulsory algorithm auditing are vital areas of focus. Encryption would 
undermine mass surveillance and algorithm auditing could curtail discrimination in 
automated decisions. They could give meaning to adequacy. 
Ultimately adequacy has the potential to redirect the technological path we all walk. 
It is to this path I want to make my final point.  
The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) recently fast tracked 
their Wide-Field Infrared Survey Telescope (WFIST) project. The telescope has a 
field of vision one hundred times that of the Hubble telescope and will assist in 
measuring the expansion of the universe. The WFIST will also look for planets 
outside Earth’s solar system and research the nature of dark energy.520  
The WFIST was an unexpected donation from the National Reconnaissance Office 
(NRO), the United States Government Agency in charge of spy satellites.521 The 
telescope had been conducting surveillance from the skies. The NRO’s new 
technology has made the WFIST obsolete.  
NASA, which struggles for funding yet drives science and innovation on a truly global 
scale, is using technology hand-me-downs from the United States spying apparatus. 
Mass surveillance is a tragic misallocation of our technological resources. Instead of 
looking out to discover the wonders of the universe we have been spying within.  
Privacy is not protected. The economy is not advanced.  
This is not adequate. This cannot continue.  
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